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Abstract 
In the midst of the age of enlightenment, revolution and political enfranchisement, the 
English radical movement of the 1790s was an important mobiliser of lower class, 
liberal and radical thought, education, association, complaint and support for socio-
political reform. However, the British government of William Pitt the Younger, 
operating in the wake of the cataclysmic French Revolution, viewed this movement first 
with suspicion and eventually outright hostility, and, perceiving in it a threat to the 
interests, institutions and prosperity of both the ruling elite and the wider nation, sought 
the means to repress radicalism and remove it from the active political sphere. My task 
in this thesis, in contributing both to the fields of security studies and the socio-political 
history of 1790s England, is to analyse how this was done by applying the recently 
conceived concept of ‘securitization’, as constructed by the Copenhagen School, to the 
government’s attempts to identify and combat radicalism as a threat to national security. 
In doing so I seek to enrich our understanding of how and why the government chose to 
utilise particular strategies, actions and discourses in its ultimately successful attempts 
to securitize and temporarily suppress radicalism, and to explore how these measures 
facilitated, shaped, improved, enlarged and in turn were influenced by the means of 
security governance employed by the state to monitor, investigate, prosecute, denigrate 
and repress radicalism and other perceived threats to national security. Complimentary 
to this I explore the radical reaction to the government’s securitization, particularly the 
resulting enhanced and reshaped use of the state’s security and surveillance services, 
and the effect this was believed to have on British society, liberty, governance and 
values. Finally I aim to assess the utility of the securitization framework as a tool for 
analysing historical and contemporary security issues in a domestic state-based context. 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is my own work containing, to the best of my knowledge and belief, no 
material published or written by another person except as referred to in the text. 
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Introduction 
‘It is often in the name of cultural integrity, as well as social stability and national 
security, that democratic reforms based on human rights are resisted by authoritarian 
governments.’1 – Aung San Suu Kyi, 1994  
The desire for security is one of the most fundamental aspects of human nature, a need 
that seeks fulfilment in all areas of life, be they personal, financial, social or political. 
As Hobbes wrote, the primary motivator for people to forgo their complete 
independence and come together to form groups of mutual interest under a 
governmental structure ‘is nothing else but the security of a man’s person, in his life, 
and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it’.2 Complete individual 
freedom is sacrificed in the interests of profiting from the collective strength, benefits 
and security of the group. Any grouping together of people will involve politics, and as 
Dillon argues all politics is in essence the ‘politics of security’, attempting to fulfil and 
maintain the fundamental reason for coming together in the first place. This has 
remained a truism of government throughout the ages, until, in our modern era, we 
beheld a world in which  
security became the predicate upon which the architectonic political discourses of modernity 
were constructed; upon which the vernacular architecture of modern political power, 
exemplified in the State, was based; and from which the institutions and practices of modern 
(inter)national politics, including modern democratic politics, ultimately seek to derive their 
grounding and foundational legitimacy.
3    
The first and foremost aim of any modern state government is to maintain national 
security, defending the state from external enemies and preserving peace, order and 
prosperity within. This is crucial to its right to rule and recognition as a legitimate 
member of the international order. Yet it is axiomatic that maintaining national security 
                                                         
1
 Aung San Suu Kyi, ‘Empowerment for a Culture of Peace and Development’, in Freedom from Fear 
and other writings, New Ed., London, Penguin Books, 2010, p. 264. N.B. All spelling, grammar and 
punctuation in quotes utilised in this work has been retained as in the original sources, uncorrected and 
unmarked. 
2
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or, The Matter, Form, and Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiastical and 
Civil, London, Andrew Crooke, 1651, p. 66. 
3
 Michael Dillon, Politics of Security, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 12-13. 
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will inevitably involve infringement upon and potential threats to the individual security 
and liberty of a state’s citizens. The need to uphold the law, detect security threats, 
maintain domestic harmony and garner the resources necessary to defend against 
potential enemies are all important duties of state. However they also carry inherent 
risks to the individual and are liable to be misused and exploited in the interests of 
government and/or a ruling elite. As Suu Kyi has stated, the very necessity and 
importance of national security, stability and integrity makes them eminently suitable 
devices for justifying actions that threaten and infringe upon the very things they claim 
to protect. History abounds with abuses of liberty, rights and security carried out by 
governments upon the pretext of defending national security. Conflicts have inevitably 
arisen between the security needs of state and citizen, nation and sub-group, national 
sovereignty and the global community. Therefore security is a hotly debated topic, as 
people of all stripes seek to provide opinions on security’s place and use in society. 
These issues lie at the heart of this thesis. I aim here to explore debates over who is 
responsible for security, what is to be secured, how it is be secured, what is to be 
considered a likely and/or acceptable threat to security, how security issues are to be 
identified and analysed, and what impact the response to such matters can have upon a 
society and the citizens who comprise it. Security remains a vital component of our 
daily lives, state policy and international relations. As an oft-contested subjective entity 
that exists as much in the realm of individual and collective consciousness as in reality, 
it is an important, vibrant and rewarding area of research. While securities, threats and 
vulnerabilities can be measured and assessed as concrete tangible elements, we can also 
study the manner in which these elements are created, interpreted, debated, acquired, 
exchanged, relinquished, addressed, attacked, guarded, and utilised in advancing 
particular arguments, aims, policies and needs.  A better understanding of the rhetoric 
and reasoning underpinning state security policy, the methods employed in protecting 
and enforcing national security, and the impact of these policies and methods upon 
society, is crucial in improving our ability to understand, assess, critique and develop 
present and future security-related stratagems and institutions and their impact upon 
individual security, rights and liberties. Examining historical aspects of security, be they 
cases in international relations, or studies of domestic security as undertaken here, is an 
effective means of achieving this.   
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As noted above, my focus in this thesis is on national security in a domestic context – 
on the means of maintaining the sovereignty, internal security, order and institutions of 
the state against predominantly internal threats. While some aspects of domestic 
security policy are relatively straightforward and generally accepted, others are heavily 
disputed, and as such this is an area fraught with difficulty, competing interests, debate, 
ideology, rhetoric, prejudice, repression and violence. In our modern state system 
governments are responsible for deciding and implementing security policy. However, 
in most states the rulers cannot act completely on their own initiative, but must persuade 
a significant proportion of their people that their actions regarding security are 
necessary, justified and effective. The Copenhagen School has provided us with a 
means of examining the methods by which a particular actor identifies a threat to 
security and proposes actions deemed necessary to ward against and defeat that threat. 
This process is called “securitization”, and while it is only a recent invention as a 
conceptual method of analysis, it is proposed here that it is highly useful in 
understanding, critiquing and learning from historical security issues and events.
4
 My 
task here is to explore one particular securitization case – that made in 1790s Great 
Britain by the government of William Pitt the Younger against the political movement 
and ideology of radicalism. 
A Radical Awakening 
In the wake of the American and especially the French Revolutions, there arose in 
Britain a new form of political radicalism. Emerging in 1791, radical ideology 
combined the British traditions of liberalism, Whiggism and constitutionalism with the 
Franco-American principles of rights, equality, republicanism and democracy. 
Radicalism was primarily a working and middle-class movement, politically active 
mostly in the form of public associations, mass meetings, later small clandestine 
societies and the publication of a staggering array of pamphlets, tracts, journals, 
newspapers, books and other works, outlining grievances with the current state of 
British society and outlining ideas for parliamentary, political, economic and social 
reform. As an off-shoot of sorts of liberalism, radicals formed an uneasy alliance with 
                                                         
4
 See Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. The American spelling of ‘securitization’ and ‘securitizing’ has been 
retained in this work in keeping with the spelling employed by the creators of the concept. 
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liberal reformers and Foxite Whigs, who shared some of their goals for reform but often 
balked at their more radical and far-reaching proposals.  
Radicalism was the first mass political movement in Britain targeted at, composed of 
and often led by working and lower-middle class people, spread throughout the country 
but concentrated particularly in industrial and commercial hubs like London, Sheffield, 
Manchester and Edinburgh. Their desire for reform and in some instances outright 
revolution, coupled with their sympathy for and connections with like-minded 
associations and political activists in France, Ireland and elsewhere, presented the Pitt 
government with a unique issue to address, one made all the more pressing and 
hazardous by the ongoing upheaval and violence in France, the state of war between 
that troubled country and Britain, and increasing unrest in Ireland. McCann argues that 
the 
French Revolution had demonstrated to the English ruling classes the precariousness of their 
privilege, and the need to police attempts within Britain to mobilize non-propertied classes in 
support of an extended franchise and parliamentary reform.
5 
The government, fearing the outbreak of a similar revolution in Britain, soon decided 
that radicalism presented an unacceptable risk to order and security, and set about 
pursuing the means to stamp it out. The story of the 1790s is therefore one of a clash 
between the interests of a ruling elite and a newly-politicised popular collective eager to 
enter and claim a place in the political realm and ensure the implementation of the 
reforms believed necessary to fulfil and protect their rights and liberties and improve 
their political representation and access to economic and social prosperity. This clash 
must be viewed and analysed as intrinsically linked with the wider struggle and conflict 
raging across contemporary Europe and North America between the forces of 
aristocracy, tradition and empire, and the new or revitalised concepts of democracy, 
popular sovereignty, natural rights and independence.
6
   
                                                         
5
 Andrew McCann, Cultural Politics in the 1790s: Literature, Radicalism and the Public Sphere, 
Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 1999, p. 59. 
6
 See Albert Goodwin, The Friends of Liberty: the English democratic movement in the age of the French 
Revolution, London, Hutchinson, 1979, passim; Jenny Graham, The Nation, The Law and The King: 
reform politics in England, 1789-1799, 2 vols., Oxford, University Press of America, 2000, passim; J. 
Ann Hone, For the Cause of Truth: radicalism in London 1796-1821, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982, pp. 
11-133; E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, New Ed., Harmondsworth, Penguin, 
1991, pp. 84-203 & 515-42; Roger Wells, Insurrection: the British experience, 1795-1803, Gloucester, A. 
Sutton, 1983, passim.  
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Aims and Means  
As discussed in the source review below, radicalism and the politics of 1790s Britain 
have been extensively studied by scholars hailing from a wide range of backgrounds 
and approaches. In particular, the government’s repression of radicalism has been 
studied and assessed by Goodwin, Thompson, Barrell, Mori, Emsley, Hone, Wells and 
others.
7
 In this area debates have centred around the real aims, intentions and actions of 
the radicals and their societies, and the nature, legitimacy and efficacy of the 
government’s measures in response to radicalism and related affairs in France and 
Ireland. I am primarily concerned with the latter, and seek to offer a new perspective by 
considering and emphasising the importance of security in understanding and analysing 
the government’s actions and the radical reaction to them. In such novel and intense 
circumstances, the Pitt government’s decision to securitize radicalism offers us a highly 
useful and interesting case study of a successful securitization carried out by a state’s 
rulers against elements of their own people. Pitt and his colleagues of course did not 
view their actions and policies as a ‘securitization’, nor did they seek to follow a 
predetermined model. Nonetheless I contend that deliberate attempts to make radicalism 
a security issue were a key component of ministerial efforts to negate and supress it, and 
therefore I believe that applying the securitization framework to this context will 
provide us with greater insight into the causes and effects of the government’s actions. 
To this end I will explore why the government chose to utilise particular discourses, 
dispositives, technologies and concepts in shaping and advancing its policies; ascertain 
why they were successful in this case; and consider what elements may be of general 
application and assistance in attempting a securitizing move. I will argue that the 
securitization of radicalism was an effective, congruous and generally well-applied 
means of achieving the government’s aims of eliminating active radicalism and 
justifying policies and actions deemed necessary for maintaining order and security. 
While it is not my intention to judge whether these actions and interpretations were 
justified or meritorious, a deeper understanding of the reasoning and motivations behind 
them will naturally be of assistance in debating this matter.  
Additionally, I seek to shed new light on how this securitization facilitated and in turn 
was developed by the state’s use of its security, surveillance and intelligence services, 
drawing and exploring connections between policy, information, structure and 
                                                         
7
 See the Sources and Literature review below for details on these works. 
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operations. In particular I will argue that securitization facilitated a restructuring, 
centralising and expanding of the existing security and intelligence apparatus, and 
examine how and why this occurred. To compliment this I will document and assess a 
relatively unexplored area of radical and liberal discourse – the response to state 
surveillance and investigation, particularly by means of ‘spies and informers’, and the 
alleged impact these operations would have on British society and state-citizen 
relations. In focusing on just one aspect of the ramifications and instruments of a 
securitization event, I hope through in-depth analysis to demonstrate and explain, at 
least in part, the impact that instances of securitization can have upon the institutions, 
operations and cultural norms of the society in question, and on the capacity of the 
allegedly threatening party to respond to and counteract the securitizing moves against 
it. Finally in the course of this study I aim to explore and advocate the effectiveness of 
securitization as a model for understanding, assessing and interpreting historical and 
contemporary security issues and responses in a domestic state context.  
This thesis is divided into four chapters, dealing in turn with the following topics: 
- the securitization of radicalism in 1790s Britain  
- the development of the state’s security and intelligence services and their 
deployment against radicalism  
- the radical and liberal response to and arguments against the government’s 
surveillance, investigation and repression of radical activities, and their alleged 
impact upon society, particularly regarding the use of ‘spies and informers’  
- a final chapter exploring my conclusions and the lessons to be drawn from these 
discussions 
The focus throughout is on affairs in England, but events in and examples from 
Scotland and Ireland are also referenced where they are of relevance and applicability to 
the English and/or security context.  
Sources and Literature  
Primary       
The UK National Archives contain a wide range of manuscript evidence relevant to the 
topics of intelligence, security and the repression of radicalism. Particularly useful are 
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the Home Office, Privy Council and Treasury Solicitor papers. The Home Office 
correspondence includes reports sent in by informers, magistrates, constables and post 
masters, as well as instructions, advice and acknowledgements sent by home office 
officials to these sources. The Scottish and Irish correspondence also contains letters 
from informers and correspondence between Home Office and local officials on matters 
pertaining to security and information collection. The Privy Council papers consist of 
evidence, testimonies and examinations concerning cases for treason and sedition 
investigated in the 1790s. Reports from spies and informers may also be found in the 
Treasury Solicitor’s papers, which contain further evidence relating to the state trials, 
including the briefs, plans and indictments of the prosecution in the trials of Thomas 
Hardy, John Horne Tooke, Arthur O’Connor, Edward Despard and others. Mention may 
also be made of the Foreign Office papers, particularly those from Hamburg, which 
provide additional insight into intelligence pertaining to domestic matters sent from 
officials stationed abroad.
8
 
Two further sources of interest are the papers of William Wickham held in Winchester 
and the published correspondence of the Viscount Castlereagh.
9
 Wickham was heavily 
involved in intelligence and security work throughout the 1790s and his papers provide 
interesting insight into his methods and correspondence. Castlereagh served as Chief 
Secretary for Ireland from 1798-1801 and his correspondence with Wickham and the 
Home Office is useful in analysing the manner in which intelligence and security 
activities were co-ordinated between England and Ireland during this period. In a 
similar vein the Irish Rebellion Papers in Dublin, while not directly relevant to English 
affairs, contain numerous reports and letters from informers, shedding considerable light 
on the manner and quality of their operations and information. These papers can be used 
to both complement and contrast the activities of their counterparts in England. The 
selected papers of the London Corresponding Society (LCS), edited and published by 
Mary Thale, also contain a wealth of spy reports and a myriad of LCS documents.
10
 
These allow us to further examine the quality of the information sent to the government 
by its spies, the activities of these informers within the society, and the manner  in 
                                                         
8
 For a full list of the archival and manuscript sources used in this work, see the bibliography. 
9
 Richard Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh, Second 
Marquess of Londonderry, vols. 1-2, ed. C. Vane, Marquess of Londonderry, London, Henry Colburn, 
1848. 
10
 Mary Thale, ed., Selections From The Papers Of The London Corresponding Society, 1792-1799, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
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which the LCS reacted to and attempted to deal with the threat and presence of spies in 
its midst.  
The recorded proceedings of the state trials and parliamentary debates of the 1790s 
contain ample evidence on the securitization of radicalism. The reports of the secret 
committees of both the Commons and the Lords on radicalism and treason were key 
components of the government’s securitizing move, heavily based on evidence obtained 
from informers and other sources of information. The nature and content of the reports 
demonstrates the manner in which the government sought to justify its actions in the 
interests of national security and conduct the propaganda war against radicalism by 
relying on and interpreting such evidence to its advantage. The debates in parliament 
surrounding these reports, the trials and the bills intended to curb the perceived radical 
threat likewise bear witness to the government’s methods and arguments and the Foxite 
opposition’s response questioning the reliability and efficacy of the government’s 
sources and actions. The trials represent another securitization battleground, fought out 
between the government and the radical/liberal defence, in which the issues of security, 
repression, surveillance and spies often took centre stage.
11
  
Contemporary newspapers are a valuable source of information on the securitization, 
repression and response to radicalism, the activities of spies and informers and the 
manner in which these issues were perceived and debated by various shades of political 
opinion. The majority of papers from the 1790s available in digital form were published 
in London, and while this unfortunately narrows their scope as sources of news and 
opinion, they nonetheless provide us with much useful material. Papers such as the 
Morning Chronicle, Morning Post, The Times, True Briton, Oracle and St James’s 
Chronicle provide us with news reports of arrests, trials, politics, parliamentary 
proceedings and investigations; opinion pieces and letters on the nature of radicalism 
and the use of spies; and published extracts and poems commenting on these topics. 
Newspapers therefore serve a dual function – they provide us both with information on 
historical events and a window into the opinions, perceptions, debates, prejudices and 
beliefs that characterised the period. 
                                                         
11
 See T. B. & T. J. Howell, eds., A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings For High 
Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors From The Earliest Period To The Year 1783, With Notes 
and Other Illustrations, and Continued From The Year 1783 To The Present Time (ST), vols. 22-28, 
London, Longman et al., 1817-20; The Parliamentary History of England, From The Earliest Period To 
The Year 1803 (PH), vols. 28-35, London, Longman et al., 1816-19.    
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The explosion in the publication of pamphlets, addresses, essays, lectures, speeches and 
cartoons in the early 1790s enables us to study in depth the political and social debate 
on all manner of issues, not least of which are the topics of security, sedition, 
surveillance, spies and informers. Radicals, liberals and loyalists were all keen to 
propagate and argue their views and refute those they disagreed with. These topics also 
feature in debates and arguments concerning a wide range of issues, from liberty and 
rights to reform, justice, morality and foreign affairs. Their prevalence demonstrates 
their importance and volatility in the period and provides us with several avenues from 
which to analyse their impact upon English society. While it is unfortunate that 
government repression significantly reduced the publication of pamphlets etc. post-
1795, this development is itself indicative of the impact of securitization, surveillance 
and repression upon the radical movement. Finally, another window into the 
liberal/radical mind is provided by published correspondence, such as the letters of the 
liberal young gentlemen William Pattisson, Thomas Amyot and Henry Crabb 
Robinson.
12
  
Secondary 
The history of 1790s Britain and Ireland may be found in a wide range of works, 
extending from the general to the highly specialised. The role of 1790s domestic British 
politics in the wider narratives of the French Revolution, the Enlightenment, and the 
Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars, and its connections both with earlier British political 
debates and the later struggles for reform and change in the nineteenth century, have 
ensured that this topic has received considerable attention from scholars of numerous 
backgrounds. Many scholars have found this to be a rewarding and instructive era on 
which to write, and in the last two centuries the history of the period has been 
approached from a variety of angles, ranging from broad historical narratives to works 
exploring particular political, social, military, legal, economic and clandestine aspects of 
this tumultuous and important decade.   
In considering the role and impact of domestic security and radical securitization in 
these momentous events, some of the general histories of 1790s radicalism have been 
particularly useful. Thompson’s The Making of the English Working Class begins with 
                                                         
12
 Penelope J. Corfield and Chris Evans, eds., Youth and Revolution in the 1790s: letters of William 
Pattisson, Thomas Amyot, and Henry Crabb Robinson, Far Thrupp, A. Sutton, 1996. 
 Securing the Nation 14 
 
 
an analysis of the rise of the working-class radical organisations in the 1790s.
13
 
Thompson documented the manner in which informers were used to penetrate and 
record the activities of these organisations, and the government’s response to what it 
increasingly perceived as the radical menace. He also briefly assessed the nature and 
motives of informers, their impact on the radical societies, and their utility to the 
government. Goodwin’s The Friends of Liberty offers a comprehensive survey of the 
history of 1790s British radicalism, documenting in detail the growth and ideology of 
the radical movement, the political and social debates, the reaction of the government, 
and the denouement at the end of the decade as the government moved to definitively 
stamp out the last embers of an increasingly desperate and dying struggle.
14
 More 
recently, Graham’s The Nation, The Law and The King: reform politics in England, 
1789-1799 has charted similar waters in great detail. In the course of their narratives 
both works comment extensively on the repression of radicalism, the role of spies and 
informers in surveillance, arrests, trials and propaganda, and the manner in which their 
use and supposed profligacy affected the actions, political debates and atmosphere of 
the period.
15
 Wells’ Insurrection: the British experience, 1795-1803 focuses on the 
insurrectionary challenges faced by the government in Britain and Ireland in the wake 
of the suppression and downfall of the popular reform movements in 1795.
16
  
A number of other publications may be cited that analyse the political and social events 
of the 1790s, the debates between government, loyalists, reformers and radicals, and the 
manner in which the government and its agents permeated ever deeper into public and 
private spheres of society. The place and role of security forms an integral part of these 
discussions. Attention is drawn here to the works of Barrell, Black, Dozier, Ehrman, 
                                                         
13
 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class. 
14
 Goodwin, The Friends of Liberty. 
15
 Graham, The Nation, The Law and The King. 
16
 Wells, Insurrection. 
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Elliott, Evans, Goodrich, McCann, Mori, Royle, Stafford and Wagner.
17
 Also 
noteworthy is Habermas’ classic account of the bourgeois public sphere in The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.
18
 The effect of loyalist activities and 
arguments upon public opinion has been examined in articles by Gilmartin, Ginter, Mori 
and Philp.
19
 Another particularly important work is Barrell’s Imagining the King’s 
Death, which comprehensively covers the treason trials of the early 1790s.
20
 While his 
primary aim was to demonstrate the manner in which the government attempted to 
construct and utilise a new interpretation of treason, he also covered many other aspects 
of the trials and associated proceedings in great depth. This included the government’s 
attempts to securitize radicalism and the use of evidence from government spies in the 
witness box and parliamentary reports.  
The British government’s security and intelligence services and their use in response to 
the radical threat have been most closely analysed by Durey, Wells, Emsley, Poole, 
Hone and Bartlett. Arguments in this area tend to revolve around the effectiveness of 
the government’s information-gathering and investigative methods, the quality of its 
analysis, the depth and accuracy of its knowledge, and the structure and motivations of 
the services responsible for these tasks. Opinions on these matters are vital in 
determining whether one views the government’s actions as being either unduly 
repressive or justified. Emsley’s important article ‘The home office and its sources of 
                                                         
17
 John Barrell, The Spirit of Despotism: invasions of privacy in the 1790s, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2006; Eugene Black, The Association: British Extraparliamentary Political Organization 1769-
1793, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963; Robert R. Dozier, For King, Constitution and 
Country: The English Loyalists and the French Revolution, Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 
1983; John Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, 3 vols., London, Constable and Company Limited, 1983; 
Marianne Elliott, Partners in Revolution: the United Irishmen and France, New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1982; Chris Evans, Debating the Revolution: Britain in the 1790s, London, I. B. Tauris, 2006; 
Amanda Goodrich, Debating England’s Aristocracy in the 1790s: Pamphlets, Polemics and Political 
Ideas, Woodbridge, The Boydell Press, 2005; McCann, Cultural Politics in the 1790s; Jennifer Mori, 
William Pitt and the French Revolution 1785-1795, Edinburgh, Keele University Press, 1997; Edward 
Royle and James Walvin, English Radicals and Reformers, 1760-1848, Lexington, University Press of 
Kentucky, 1982; William Stafford, Socialism, Radicalism and Nostalgia: social criticism in Britain, 
1775-1830, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987; Corinna Wagner, ‘Domestic Invasions: John 
Thelwall and the Exploitation of Privacy’, in Steve Poole, ed., John Thelwall: Radical Romantic and 
Acquitted Felon, London, Pickering & Chatto, 2009, pp. 95-106. 
18
 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, English Translation by Thomas Burger, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1989. 
19
 Kevin Gilmartin, ‘In the Theatre of Counterrevolution: Loyalist Association and Conservative Opinion 
in the 1790s’, Journal of British Studies, vol. 41, no. 3 (2002), pp. 291-328; Donald E. Ginter, ‘The 
Loyalist Association Movement of 1792-93 and British Public Opinion’, The Historical Journal, vol. 9, 
no. 2 (1966), pp. 179-90; Jennifer Mori, ‘Languages of Loyalism: Patriotism, Nationhood and the State in 
the 1790s’, English Historical Review, vol. 118, no. 475 (2003), pp. 33-58; Mark Philp, ‘Vulgar 
Conservatism, 1792-3’, English Historical Review, vol. 110, no. 435 (1995), pp. 42-69. 
20
 John Barrell, Imagining the King’s Death: figurative treason, fantasies of regicide, 1793-1796, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2000. 
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information and investigation 1791-1801’ was the first attempt to assess this topic in 
depth.
21
 While he was successful in identifying many informers and the manner in 
which their information was received by the Home Office, he did not document the 
changes and improvements made by the government to the structure and methods of the 
secret service during this time. In a series of articles, Emsley and Poole have debated 
the nature and extent of the government’s repression and persecution of radicalism. 
Emsley provided detailed information and figures on prosecutions and the effects of 
legislation, but Poole demonstrated that figures in themselves may not be a reliable 
guide to government policy or the true state of affairs.
22
 Hone pursued the matter 
further, investigating the reliability of the government’s sources and the manner in 
which it analysed and interpreted information in order to determine the reasoning and 
justifications for its actions in the struggle against London-based radicalism.
23
 In 
Insurrection Wells devoted a chapter to an analysis of the structure, operations and 
growth of the British secret service during the 1790s, and his narrative of the 
insurrectionary threats faced by the government contains a detailed analysis of the 
security services at work.  
Bartlett’s Revolutionary Dublin, 1795-1801, in addition to publishing the letters of the 
Irish informer Francis Higgins, investigates and assesses the Irish side of intelligence 
work and its close links with British security, exploring the government’s use of 
numerous informers and other sources of information in this period and Dublin Castle’s 
ability to analyse their copious information and turn it into accurate and usable 
intelligence.
24
 Durey, in a number of articles and his ground-breaking book William 
Wickham, Master Spy, charted the development of the British secret service and for the 
first time documented the creation of the Inner Office in 1797-98 as the nerve centre of 
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British intelligence.
25
 Durey assessed the manner in which this office acquired and 
analysed information and co-ordinated the surveillance of and actions against suspected 
rebels in both Britain and Ireland from 1798-1802. Mention may also be made in this 
regard of the work of Sparrow. While her primary focus was on the international 
activities of British agents, particularly concerning France, her work also touches on the 
domestic security role of the Alien Office and the important connections between 
domestic and international intelligence.
26
 Other works noteworthy for matters pertaining 
to information collection include Nelson’s The Home Office, 1782-1801, Higgs’ The 
Information State in England and Ellis’ The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century.27 
The role of the informer in eighteenth-century British criminal law and law enforcement 
has been discussed in works by Hay, King, McLynn, Radzinowicz and Winslow.
28
 On a 
more general level Cobb has analysed the mentality, motivations and reliability of 
informers both as sources of information and a means of law enforcement in The Police 
and the People: French Popular Protest 1789-1820.
29
 
Scottish radicalism has until recently received far less attention than affairs in England. 
The definitive account remains Meikle’s informative but dated Scotland and the French 
Revolution, first published in 1912.
30
 However scholars can now benefit from 
McFarland’s Ireland and Scotland in the Age of Revolution: planting the green bough, 
examining the links between Irish and Scottish radicalism; and Harris’ The Scottish 
People and the French Revolution, documenting 1790s popular political culture, the rise 
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of radicalism, and the government/loyalist response.
31
 These works explore government 
security and surveillance in Scotland and the important role of local radicalism – 
significant and highly-relevant counterparts to affairs south of the border. 
The analytical framework of securitization was developed by Buzan, Wæver and de 
Wilde in Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Buzan’s earlier work People, States 
& Fear is also very useful in examining aspects of domestic and national security in a 
state context.
32
 A method for analysing historical instances of securitization has recently 
been proposed by de Graaf and Zwierlein in ‘Historicizing Security – Entering the 
Conspiracy Dispositive’.33 Zwierlein has undertaken similar work in developing a new 
definition of conspiracy theory useful for historical research. At this stage the historical 
application of the securitization framework in a state context is in its infancy, especially 
as applied to pre twentieth-century cases. Two early forays into this field may be found 
in the works of de Graaf and Cubitt.
34
 Finally, the practice of denunciation, being a key 
component of conspiracy and securitizing discourses, has been explored in an 
eighteenth-century context by Lucas in ‘The Theory and Practice of Denunciation in the 
French Revolution’.35 
This thesis, in emphasising and discussing the importance and role of security in the 
history of 1790s Britain, seeks to contribute both to the realm of security studies, 
particularly in exploring the applicability and utility of the securitization model in 
domestic and historical contexts, the political, social and psychological uses and impact 
of security, and the operation of the Pitt government’s security services; and to the 
fields of eighteenth-century studies and the socio-political history of England, in its 
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attempts to expand our understanding of 1790s politics, law enforcement, state 
administration, literature, ideologies, beliefs and social relations.    
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Chapter One – The Securitization of Radicalism 
‘A conspiracy clearly proved need not be traced distinctly through all its branches and 
ramifications; its existence, and the danger to the state from its nature, are sufficient to 
justify the temporary suspension of that security for our liberty, which by law is our 
birth-right.’36 – The Earl of Carnarvon on the proposed suspension of habeas corpus, 
22 May 1794  
Securitization is the process, as identified and developed by Buzan, Wæver and de 
Wilde of the Copenhagen School, in which a securitizing actor performs a securitizing 
move/s by identifying an existential threat/s to a referent object/s. The move will result 
in a successful securitization if the alleged threat or threatening party (referred to as the 
‘referent subject’) is accepted as posing a legitimate threat to the survival of a referent 
object deemed worthy of extraordinary protection by a significant proportion of the 
relevant audience, justifying its priority status and the implementation of emergency 
measures against it that go above and beyond the rules normally binding the securitizing 
actor. A referent object can be physical, institutional or conceptual; essentially anything 
capable of being undermined, damaged or destroyed by external agency. Buzan et al. 
describe securitization as the ‘intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with 
a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects’.37 It is a speech act, the 
subjective ‘process of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered 
and collectively responded to as a threat’.38 The securitizing actor must construct a 
plausible narrative of object, threat, priority and solution, understandable and acceptable 
to an audience who recognise the authority of the actor to make and act upon such 
claims. Securitization is thus a step above politicisation, in which an issue is made ‘part 
of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations’39 that are 
debated and decided upon in an at least partially open forum. By contrast, a securitized 
issue is defined as one that requires ‘emergency measures and justifying actions outside 
the normal bounds of political procedure’, prioritised above the ‘normal haggling of 
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politics’.40 The securitizing actor has claimed for themselves ‘a need for and a right to 
treat it by extraordinary means’ in order to ensure the elimination of the threat and the 
survival of the referent object.
41
 
The discourses, institutions, propositions and measures enacted by the securitizing actor 
may be thought of as a security dispositive, created and utilised as a means of achieving 
a successful securitization and control over security issues. Foucault introduced the 
notion of a dispositive as ‘a way to grasp and analyze the ensemble of power relations at 
distinct historical moments, without reducing them to a fully coherent or overarching 
structure’.42 De Graaf and Zwierlein argue that in the realm of security, the concept of a 
dispositive ‘makes it possible to identify and analyze the precise interplay of security’s 
administrative practices, legal categorizations, cultural imaginations, and calculative 
technologies’.43 De Graaf also notes that ‘Security rests on the basis of certain images of 
danger, threat and destruction’ that need to be communicated to the relevant audience in 
an effective and persuasive manner.
44
 A security dispositive is essentially a power play, 
enacted within and utilising particular webs of knowledge, imagery and interrelations in 
order to attach a sense of urgency, legitimacy and immediacy to a particular threat 
situation. As Cubitt notes, it therefore ‘reinforces the notions of urgency and response 
that are implicit in the concept of securitization itself’.45 Furthermore, as de Graaf and 
Zwierlein explain, a security dispositive provides a means of legitimising present action 
against an anticipated future event by ‘mobilizing governmental practices and expert 
knowledge and implementing exceptional measures’ to define, securitize and eliminate 
a perceived threat. In doing so the securitizing actor may utilise new and existing 
“technologies of imagination” – ‘techniques…aimed at visualizing and representing the 
threat’ – and ‘new modes of security governance’.46 We may seek to explore and 
determine how the use of the former legitimises and shapes the latter.
47
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In each securitizing move, one must identify the following elements: the referent object, 
securitizing actor, referent subject, the “terrain” of the threat i.e. the areas in which the 
threat is carried out (politics, war, economics etc.), the audience of the actor, and the 
means by which the actor makes their securitizing move.
48
 One may also identify and 
consider functional actors – parties apart from the securitizing actor who have an impact 
upon the course and outcome of the securitizing move. The move will be followed by 
whatever extraordinary measures are deemed necessary to defeat the existential threat. 
Buzan et al. state that ‘A successful securitization thus has three components (or steps): 
existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free 
of rules.’49 How did these elements and components manifest themselves in the 
securitization of radicalism in 1790s Britain? Radicalism, both as an active political 
ideology and in the form of radical societies such as the LCS and the Society for 
Constitutional Information, was identified by the Pitt government as an existential threat 
to the sovereignty and status of the British king, parliament and constitution, by means 
of alleged intentions and plans to carry out alternations to the composition and powers 
of parliament, executive and monarch by force, potential violence and a usurpation of 
sovereignty. In government eyes this constituted a political threat to what Buzan et al. 
describe as ‘the internal legitimacy’ of the state, ‘which relates primarily to ideologies 
and other constitutive ideas and issues defining the state’ – in this case the sovereignty 
of parliament and its right to govern in conjunction with the executive as a legitimate 
representative of the British people of behalf of the ruling monarch.
50
 
This securitizing move was performed by the government to convince parliament and 
the British people of the need to use extreme and novel measures to eradicate the radical 
threat and protect the political status quo. Tomline asserts that Pitt  
perceived the formidable co-operation of internal and external enemies; but the former could 
not be effectually resisted, except by open war, nor the latter without coercive acts of the 
legislature: and he was persuaded, that neither of these expedients, exclusive to his own 
earnest wish not to have recourse to them, would be approved, till their necessity was obvious 
and incontestable.
51 
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In the climate and context of the time the Prime Minister and his colleagues believed 
that radicalism was dangerous, French republicanism intolerable and reform 
inadvisable. However, they could not act immediately or without justification, for as 
Mori states, ‘Public opinion was not a force the Pitt ministry could afford to ignore’, 
and ministers recognised that ‘all government was based on consent’. They therefore set 
about convincing the public and their fellow MPs of the need for war and repression, by 
securitizing and linking the French and domestic threats ‘as a diabolical menace to the 
laws, liberties and constitution of Britain.’52 Loyalists and their associations played an 
important role as functional actors assisting the government in constructing and carrying 
out its securitizing move and exercising the measures deemed necessary to tackle the 
radical threat, while liberal groups such as the Foxite Society of the Friends of the 
People acted as a counterweight, championing the need for reform, supporting the right 
of radicals to associate, debate, speak and publish, and fighting against the 
government’s securitizing move, security measures and repression. The press, sharply 
divided between loyalist and radical firms sandwiching a more neutral assortment of 
papers, also played an active political and ideological role. The securitizing move was 
followed by a number of extraordinary actions the government used to monitor, 
investigate and repress radicalism and remove the threat it was believed to pose to 
national security. The nature of some of these measures and their effects on British 
society shall be discussed below.  
The government had to overcome a number of obstacles in order to make a successful 
securitizing move. English radicalism had existed since at least the mid eighteenth 
century and the age of John Wilkes, and one may perhaps trace it even further back in 
time. Regardless of its origins, by the 1790s it had unquestionably existed for some time 
as a legal and legitimate political and social ideology. Popular, religious and political 
dissent also had strong traditions on English soil. Furthermore, the cause its leaders 
advanced most strongly in public – a moderate parliamentary reform – had earlier been 
espoused by Pitt himself and his colleague the Duke of Richmond, and was widely 
perceived as a legitimate political argument that challenged particular details of the 
current state/government system and policies rather than threatening the constitutional 
structure as a whole. Therefore, it would require a concerted and systematic effort by 
the government in order to turn radicalism into an intolerable existential threat to an 
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independent referent object worthy of especial protection in the eyes of public and 
parliamentary opinion.
53
  
Senior ministers and their supporters employed a number of means to facilitate their 
securitizing move. None of these were in themselves new or revolutionary, but the 
identification of a radical conspiracy as a new form of plot played a significant part in 
distinguishing it from past actions and movements and in emphasising the seriousness, 
novelty and extreme danger of the threat, necessitating original and innovative means to 
combat it. The securitization of radicalism did not occur quickly or instantaneously, but 
rather grew and solidified over the course of the 1790s, marching in step with the 
perceived nature of the threat and efforts to supress it, until any form of public or 
association radicalism was effectively outlawed in 1799, with public opinion being 
largely either supportive of or indifferent to its demise. Even though particular themes 
and tactics persisted throughout the decade, the attempts to securitize and repress 
radicalism increased at particular moments punctuated by occasional lulls in activity or 
backward steps, as circumstances and policy dictated. Other (mostly loyalist) actors also 
suggested, dictated or even proposed contrary securitizing tactics, sometimes resulting 
in muddles, confusion and contradiction. While radicalism as a whole eventually came 
to be identified as an existential threat, at different times certain components of radical 
activity were focused on and given increased emphasis as being particularly hazardous 
to national security. The means employed by the government and its allies to securitize 
and combat radicalism were therefore akin to tools from a tool kit, each being employed 
or redeployed at what was judged to be the appropriate moment to achieve the 
government’s aims, with some proving more effective than others. Let us now analyse 
in greater detail what they were.      
A Traitorous Conspiracy 
Conspiracy theories were exceedingly common in the late eighteenth century. Zwierlein 
has defined a conspiracy theory as  
a narrative of a possible past and present, often also containing elements of future predictions, 
claiming to be the true representation of the past and present which is built from some 
commonly accepted elements…and some elements that are not proven but possible and that 
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bridge the gaps of knowledge and understanding concerning a certain event or sequence of 
events…A conspiracy theory mostly has an explanatory, an appellative-affective and a 
denunciation function.
54
 
As a means of establishing causation and agency, such theories are well-suited to the 
securitizing task of subjectively identifying, interpreting and denouncing a particular 
threat within a defined political and social space. As Cubitt notes, ‘discourses evoking 
them [conspiracies] can articulate the ways in which security actors and security 
agencies view the world around them’.55 De Graaf explores the means of applying these 
discourses to threat identification, stating that while a subversive and hidden plot may 
be ‘beyond measurement’ and concrete description, it is ‘not beyond imagination, and 
here the technologies of imagination [come] in useful as means of rendering the 
imagined threat as positively measurable and visible as possible’. Conspiracy theories 
provide a familiar and flexible framework with which to achieve such visualisation, 
facilitating the ‘expansion of the referent subject, referent object, and the rise of new 
modes of governance’.56 Barrell has also written persuasively on the importance of 
imagination in 1790s political, legal and literary discourses, and of its role in 
constructing the modern form of treason by means of ‘newfangled doctrines, the flights 
of figurative imagination, of “wit and invention”’.57 
Furthermore, as de Graaf and Zwierlein point out, ‘“Conspiracy” functions as a 
legitimizing argument, serving and fuelling a larger, encompassing security regime’ and 
being ‘used as a political weapon by political entrepreneurs claiming to speak for a 
threatened majority’.58 Yet it can also simultaneously delegitimise a target subject by 
accusing it of harbouring or acting as a cover for a hidden group or plot with illicit 
intentions. Conspiracy thinking can therefore serve to identify, describe, denounce and 
delegitimise a subject in the eyes of a relevant audience. Lucas argues that in such 
situations denunciation is ‘harnessed as an instrument of state power’.59 Conspiracy 
theory is therefore a highly effective means of interpreting a scenario in a manner that 
empowers the actor and facilitates a securitizing move and the use of extraordinary 
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measures against a target threat. In our period Revolutionary France abounded with 
claims of plots, conspiracies and counter-conspiracies, and claims of secret international 
or foreign conspiracies were commonly cited as being responsible for all-manner of 
significant events in Europe and North America. Wood has argued that the 
Enlightenment commitment to reason, the certainty of cause and effect and the 
centrality of human agency often manifested itself in ‘attributing events to the concerted 
designs of willful individuals’.60 Wells posits that ‘Secrecy, intrigue and conspiracy are 
the hallmarks of politics in the [seventeen] nineties’, and indeed Britons were far from 
immune from conspiracy paranoia, especially when it came to fears over the presence 
and activities of foreigners, subversives and Catholics.
61
 Senior politicians like Pitt and 
his fellow ministers were equally prone to belief in hidden plots and forces, especially if 
they conformed with their own preconceived notions and perceptions. It is thus no 
surprise to find that the government believed in a grand radical conspiracy, or that it was 
perceived as a suitable means of securitizing radicalism and legitimating the use of 
extraordinary means to crush it.
62
 
Right from the beginnings of the popular radical societies in 1792, the government 
suspected that they harboured republican and Jacobin principles and secretly targeted 
the overthrow of the entire constitution. In April 1792 Henry Dundas alluded to ‘the 
Associations of Sheffield and Manchester, whose avowed object was nothing less than 
the overthrow of the constitution’, while in May 1793 Pitt argued that in some radical 
societies ‘French principles were inculcated as the true standard of political belief, and 
the example of the French government proposed as a worthy object of imitation’.63 Lord 
Grenville claimed that ‘The hands of Government must be strengthened if the country is 
to be saved’, yet for the time being the government was content to rely on loyalism, 
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surveillance, deterrence and an active campaign against sedition, rather than target the 
societies directly.
64
  
However, by spring 1794, the government and the Portland Whigs had become 
convinced that radical efforts and principles had now been channelled into a detailed 
and systematic conspiracy to subvert the constitution, claim all sovereignty and 
authority for themselves, and reform the legislature and executive by force. The 
government and the parliamentary secret committees appointed to investigate radical 
activities claimed that the public radical platform of limited parliamentary reform in line 
with that outlined by the Duke of Richmond in 1782 was a mask for this traitorous 
conspiracy, involving all the major radical societies in Britain. Radicalism was turned 
from an extra-parliamentary and loosely-organised political movement into a systematic 
and concerted plot to overthrow the state; an existential threat with reform as a mask 
and liberals and moderates as its duped and therefore delegitimised allies, incapable of 
acting without propagating (wittingly or otherwise) the treasonous radical cause. The 
First Report from the Committee of Secrecy of the House of Commons respecting 
Seditious Practices informed the Commons that the radical societies had been plotting 
‘a traitorous conspiracy for the subversion of the established laws and constitution, and 
the introduction of that system of anarchy and confusion which has fatally prevailed in 
France’. This conspiracy was ‘every day more and more likely to affect the internal 
peace and security of these kingdoms, and to require, in the most urgent manner, the 
immediate and vigilant attention of parliament’.65 It was the intention of the societies ‘to 
supersede the House of Commons in its representative capacity, and to assume to itself 
all the functions and powers of a national legislature’ by means of a convention formed 
for the purpose of ‘making their resolutions to be law’.66 
Pitt argued that ‘the pretext of reform, under which they masked their purpose, was far 
from being the true object of their intentions’, which they had contemplated ‘from the 
very outset’. But ‘Happily for this country’ they had ‘thrown off the mask just when the 
bulk of the nation unanimously were uniting with government in vigilance and care for 
its protection’. The planned convention was not to be a collection of radical 
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‘representatives…for the accomplishment of particular legal purposes’ but was to 
represent ‘the whole body of the people of England’ and ‘exercise legislative and 
judicial capacities’, usurping the power of parliament.67 Edmund Burke darkly warned 
that 
Parliamentary reform was the pretext for all the sedition that had been sown for many years in 
this country. But the real object in view…was nothing more nor less than the usurpation, and, 
in the end, the plunder, of the state. This was parliamentary reform; and for this purpose, 
whole classes of the working people of the country were to be jacobinized!
68
 
William Windham concurred, arguing that it was ‘plain as the sun’ that the societies’ 
declared support for reform was simply a mask ‘for their real intention of a total 
annihilation of all property, constitution, and religion’.69 The implications of such 
arguments were clear – it was obvious to anyone who looked closely that the radicals 
intended subversion, usurpation and the full implementation of French principles, and 
only those who allowed themselves to be duped by the conspiracy, either from 
incompetence or a secret support for the radical cause, could fail to see this.  
The conspiracy theory’s adaptability and fear-factor maintained its usefulness as a 
securitizing force throughout the 1790s. In May 1794 it was used to justify the arrest of 
Hardy and his colleagues on a charge of treason for their part in planning the imminent 
insurrection. Habeas corpus was suspended to facilitate their ongoing detainment and 
investigation. Government MPs and alarmist Whigs lined up to support these measures 
and their necessity for preserving national security. Pitt himself stated that there was 
‘not one moment to be lost in arming the executive power with those additional means, 
which might be sufficient effectually to stop the farther progress’ of the radical plans. 
Therefore it was necessary ‘to enact a temporary suspension of the Habeas Corpus 
laws’.70 What point was there in maintaining this particular part of the constitution, he 
argued, if the whole constitution should otherwise be destroyed? Burke did not deny 
that ‘Habeas Corpus was unquestionably one of our most invaluable securities; but in 
times of great emergency, even that must be given up temporarily with a view to the 
preservation of the whole’.71 Canning thundered that ‘extraordinary measures required 
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extraordinary powers for their suppression’, while William Young argued that ‘we had 
to deal with men of dangerous and desperate characters. When Cicero suppressed the 
conspiracy of Catiline, he was obliged to step beyond the strict letter of the law’. It was 
the ‘duty of the House’ to do likewise.72 
Later in the year Hardy, Horne Tooke and John Thelwall were tried for high treason. 
The prosecutions, along with the many others for sedition and treason, were not only 
attempts to punish, detain and silence radical agitators, but were themselves aspects of 
the government’s securitizing move. The very sight of radical leaders in court was 
designed to alert the public and produce the evidence as to the supposedly dangerous 
and criminal plans and principles of radicalism, further justifying the need to combat it 
by extraordinary measures. The Attorney-General John Scott claimed that the primary 
reason for prosecuting the defendants for treason rather than a lesser charge was ‘the 
great object of satisfying the country and making them aware of their danger’. For ‘It 
appeared to me to be more essential to securing the public safety that the whole of their 
transactions should be published, than that any of these Individuals should be 
convicted.’73 Despite the acquittal of all the accused, Pitt was convinced that the 
evidence produced at the trials nonetheless proved the conspiracy
74
 and  
had a strong effect upon the public. When that immense mass of matter was laid open, and the 
real designs of these societies developed, it served to open the eyes of the unwary, to check the 
incautious, and to deter the timid.
75
 
He maintained that with this support ‘The circumstances of the time demanded that a 
discretionary power should be given to ministers’, to continue to pursue the conspiracy 
and protect the ‘public safety’, for by a judicious use of such power the people would 
‘be happily rescued from all the dangers that assailed them’.76 
Furthermore, the continuing conspiracy was posited as necessitating the Two Acts of 
1795, as it allowed the government to connect radical mass meetings with apparent 
violence against the king (on 29 October 1795), subversion of the public towards 
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rebellion, and a new “modern” species of treason77, thus demonstrating the need to ban 
such meetings, increase state power, surveillance and vigilance, and add a new form of 
treason to the statute books.
78
 Canning claimed that   
there was an intimate connexion between the proceedings at Copenhagen-house [the last 
public mass radical meeting], and the disgraceful outrage which followed. An attempt had 
been made against the king, and a hand bill was circulated on the practice of “king-
killing”…If the attack on the sovereign immediately followed the circulation of such 
abominable doctrine, he did not see how the connexion could be discredited.
79
 
A Narrative of the Insults Offered to the King argued that ‘the machinations of foreign 
enemies’, combined with indigenous ‘preparations to inflame the public mind’, had 
inspired the attack. Radical leaders, whose plans were ‘laid with a sagacity worthy of a 
better cause’, had taken advantage of  
the distress of the moment, of the fever of the times, with a shrewd promptitude, that shews, 
however despicable the common herd may be with respect to their abilities or importance, they 
are in the hands of men who know well how to set their talents, such as they are, in motion, 
and while they skulk secure, thrust them on to acts of treason and desperation.
80
 
 
The new republican treason allegedly found a fruitful breeding ground in public 
meetings and the agitation of contempt for king, constitution and parliament.
81
 William 
Pulteney warned against the dangers of ‘inflammatory assemblies where sedition was 
copiously dealt out to the multitude’, leading them astray by their ‘ignorance’ and 
imbibing of ‘insidious poison’. The MP argued that ‘If treason and sedition were afloat, 
the current ought to be stopped; and if the laws already in force were inadequate, some 
regulation ought to be made to save every thing dear to Englishmen.’82 Windham 
strongly agreed, arguing that the country stood near a ‘dreadful precipice’, necessitating 
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ministers to ‘exert a vigour beyond the law, as exercised in ordinary times and under 
ordinary circumstances’. Or perhaps the times rather required ‘stronger laws, and the 
exertion of more efficacious means to put those laws in execution’.83 The True Briton 
likewise advocated  
the adoption of decisive measures for the Suppression of those unlawful Meetings and 
Societies, in which such disaffection originates, as the only effectual means of eradicating an 
evil, which threatens the very existence of Civil Society.  
It was imperative that the ‘Magistracy...from the highest to the lowest, should be called 
forth into immediate and effectual exertion’ to ensure ‘the security of our Persons, our 
Property, and of every thing valuable in Society’ by shutting up ‘those infamous 
Schools of Treason and Sedition’ who desire ‘to corrupt the minds of the rising 
generation’, so that ‘the torrent of their poisonous Principles may, as far as possible, be 
prevented from extending its destructive rage’.84 
Finally in 1798-99, in the wake of the United Irish Rebellion and the discovery of a 
definite clandestine plot to instigate an insurrection on British soil, the conspiracy 
theory was used to paint the United movement as being merely the latest radical attempt 
to secure the aim they had sought since the beginning – the ‘entire overthrow of the 
British constitution…and the erection of a democratic republic’.85 As Arthur Young had 
warned, driving the radical movement underground had only made ‘resistance a 
question of prudence, though not of morality’.86 The conspiracy had simply changed 
form, not substance. The Anti-Jacobin asserted that the verdict against James Coigly in 
May 1798 had ‘settled for ever the question so long agitated between the opposite 
Political Parties in this Country’. For the ‘condemnation of one man for conspiring 
against his Country, does incontrovertibly establish the existence of the Conspiracy’. In 
the loyalist mind, individual guilt was proof of a wider conspiracy, while individual 
innocence merely bespoke a lack of evidence against that one individual. The verdict 
demonstrated that parliament had ‘been justified in confiding extraordinary powers to 
the EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT of the Country’ and showed that ‘the EXECUTIVE 
GOVERNMENT, in the active and necessary use of those extraordinary powers’ was 
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acting with ‘the conviction, and the support of the great mass of the People’.87 The case 
and associated evidence therefore justified the government’s earlier acts of repression 
and securitization and reinforced the people’s support for its past and present actions, 
for as the Earl of Liverpool claimed it was now undoubted that ‘the measures of security 
which Parliament adopted to frustrate [radical] designs, were loudly called for, by the 
atrocious and desperate attempts of the most daring and flagitious traitors’.88       
Via the evidence obtained from the Maidstone trial, British and Irish intelligence and 
despairing Irish radicals, British domestic radicalism was linked to rebellion, violence 
and invasion in Ireland, clandestine and open French aggression, and unified republican 
collusion.
89
 The 1799 Report from the Committee of Secrecy of the House of Commons 
informed parliament that  
your committee have found the clearest proofs of a systematic design, long since adopted and 
acted upon in France, in conjunction with domestic traitors, and pursued up to the present with 
unabated perseverance, to overturn the laws, constitution, and government, and every existing 
establishment…both in Great Britain and Ireland, as well as to dissolve the connexion between 
the two kingdoms, so necessary to the security and prosperity of both…The most effectual 
engine employed for this purpose, has been the institution of political societies, of a nature and 
description before unknown in any country, and inconsistent with public tranquillity, and with 
the existence of regular government.
90
 
As Goodwin states, the report speciously 
analysed the whole evolution of the radical movement in Britain since the early 1790s as if it 
had always been the clandestine, treasonable and republican conspiracy that it only became on 
the eve of its dissolution.
91
 
This allowed the government to extend the conspiracy in time and space and securitize 
radicalism as the vehicle for a single ongoing grand design to subvert the British Isles 
and assist the French invasion of Britain and/or Ireland – an existential threat whose 
ongoing existence was intolerable in any form. The effect of the report on public and 
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parliamentary opinion was clearly at the forefront of the minds of its composers, for one 
of the briefs attached to its supporting documentation notes that ‘The nature and extent 
of these extracts to be regulated by the manner in which the committee is composed, 
and the greater or less degree of alarm that the Cabinet would wish to create.’92 
Wickham admitted to Castlereagh that the report was intended ‘to explain the state of 
things, in a manner that must draw the attention of the public as well to a sense of the 
general danger as to the means of preventing it’.93 These means were swiftly identified. 
It was the committee’s  
unanimous opinion, that the system of secret societies…cannot be suffered to exist in these 
kingdoms, compatibly with the safety of their government, and constitution, and with their 
security against foreign force and domestic treason.
94
 
Pitt duly proclaimed that, being ‘in a contest for every consideration that is most 
valuable to us’, it was now necessary to ban the radical societies outright and re-suspend 
habeas corpus.
95
 This was done with little opposition. Graham concludes that ‘the effect 
of the government’s legislation and prosecutions in 1799, was, for a time at least, to 
silence almost altogether the voice of political dissent’.96        
The government’s theory was a wonderfully malleable and effective tool for 
securitizing radicalism. The claimed existence of a grand secret conspiracy allowed the 
government to paper over any deficiencies in its evidence, either by pointing to the 
certainty and inevitable direction of the conspiracy and its principles as a whole – as 
Mori states, by equating ‘community of spirit with a confederacy of purpose’ – or by 
using the careful secrecy of radical preparations as an excuse for the state’s inability to 
procure information on particular aspects of their operations.
97
 After the treason trials, 
Scott maintained that ‘he was convinced that a conspiracy had existed, and did still 
exist’, for the ‘numbers concerned, their characters and dispositions, were sufficient 
evidence, that there was a combination of the most dangerous tendency’.98 After the 
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mass meetings and attack on the king of 1795, Thomas Powys made a similar 
assumption, stating in the Commons that  
the House had not, it was true, nor need it have, specific evidence of the treasonable designs of 
the meetings. The notoriety alone was enough to justify the legislature in resorting to strong 
regulations, to prevent the consequences that might arise from such inflammatory 
assemblies.
99
  
Whatever doubts they may have harboured in private, many loyalists were publicly 
adamant that the nature and existence of the conspiracy was plain on the record of the 
evidence presented at the treason trials. John Bowles argued that such confirmation was 
obtainable  
not by attending to the impulse of vague suspicion, or to the suggestions of general alarm; not 
even by listening merely to the fatherly admonition of a gracious and affecting Prince, or to 
the wise and seasonable measures of a vigilant Legislature; but by pursuing a body of proof, 
regularly brought forward in the face of day, and submitted to severest scrutiny of public 
examination.
100
 
There was no need nor cause for the government to dissemble, misdirect and speculate, 
reasoned Bowles, when the proof was there for all to see. As for secrecy, at Hardy’s 
trial Chief Justice Eyre informed the jury that ‘though multitudes are made parties to 
these proceedings, there is every reason in the world to believe, that but few are 
engaged in the depth of the project’, implying a commitment to secrecy that both 
pointed towards conspiracy and explained the difficulty of proving it.
101
 The 1799 
Commons report explained that the societies’ ‘principle of secrecy, generally enforced 
by unlawful oaths…peculiarly fits them for the most desperate enterprizes’ while at the 
same time providing ‘an obvious tendency to elude detection…and to defeat legal 
enquiry’.102 
Loyalists could also allege the existence of the “hidden hand” of French Jacobins and 
republicans that either directed, supported or inspired British radical operations, on the 
mere premise that their interpretation of the conspiracy indicated this must be the case, 
even though the supporting evidence was circumstantial at best. Pitt certainly believed 
in this external assistance, for as Mori states in his view  
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The remarkable outward cohesion of the parliamentary reform movement during the 1790s 
could only be put down to an external agency. The British public did not, thought Pitt, behave 
under normal conditions with such determination and consistency. Radical unity could only be 
a product of French aid.
103
 
This perception, that the “lower orders” were incapable of independent action or orderly 
political activity without direction and assistance from some higher or foreign power, 
was common in government and loyalist circles, forming a key aspect of the conspiracy 
theory and securitizing move. Pitt described the societies as a ‘jacobin army’ and 
alleged that   
The conduct of the French, in all its circumstances, bore a peculiar application to this country; 
it presented the fruits opening, in due season, the legitimate offspring of those trees, under the 
specious pretext of liberty, planted against this country and its allies.
104
 
Furthermore, the presence of so many French émigrés in England ostensibly fleeing the 
Revolution was deeply suspected by loyalists as being a means for republicans to 
secretly enter and operate in the country. In January 1793 The Times had praised the 
immediate impact of the pending Aliens Act, noting that London was now ‘cleared of 
hundreds of the French vermin who came hither to breed rebellion and assassination’.105 
In the Lords Loughborough likewise praised the act for addressing the presence of 
foreigners who ‘came hither for the purpose of, and who were active in doing all they 
could to create confusion’.106 The Home Office certainly viewed these aliens as a grave 
security threat, necessitating urgent measures, with Sir Evan Nepean once commenting 
that   
in the performance of this service some steps may be necessary to be taken not exactly 
justifiable by Law, but it times like the present, when dangerous incendiaries are daily 
resorting to this Country, avowedly with mischievous intentions, it is not necessary to be very 
nice.
107
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The evidence of French collusion unearthed in 1798 was spuriously seized upon as 
proof that these earlier insinuations and rumours had been correct. 
The conspiracy was therefore used to make the facts fit the government argument, rather 
than the other way around. Barrell argues that the secret committees could interpret the 
statements of the radical societies 
as having only one “possible purpose”, as proving “strongly and unequivocally” a design to 
overthrow the constitution, only because it had begun by assuming what it was appointed to 
prove. The argument was back to front: the committee claimed to establish that the intentions 
of the SCI were revolutionary on the grounds that the society had adopted the doctrines of 
Paine and the French Convention; in fact it was arguing that because its intentions were 
revolutionary the SCI…must have adopted those doctrines. By starting from this assumption, 
the reports of the Commons’ committee were imagining – at least in part – the conspiracy they 
claimed to have discovered.
108
 
By viewing the societies’ plans, statements and intentions through the lens of the 
conspiracy, the committees were assigning them an interpretation and composition that 
naturally conformed to the matrix of the government’s theory. This method was far 
from impartial and accurate, but it certainly benefited the government’s efforts to prove 
and publicise the traitorous plot. It also allowed ministers to attribute a cohesiveness and 
unity of purpose to the radical movement, allegedly from its very beginnings, which 
simply did not exist. By the end of the decade, the 1799 secret committee report went so 
far as to assert that  
The extent and uniformity of this systematic conspiracy, are equally striking. The formation 
and structure of all these societies, in this country, in Ireland, and on the continent, are similar; 
their views and principles are the same, as well as the means which they employ to extend 
their influence. A continued intercourse and concert has been maintained from their first origin 
to the present moment…
109
 
In this way radicalism could be identified, targeted, denounced and securitized as one 
comprehensive block, rather than having to allow that particular radicals, ideas, 
societies or forms of radicalism may be more or less tolerable and reasonable.  
Conspiracy thinking formed a key part of government attempts to distance 1790s 
radicalism from earlier British antecedents, and to divorce it from the more acceptable 
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and debatable cause of reform, while simultaneously doing great damage to this cause 
and the liberals who supported it. This was viewed as advantageous by a government 
that regarded any parliamentary reform as inadvisable in the current climate and valued 
any means of discrediting the Foxite opposition. The government could minimise its 
need to properly consider and debate popular grievances and political/state deficiencies 
by maximising the conspiratorial threat. Even moderate reform was deemed unwise 
simply because, as Pitt said, it would be impossible to achieve a ‘separation of the 
friends of moderate reform and the determined enemies of the constitution’. There was 
therefore a grave ‘danger of introducing an evil of much greater magnitude than that 
which we are now desirous to repair’. The Prime Minister claimed that a reform would 
neither improve the lot of the people nor satisfy the radicals, for ‘Those men who treat 
parliament as an usurpation, and monarchy as an invasion of the rights of man, would 
not receive a reform which was not the recognition of their right’.110 Reform was 
therefore not a cause any loyal citizen should champion. Some loyalists even argued 
that any form of proactive political opposition was disloyal and dangerous at a time of 
national emergency, with Loughborough advising that any actions calculated to 
diminish confidence in the government would ‘increase the danger with which the 
country was threatened’. Rather it was necessary for all parties to ‘unite in their efforts 
to preserve our glorious Constitution’, for any divisions were ill-advised ‘when the 
enemy were at the gate, and some of them within the citadel’.111    
The government claimed that even if some radicals were moderate men who genuinely 
supported legal reform, and regardless of whether a few individuals like Thomas 
Walker, Hardy and Thelwall were acquitted of the charges against them, radicalism 
remained a dangerous and intolerable threat because it propagated and harboured a 
treasonous despicable plot that was greater than the sum or participation of any one part. 
Scott, smarting from his defeats in the trials, told the Commons that ‘it was by no means 
necessary that any of the individuals accused of treason, should have been convicted, in 
order to justify parliament’ in suspending habeas corpus. For that decision rested upon 
‘the existence of a conspiracy’, this being ‘a subject upon which parliament was fully 
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competent to decide for itself’, as it had indeed done before the trials.112 The loyalist 
pamphlet Treason Triumphant advised the government that  
The conspiracy being implicitly admitted, it is your immediate duty to prevent the profligate 
and unprincipled…from executing their horrid designs. The late acquittals have served only to 
inflame their hopes and increase their presumption.
113
 
James Adair argued that from the written evidence alone it was ‘impossible than any 
individual could doubt of the existence of a treasonable conspiracy’, an opinion shared 
by many of his conservative colleagues.
114
 Bowles castigated the defence counsel 
Thomas Erskine for taking advantage of ‘the unavoidable prolixity and complication of 
the case, arising out of the nature and extent of the Conspiracy, which it was necessary 
to unfold’ and condemned him for attempting 
to convince the Jury that a Conspiracy against the Monarchy had no real existence, although it 
had been strictly investigated, and solemnly affirmed by both Houses of Parliament…and 
although every man in the kingdom in his heart believes, that if the plans and designs which 
were charged and proved to have constituted that Conspiracy had been effected, the 
Government would have been instantly overthrown. 
The trials therefore, having ‘established the existence of the crime’, in fact meant that 
‘the danger is encreased, and the necessity of vigilance and precaution…encreased 
also’.115 As for the defendants, Windham notoriously described each of them as an 
‘acquitted felon’ whose clear ‘moral guilt’ reinforced the need for ongoing vigilance 
and emergency measures.
116
  
Conspiracists asserted that all incidents demonstrating a radical tendency towards force, 
violence and rebellion – the Watt conspiracy, the pop-gun plot, the Walker case, food 
and crimping riots, the naval mutinies of 1797, the United Irish rebellion, even the 
penetration of French agents into Ireland – were part of the master plan to introduce 
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anarchy and disorder into Britain and seize power.
117
 In one example in August 1794, 
following the recent crimping riots in London, the police magistrate Patrick Colquhoun 
advised the Duke of Portland that ‘I have strong grounds to believe that these Riots have 
been incited by the leaders of the Seditious Societies, whose views extend very far 
beyond the Recruiting Houses’. He believed the riots were initiated by the societies ‘for 
the purpose of introducing anarchy & confusion into the capital that they may with more 
ease carry into execution these designs which they are hatching for the purpose of 
overthrowing the Government’. Nepean was informed that ‘it is to be feared the 
mischief would extend itself especially if there are evil disposed Persons ready to make 
use of the prejudices and passions of the common People to serve their own 
Purposes’.118 
However, while some individual members may well have joined the riots, it is almost 
certain that the radical societies actually played no organised or active role in either 
instigating or exploiting them, for as Stevenson opines ‘there is little evidence to 
substantiate the view that the riots were planned, either by the radical sections of the 
Whigs or the radical societies’.119 This did not stop loyalists from exploiting them for 
their own purposes, once again raising the spectre of radical conspiracy to explain and 
delegitimise popular agitation and grievance. St. James’s Chronicle stated that  
It was evidently apparent that the mob was led on by persons above the common rank, whose 
aim it is…to raise a general riot in the metropolis…It is greatly to be apprehended, that there 
exists a scheme to raise mobs, and disturb the peace of the Metropolis.     
The paper was in no doubt as to who was behind this scheme, arguing that as ‘some 
persons in those mobs frequently cry out, Liberty Fraternity, and Peace with France, it 
is an easy matter to conjecture by what party they are encouraged thus illegally to 
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assemble’.120 In each of these cases, the ability to smear radicalism and create suspicion 
was more important than actually proving radical guilt or the involvement of 
conspirators, for alarm and insinuations were alone sufficient to reinforce the 
government’s case for ongoing investigations and the use of increased repressive 
powers against the radical menace. The grand conspiracy magnified the power and 
reach of the radical societies, explaining their involvement in so many different plots 
and events and allowing each incident to reinforce and build the general alarm.     
Yet for all the alarm it caused the conspiracy theory also held out hope that if the 
government could just unmask the conspirators and bring them to justice, radicalism 
would cease a pose a threat to peace and order. This was an important aspect of the 
securitization process, as it gave the government the means to convince the public of its 
ability to tackle and defeat the radical menace, as long as it was given the tools and 
support necessary to do so. In December 1792 Loughborough expressed his desire ‘that 
all the inhabitants of this kingdom would join heart and hand in assisting the Executive 
Government’ to confront the radical threat, for by such actions ‘we should be safe–
without it we might be ruined’.121 Later, after the arrests in May 1794, Grenville 
informed the Lords that the conspiracy could be defeated if the government took ‘such 
measures as might best tend to defeat all such purposes, and to bring the authors and 
abettors of them to public justice’. By such efforts, ‘the conspiracy was discovered in 
time, the plans of the conspirators developed, and their intentions frustrated’.122 The 
1799 secret committee report glowingly praised the government’s success in having  
obtained early and accurate information of the chief designs and measures of the 
conspirators; and the striking manner in which the most important particulars of the secret 
intelligence thus procured, have, in a great variety of instances, been completely confirmed 
by events now notorious to the world…  
This information had availed ‘the early and uniform defeat of all attempts to disturb the 
public tranquillity of this kingdom’, allowing the government to demonstrate both the 
necessity and success of their measures to combat radicalism.
123
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One the most important aspects of the conspiracy theory was its ability to link the 
radical threat to suitable referent objects that the public could accept as independent of 
the government itself and important enough to merit protection by extraordinary means. 
As Buzan notes, ‘If domestic threats are accepted as a national security problem, then 
the government is provided with a powerful tool to legitimize the use of force against its 
political opposition.’124 Pitt and his colleagues were in no doubt that their radical 
opponents posed a threat both to their own grip on power and to the general 
preservation of oligarchic government and its hold on British sovereignty. Buzan et al. 
state that ‘Sovereignty can be existentially threatened by anything that questions 
recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority.’125 The radical reform arguments 
threatened all three, as their refusal to recognise the current parliament and government 
as truly representative of the people undermined their legitimacy and public recognition 
and therefore their authority to govern. However while many of the elite viewed their 
and the nation’s interests as virtually synonymous, the government realised that it could 
not claim such naked self-interest as an acceptable referent object. Suitable alternatives 
would be required to engage the public as a whole and convince them that radicalism 
posed a threat to their interests and security too, rather than merely those of a ruling 
elite. 
As such, the referent objects the radical conspiracy was alleged to threaten were initially 
identified as the constitution and the sovereignty of parliament. The second report of the 
Lords secret committee avowed the existence of a conspiracy aimed at ‘subverting, by 
their authority, the whole frame of the government, and the constitution of this realm, its 
monarchy, its parliament, and its fundamental laws’.126 Bowles claimed that even the 
radicals’ stated aims of universal suffrage and annual parliaments ‘would be as fatal to 
the Constitution, and which are in fact as incompatible with the existence of Monarchy, 
as the actual establishment of a Republic’.127 Exactly what comprised the constitution 
was vague and unclear, but the government and loyalists were convinced of its 
excellence, liberality and key role in the nation’s happiness and prosperity. Pitt argued 
that the current constitution provided order, justice and decency, and ‘the people of 
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England…are sensible of the security which they enjoy for these blessings from the 
frame of our excellent constitution; and…are prepared to defend it against every 
attack’.128 This curious mix of imprecision and sanctification made the constitution an 
ideal referent object. The government and its allies could make broad statements that 
any attempt to alter even a part of the constitution threatened the integrity and utility of 
the whole, as the True Briton did in claiming that ‘an attack upon one branch of the 
Legislature, if successful, is as likely to destroy the whole Constitution as an attack 
upon another’; and push the issue further by alleging that radicals secretly wished to 
deliberately overthrow the entire constitution, without being precise about how either 
threat would actually manifest itself in practice.
129
  
The sovereignty of parliament and its authority to represent the people were defined as 
an indisputable and prosperous element of the constitution, secured by the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 and popular support. It was integral to the maintenance of both the 
constitution and the monarchy, and any attempt to usurp or change it by force was a 
threat to national security. As the True Briton argued: ‘Destroy the legal representation 
of the people in Parliament assembled, and the King’s power is at an end.’130 Pitt 
claimed that in proposing a convention the societies intended to ‘wrest from the 
parliament that power which the people and the constitution had lodged in their hands’. 
Radicals were therefore defying the people’s will, and such plans required the adoption 
of the ‘proper steps to check their execution, and punish those who were so wicked as to 
devise them’.131 
The radical threat was identified as a new and “modern” or “Jacobin” form of treason, 
aimed at the constitution and its institutions rather than the king directly. One 
pamphleteer warned against the perils of the new ‘Jacobin Treason, in which the King’s 
name is never mentioned, and the only usurper is Universal Suffrage’.132 Bowles 
described the radical conspiracy as ‘a species entirely novel in these times, but infinitely 
more subtle in its nature, more easy in its progress, and more extensively ruinous in its 
tendency, than any of which former times has a conception’. The current laws were 
‘inadequate to reach the evasion of modern artifice’ and ‘The source of all social 
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security, the tenor of Justice, had failed the Constitution at the moment of danger’. The 
laws thus had to be rendered ‘more effectual for the protection of Government against 
the wily machinations of French Revolutionary Treason’.133 The resulting new and 
extraordinary measures eventually included the Treasonable and Seditious Practices 
Act, which allowed the government to secure for parliament and in effect the executive 
itself the same protection afforded to the monarch.  
However, while these objects remained on the table throughout the 1790s, as 1794 
progressed and the debate about radicalism intensified, the government felt it necessary 
to garner even further support for its securitizing move and to that end began to argue 
that the very existence of the monarchy and the life and reign of the present king were 
in danger. The use of George III as a referent object allowed the government to attach 
the radical threat to a tangible, popular and personable figure the public could relate to 
and empathise with, rather than relying solely on the vaguer and potentially disputed 
notions of sovereignty and constitution. One loyalist argued that when attempting to 
sway the common people, ‘To talk to them of the constitution is vain: they can only 
respect the constitution in its true representative and visual emblem, the King’s 
person.’134 A Narrative of the Insults Offered to the King argued that this king was ‘a 
man whose happiness, and the prosperity of his whole family is, by the just balance of 
our constitution, so intimately connected’ with that of the people, that ‘it is impossible 
to separate them’.135 The king was portrayed as representing and protecting the 
continuance of not only all order and good government, but the very identity of Britain 
itself, such that any threat to the reign of the king threatened both the existing 
government and the very foundations of society, and vice versa. Eyre informed the 
grand jury of the treason trials that should any man or group ‘design to overthrow the 
whole government of the country, to pull down and to subvert from its very foundations 
the British monarchy’, this would result in ‘a horrible ruin and devastation, which no 
King could survive’.136 This was reinforced in October 1795 by the attack on the king 
and the alleged attempt against his life. John Addington stated that ‘The atrocious attack 
on his majesty was not only an attack upon the king, but…it was an attack also upon the 
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Lords and Commons, and was apparently the effect of a dark, diabolical, and 
premeditated conspiracy.’137 Bowles claimed that ‘The daring attack on his Majesty’s 
person…was the obvious and natural consequence’ of the radical efforts ‘to propagate 
the most seditious doctrines, and to inflame the minds of the populace’.138 This 
supposed link between the attack and radical agitation was particularly important in 
securing the necessary public and parliamentary support to pass and enforce the 
Seditious Meetings Act, a grievous blow to the radical cause.  
Finally, morality and property were also identified as referent objects threatened by 
radicalism. By using morality, loyalists could emphasise the allegedly subversive and 
corrupting nature of radicalism, and project it as a conspiracy not only against a 
particular institution or idea but against the very fabric of society. William Hamilton 
Reid decried the radical habit ‘of ridiculing every thing before held sacred’ and making 
‘infidelity as familiar as possible with the lower orders’.139 The second report from the 
Lords committee of 1794 likewise condemned the radical ‘avowal of those doctrines 
which had led that convention to all those excesses which have proved so destructive in 
France to the principles of social order, of religion, and of morality’.140 The threat to 
property on the other hand, that great bastion of British status and order, described by 
Young as the ‘principle of our constitution’, was directed squarely at the middle classes, 
pointing out that whatever sympathy they may have for radical ideas and grievances, the 
threat to their hard won gains and possessions overawed any notion of tolerance or 
reform.
141
 One loyalist writer pleaded for ‘the union of all ranks of property, in defence 
of the Constitution’. He argued that the popular reform movement ‘must be speedily 
crushed, or the liberty and property of Britons are no more’.142 William Wilberforce 
argued that radical doctrines advocated a ‘detestable and destructive system;…hostile to 
all property, to all personal security and domestic comfort’, and pointed out ‘that it was 
not only the wealthy and the noble that became its victims’.143 Therefore both national 
and individual security were at stake and it was in the interests of not only the elite but 
all property owners to support the government’s moves to combat the radical threat. In 
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sum, the concepts of constitution, parliamentary sovereignty, monarchy and morality 
were powerful and persuasive referent objects that allowed the government to convince 
the public that radicalism constituted an existential and unacceptable threat to the 
security and prosperity of the entire nation-state apparatus, justifying and shaping both 
its securitizing moves and threat response.   
French Principles 
British radicalism was described by the government as being indelibly attached to what 
they described as “French principles”, being a volatile mix of republicanism, 
Jacobinism, democracy, revolution, natural rights, equality, sedition and a general desire 
for anarchy and disorder. The publicly-avowed beliefs in Anglo-Saxon 
constitutionalism, British liberties and limited parliamentary reform professed by many 
radicals and societies were declared to be a mere cover for the far more comprehensive, 
disruptive, foreign and dangerous ideology borrowed from France that really drove the 
radical movement. This served a number of purposes in the securitization of radicalism.  
Firstly, it allowed the government to paint radicalism as inherently incompatible with 
limited reform, order and the maintenance of the current constitution and state structure, 
and to separate it from earlier native forms of radicalism and dissent. French principles 
were believed to be calculated towards the subversion and democratisation of the 
common people, and were therefore liable to create a sense of grievance, rights-
consciousness and a loss of respect for the existing institutions of class, authority, 
constitution and commerce; ultimately leading to sedition, disorder, social breakdown 
and insurrection. The 1794 Commons secret committee report stated that this was an 
important part of the radical conspiracy, calculated with ‘art and industry’ to subvert 
and corrupt the ‘lower orders’ and ‘prepare them to be the instruments of the most 
dangerous and desperate designs’.144 McCann argues that  
Anti-Jacobin writers represented radical textual dissemination as a manipulative mode of 
indoctrination that, by flattering the egos of hitherto disempowered subjects, ushered them to 
the precipice of revolutionary violence.
145
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This belief justified the prosecution and suppression of what Bowles once described as 
the ‘Gallic Republican Faction’, banning their works and prosecuting those bold or 
careless enough to speak seditious words and promote radical ideas.
146
 Young warned 
that this was necessary to save the lower classes from themselves, against a tide of 
sedition ‘presented in a thousand forms to the attention of classes who are devoid of 
skill to disentangle duplicity, unprepared with any antidote to repel such poison’.147  
Furthermore, the government argued that the radical societies’ alleged adherence to 
French principles demonstrated that they were actively dedicated to nothing less than a 
root and branch upheaval of the constitution. At Hardy’s trial, John Mitford argued that 
such principles  
are utterly inconsistent with monarchy; they are utterly inconsistent with a House of Lords, 
and with many other parts of our establishment; and therefore, persons who attempt to procure 
the establishment of these principles…must be conceived, prima facie, to have within their 
view the intent of destroying the existing government...and of forming a constitution of 
government upon their own principles…
148
 
The Commons secret committee concluded that if one considered the radical 
‘approbation…of the doctrine of the Rights of Man, as stated in Paine’s publications’ 
and furthermore ‘the subsequent approbation of the French system; and consider that 
these are the principles which the promoters of a convention evidently make the 
foundation of all their proceedings’, then one could only conclude that the societies 
aimed ‘at nothing less than…a traitorous conspiracy for the subversion of the 
established laws and constitution’.149 The True Briton concurred, stating that ‘those who 
have applauded Mr. PAINE’S Book, and who have sent complimentary Addresses to 
the French Convention’, cannot maintain that this was done ‘only with a view to 
Parliamentary Reform’.150 Likewise Pitt posited that if the 
principle of individual suffrage be granted, and be carried to its utmost extent, it goes to 
subvert the peerage, to depose the king, and, in fine, to extinguish every hereditary distinction, 
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and every privileged order, and to establish that system of equalizing anarchy announced in 
the code of French legislation, and attested in the blood of the massacres at Paris.
151
 
As such, Young concluded that any ‘small concessions to satisfy the moderate’ would 
merely ‘be made a vantage ground for new demands’ and a gradual tumble into 
anarchy.
152
 
This brings us to our next point – the focus on French principles facilitated the 
government’s portrayal of recent and contemporary events in France as being indicative 
of the desires and consequences of domestic radicalism. McCann argues that events in 
France ‘could be produced as an image of what lay hidden behind a political culture 
that, in Britain at least, was tending towards constitutional avenues, not rebellion’.153 
They visualised and pointed to a penchant and desire for violence, revolution and 
anarchy lying just below the surface of reformist respectability. The common use of the 
terms “Jacobin societies” and “Jacobinism” in regards to British radicalism was 
designed to reinforce the supposed similarity between radical and Jacobin ideology and 
to smear domestic radicalism by conflating it with the horrors and fanaticism of French 
Jacobinism. Pitt argued that ‘those who have introduced into this island, Jacobin 
principles, Jacobin names, and Jacobin acts, were the defenders of the French 
government’ and its ‘aggravated horrors’.154 Windham argued that ‘it was a fallacy to 
suppose, that whatever effect democratic principles might have in France there was any 
chance of their being innocent in England’. Rather ‘the freedom of our government gave 
the greater latitude for the introduction of those new principles’, increasing their 
destructive potential.
155
 John Anstruther targeted the practice of associating specifically, 
claimed that to radical ‘clubs and meetings…France had owed all its miseries’, while 
Dundas looked instead to the plan for a convention, arguing that ‘it has a direct 
tendency to introduce that system of anarchy and confusion, with all their attendant 
evils, of which a neighbouring country has afforded so fatal an example’.156 As Pitt 
concluded, why were the radical societies ‘so eager to bring about such a convention? 
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Because this, as they themselves stated, was the precise mode by which France had 
effected her revolution’.157   
The adoption of French principles also provided apparent substance to government and 
loyalist claims and insinuations that domestic radicals were secretly in league with or 
even directed by French republican agents and politicians. In the Commons Adair 
claimed that if radicals secretly wished  
to depose their king, to abolish monarchy, to annihilate the peers, and to establish in England a 
representative government, on the broad basis of liberty and equality, as explained and 
practised in France, it is not difficult to conceive that they might consider “the cause of the 
French convention as intimately blended with their own.”
158
 
Burke believed some eighty thousand British citizens to be  
pure Jacobins; utterly incapable of amendment; object of eternal vigilance; and when they 
break out, of legal constraint…They desire a change; and…If they cannot have it by English 
cabal, they will make no sort of scruple of having it by the cabal of France, into which already 
they are virtually incorporated.
159  
This common cause and association, reinforced by earlier open communications and 
fraternisation between the leading societies, French republicans and the National 
Convention
160
, surely hinted at continued collaboration with the enemy, and radical 
efforts to spread disaffection were believed to signify a willingness or even an earnest 
desire to assist French clandestine and military efforts. At their trial in April 1794, 
Walker was accused of conspiring to not only ‘overthrow the constitution and 
government of this kingdom’ but also to ‘aid and assist the French…in case such 
enemies should enter into and invade this kingdom in a warlike and hostile manner’.161 
Despite an inability to prove such accusations at the time, they still damaged the 
reputation of radicalism and contributed to its securitization, all the more so post the 
revelations and events of 1798, after which the Commons secret committee could claim 
to have proven that the societies’ ‘reliance on the assistance and co-operation of France, 
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by which they expect ultimately to effect their purposes, continues undiminished’, as it 
had done throughout the decade.
162
 
Don’t you know we’re at war? 
The state of war with France post-January 1793 was a crucial aspect of the 
securitization of radicalism. The war naturally made national security and potential 
weaknesses government priorities, as it sought to achieve its goals and protect its 
interests in a long-running battle with the French and their allies. Buzan states that 
‘Insecurity reflects a combination of threats and vulnerabilities’.163 A state may possess 
particular vulnerabilities on account of its location, geography, ethnic composition, 
political structure and ideology, and internal (in)stability, but these will only cause 
insecurity if threats are deemed to exist (or at least potentially exist) that may exploit 
these vulnerabilities to the detriment of the state.
164
 In our case, an internal fifth column, 
allied with French republicans and/or Irish rebels, was viewed by the British 
government as a significant vulnerability in the war with France and the efforts to 
suppress the Irish independence movement. Radicalism, in fulfilling this role as a 
potential force for destabilisation, disorder, sedition, and waste of resources, not only 
posed a security threat in itself but also represented a weakness capable of exploitation 
by French agents and soldiers. Loyalists feared the horror of insurrection coupled with 
invasion, with one pamphlet-writer arguing that ‘each has its separate chance, and will 
produce the other’. This left Britain ‘in the state of a wretch who kneels bound before 
the executioner, whose hand is upon his scimitar, ready to unsheath it, while his death 
depends upon the turn up of a die, with two bloody faces’.165 
Robert Jenkinson claimed in parliament that ‘it was the intention of the French to kindle 
the flame of civil war in this country’, and indeed by the spread of radicalism and the 
assistance of the societies ‘they had got a great way towards making the lower order of 
society discontented’.166 These fears were apparently justified by the United plots and 
uprisings of 1798, coupled with the heightened fears of French invasion, prompting the 
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1799 secret committee report to advise that only if ‘vigilance and precaution’ is 
maintained can the nation ‘look forward with confidence to the ultimate disappointment 
and defeat of the projects which have been so long pursued by our foreign and domestic 
enemies’.167 Wells states that ‘The threat of invasion provided a favourable background 
when the government took its case to parliament’ for further measures to repress 
radicalism and other potential threats to national security.
168
 Any dissent was viewed as 
a sign of disloyalty and potential French sympathies, with Young arguing that in a time 
when invasion threatened, ‘all must contribute heart and hand in the defence of every 
thing dear to human nature’.169 This gave the government a largely free hand to set the 
agenda for what these contributions and sacrifices were to be, facilitating its measures to 
increase security as it saw fit. A war was also no time to discuss or pursue even limited 
reform, let alone more radical notions of greater social and economic equality. In the 
Commons, Windham argued that reform was too hazardous to contemplate at such a 
time, declaring that ‘This is no occasion for an infusion of new blood, which, instead of 
being salutary, might prove fatal’ and questioning whether one should seek to ‘repair 
your house in the hurricane season?’170 Anstruther also claimed that the time to push for 
reform ‘was ill chosen, when the country was engaged in a war, and after attempts had 
been made to agitate the minds of men by the propagation of principles incompatible 
with the existence of any government’.171  
In turn, the presence of domestic radicalism and its alleged links with French 
republicans were often used to justify continuing the war. French republicanism, being 
inherently subversive, had to be defeated and removed from its homeland in order to 
bring peace to Britain and Ireland. The much feared and oft quoted Decree of Fraternity, 
passed by the French Convention in November 1792, offering ‘fraternity and assistance 
to all people who wish to recover their liberty’, was declared by Pitt to be ‘hostile…to 
the human race’ and ‘calculated every where to sow the seeds of rebellion and civil 
contention, and to spread war from one end of Europe to the other’. France’s conduct 
‘militated against the dearest and most valuable interests of this country’.172 Burke 
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claimed that republican France ‘held out temptations the most seductive to the 
enlightened lower orders of all countries, and furnished instruments for the overthrow of 
their government’.173 Therefore, as Dudley Ryder concluded, ‘When a nation like 
France was aggrandizing her power, and threatening the subversion of every state, there 
certainly was a necessity for raising the utmost strength to oppose her progress.’174 
Dundas stated that he hoped to see ‘the re-establishment of such a government in France 
as would…protect other powers from a renewal of that spirit of restlessness and intrigue 
which has so often been fatal to the tranquillity of Europe’.175 Only then could the 
government be sure of its national and domestic security. 
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Chapter Two – Defending the State 
‘(T)hese Farming societies…have been productive of far more good than harm, in as 
much as they have turned the publick attention from Political to Domestic pursuits. 
Besides their progress is well watched and we are minutely informed of every thing that 
passes among them; so that on the least appearance of their assuming any thing like 
political character or consequence we should be ready to meet and prevent the mischief, 
and we have various & abundant means of doing so.’176 – William Wickham to Henry 
Addington on Irish security affairs, 3 January 1803  
The securitization of radicalism had a significant effect on the state’s development and 
use of its security and intelligence services. Such services are of course fundamental to 
any attempt to identify, understand and combat threats to national security, and as such 
are an ideal platform on which to assess the manner in which a securitization event can 
shape and impact upon the institutions, activities and cultural norms of a society. As 
discussed in the preceding chapter, the securitization of radicalism was a process that 
developed over the course of the 1790s, as the government continued to monitor radical 
activities and tailor its response accordingly, ultimately culminating in the decision to 
eradicate it altogether as an active political force at the end of the decade. The steps 
taken against radicalism in sequence may briefly be described as surveillance, 
prosecution, suppression, investigation, obstruction and elimination. The work of a 
surveillance and investigative apparatus was crucial to the government’s actions and it 
is our task here to examine the manner in which this apparatus was utilised, developed 
and centralised throughout the 1790s to serve the shifting needs of the state and its 
securitizing moves. How did the securitization of radicalism shape and enable security 
service use and development, and how in turn did service operations facilitate 
securitization?  
 
 
                                                         
176
 Hampshire Record Office (HRO), Winchester, 38M49/1/45/1, Wickham to Addington, 3 January 
1803. 
 Securing the Nation 53 
 
 
Beginnings 
In the early 1790s information collection was carried out on a decidedly ad hoc and 
irregular basis, as it had been for much of the eighteenth century. The Home Office, 
presided over by Dundas from June 1791 to July 1794, was officially in charge of 
domestic intelligence. The Office ran its own spies, responded to particular threats as 
they arose, paid agents to procure particular information and sought to maintain ongoing 
correspondence with numerous other sources of information. These included the new 
police offices in London, established by the Middlesex Justices Act in 1792 on the 
model of the original Bow Street office.
177
 The police magistrates ran spies and gathered 
information via their salaried constables. Bow Street enjoyed a special position as it 
stood outside of the legislative apparatus, and its constables could thus be used in a 
more flexible and expansive manner. In the counties local magistrates were primarily 
responsible for information collection and dissemination and the preservation of order. 
On 21 May 1792 the king issued a proclamation against seditious writings, in which he 
commanded all magistrates to ‘make diligent inquiry in order to discover the authors 
and printers of such wicked and seditious writings’.178 However without a proper police 
force or official investigative personnel of any kind, local authorities were forced to rely 
on informers and agents whom they could pay or otherwise persuade to provide them 
with information. Local officials enjoyed a large degree of autonomy from the central 
state apparatus, and the manner in which magistrates, mayors, solicitors and justices of 
the peace performed their tasks, and their zeal for investigating radical activity, varied 
from place to place, being largely dependent on the character and political allegiances of 
each official and local administration. Occasionally the Home Office requested local 
magistrates to investigate particular matters, and at times sent their own agents to assist. 
The authorities in Scotland were closely monitored by Dundas himself. His nephew the 
Lord Advocate Robert Dundas ran his own spy network, particularly targeting the 
radical groups in Edinburgh, while as elsewhere in the kingdom excise officers and their 
numerous contacts provided another useful source of information.  
The Post Office also played an active role in the collection of information. Local 
postmasters were tasked with the collection and reporting of information on all manner 
of topics and activities within their respective areas, though again their zeal and 
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efficiency in completing these functions varied from office to office. Reports were sent 
to the head office in London for examination. As Ellis notes, ‘the office also created 
intelligence by opening, detaining, or copying correspondence, and sending 
“interceptions” to the Secretaries of State’.179 Suspect individuals had their mail opened 
on Home Office orders, while other articles drew the Post Office’s attention due to their 
appearance or destination. The LCS was aware of the Post Office’s intelligence role, 
informing a fellow society in Birmingham in June 1793 that ‘The post we no ways rely 
on, as many of our letters have already been intercepted.’180 Customs officials and 
military units were further sources of information. The former were bolstered by the 
passing of the Aliens Act in 1793, which increased their powers and responsibilities 
under a new hierarchy of superintendents reporting to the Alien Office (a sub-branch of 
the Home Office), whilst amongst the armed forces militia units in particular were of 
significant use in gathering information owing to their close ties to local areas.
181
 The 
Alien Office, responsible for interviewing and monitoring foreign immigrants, quickly 
became an important source of information, solicited in particular from French émigrés 
fleeing the Revolution. Charles Lullin, an early member of the new office, recalled that 
the superintendents of aliens, including Wickham, were assigned ‘the task of 
regularising a branch of Police…which, both in its permissive and coercive attributions, 
had, up to that time, been nearly overlooked or neglected’.182 Wickham himself stated 
that it was his job ‘to open some channels of Information by which better intelligence 
might be obtained of their several views and proceedings, with the intent…that the 
whole might be reduced to something like a regular system’.183 Fears over the 
subversive influence of French agents, the ability of republicans to slip into the country 
posing as legitimate émigrés, and of connections between these agents and local 
radicals, ensured that the Aliens Act was well-received as a necessary security measure 
in an unstable climate.  
It may thus be said that in the context of the eighteenth century the sources of 
information at the Home Office’s disposal were substantial. However, as Nelson points 
out, ‘Simply collecting the information…does not suffice to provide usable 
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intelligence.’ Someone must ‘collate and analyze’ the raw information in order to turn it 
into usable intelligence, reports and estimates.
184
 Yet in Britain, while the basic 
principles of the intelligence cycle were understood and recognised as important, prior 
to 1798 the tasks of information collection, communication and analysis were neither 
centralised nor systematised. The intelligence roles of the police, Post Office, Foreign 
Office, local magistrates and customs officials were not fully integrated with the 
operations of the Home Office. Furthermore, despite exhortations from the king himself 
to ‘transmit to one of our principal secretaries of state, due and full information’, the 
communication of intelligence from the provinces to the Home Office was erratic, 
Home Office staff numbers were small and there is no record from this time of a 
comprehensive system for the collating, filing and analysis of information.
185
 Data 
obtained directly by Home Office officials and county magistrates had to be sorted and 
analysed amongst the plethora of far less reliable correspondence sent voluntarily by 
loyalists, local elites, opportunists and cranks of all kinds. Yet the personnel available to 
carry out this mammoth task were so limited that at one point in April 1793, a friend of 
Nepean – the principle undersecretary of the Home Office from 1782-1794 – stated that 
‘I may without exaggeration say almost the whole official business is now thrown upon 
his shoulders, and it is the astonishment of every person how he holds…out.’186 Faced 
with these disadvantages the Office’s ability to turn information into useful intelligence 
was limited and the government’s capacity to monitor the nation was dependant largely 
on individual initiative and chance discoveries rather than any systematic approach.
187
 
Yet despite these drawbacks the Home Office was able to achieve a reasonably effective 
collection and analysis of relevant information on working-class radicalism because the 
importance of the LCS and its associated provincial organisations was quickly realised. 
These were public organisations with open membership, easily infiltrated by informers. 
The first known report from an informer within the LCS was written by George Lynam 
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in October 1792. Initially their role was simply to inform the Home Office on the 
proceedings, opinions and intentions of the new radical associations. Dundas stated that  
I most certainly thought it my duty…to have a constant lookout after the proceedings of the 
societies, which I believed to be meditating mischief and sedition, & and that therefore I 
always had, and always would take care to have persons amongst them to watch their plans & 
give me immediate information of every design they had in hand.
188
 
By this means and the efforts of its magistrates the government gained a reliable picture 
of the new radical societies, even if this knowledge did not always translate to 
understanding or reassurance. Yet despite the concerns of the Home Secretary and 
others, until late 1793 the incoming reports did not suggest a need for anything other 
than ongoing surveillance, and the government and its agents continued merely to 
observe. No significant alternation to the state’s information-gathering and investigative 
capacity was yet deemed necessary.
189
  
While the central government remained largely passive, radicals nonetheless faced a 
serious threat from loyalist magistrates, informers and associations, spurred on by the 
king’s May proclamation, the hope of reward and rising fears of seditious threats to the 
maintenance of order and security. On 20 November 1792 the lawyer and public official 
John Reeves founded the Association for Preserving Liberty and Property against 
Republicans and Levellers. Branches of this and similar associations quickly sprung up 
across the country. Apart from attacking suspected radicals and their businesses, 
disrupting radical meetings, preventing the dissemination of radical literature, 
organising loyalist marches and publishing pamphlets, the associations encouraged 
people to inform on citizens who uttered or wrote seditious words. Informers were soon 
to be found in many pubs, coffee-houses, taverns and radical meetings, and numerous 
prosecutions for sedition were brought before the authorities, often with the active 
assistance of the associations. Citizen’s arrests and denouncement – defined by 
Fitzpatrick and Gellately as ‘spontaneous communications from individual citizens to 
the state…containing accusations of wrongdoing by other citizens or officials and 
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implicitly or explicitly calling for punishment’ – were also encouraged.190 The number 
of prosecutions for sedition in the 1790s is difficult to determine. Clive Emsley’s figure 
of under 200 has been questioned by historians such as Steve Poole, who has 
demonstrated that only a careful investigation of the records of each county could give 
us a figure anywhere near accurate. To this must be added the many cases which did not 
proceed to trial but would still have resulted in hardship for the accused. Certainly the 
number of cases declined as the decade progressed after the initial flurry in 1792-93, as 
loyalist activism decreased and radicalism declined in the face of repression and 
invasion fears. But ultimately the threat of being reported to and charged by the local 
authorities varied from place to place depending on the strength of loyalism and the 
vigilance, beliefs and allegiances of the magistrates in each area.
191
  
A Change of Pace 
The loyalist persecution of radicalism, in most cases tacitly approved by the 
government, initially reassured ministers that further direct action was unnecessary. 
However as 1793 progressed and radicalism experienced a resurgence in activity and 
popularity, the government eventually deemed it necessary to intervene more directly in 
radical affairs and attempt a securitizing move against them. Late 1793 therefore 
witnessed a change in government policy. Amidst increasing concerns about the threat 
from French agents and collaborators, the disbanded British Convention in Edinburgh in 
October-December 1793, proposals for a new convention in London in mid 1794 and 
fears that the radical societies were intending to usurp parliament’s authority and 
achieve reform by force, the government began to act in a more aggressive manner. As 
ministers began to suspect the existence of a radical plot, the Home Office moved 
beyond passively monitoring the radical societies and focused the efforts of new and 
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existing spies on collecting information pertaining to allegedly treasonous activities.
192
 
For example in April the LCS spy Edward Gosling disclosed that Wickham, then 
serving as a police magistrate, had ‘desired me…to direct my attention particularly to 
discover whether they were serious in their conversation and really intend to procure 
Arms or had any secreted’.193 Reports from Gosling and other new spies such as John 
Groves and John Taylor contained details of intentions and preparations to use force to 
achieve reform and possibly even overthrow the monarchy. Gosling alleged that the 
prominent radical John Baxter stated ‘Is there one Man in the Society who believes a 
Parliamentary Reform is all we want; no not one’, for indeed ‘a Revolution might be 
effected in a few Hours’.194 
The government’s altered and increased use of spies and informers, attempting to 
uncover evidence of a suspected conspiracy, produced mixed results. The accuracy of 
their reports and the role played by spies themselves in directing the proceedings of the 
societies is not easily assessed. Three things at least may be noted. Despite extensive 
searches clear physical evidence of treasonable designs of the type alleged by some 
spies was not forthcoming. Furthermore in 1794 the government’s spies became far 
more active in the affairs of the LCS and there is a marked difference in the tone and 
nature of the information provided compared with that received in 1792-93. But 
whether this was due more to the imaginations of the spies, the promptings of the Home 
Office, or a real rise in extremism within the radical societies is the subject of ongoing 
debate. Finally the extent to which the government truly believed the increasingly 
alarming information it received is unknown. Wickham at least appears to have given it 
credence, informing the Home Office in May that amongst the radical societies ‘the 
intention to overturn the Government of the Country is openly avowed’.195 Whatever its 
true motives, the Home Office’s efforts convinced the Cabinet that decisive action was 
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needed. Sufficient evidence was obtained to bring the radical leaders Hardy, Horne 
Tooke and Thelwall to trial on a charge of treason, and to justify the arrest of several 
other prominent figures, while information from spies also played a key role in the 
government’s efforts to convince the public that the radical societies were plotting a 
treasonous conspiracy to overthrow king, constitution and parliament.  
However the government’s decision to place its own spies on the witness stand at the 
trials in November-December 1794 proved a mistake. The defence counsels Erskine and 
Vicary Gibbs skilfully attacked their character and credibility and attempted, with some 
success, to paint the alleged conspiracy as a fabrication based purely on evidence from 
untrustworthy spies. Erskine referred to the witness George Sanderson as ‘good Mr. 
Spy’ and argued that Groves ‘has been guilty not only of a suppression of the truth, but 
he has been guilty of direct perjury’.196 He summed up the crown’s case by arguing that 
the evidence obtained from ‘natural’ sources was plain and innocent in meaning, and it 
was only ‘whenever a different complexion was to be given to it’ that the prosecution 
relied on ‘the medium of spies and informers, and of men…of the most abandoned and 
profligate characters’.197 The defence’s strategy and targeting of informers appears to 
have been successful. Public contempt and distaste for the appearance of spies in court 
was widespread. All three radicals were acquitted and the charges against the others 
dropped. While it is impossible to know the reasoning behind the juries’ decisions, the 
government’s extreme reluctance to use spies as witnesses in all future state trials 
signifies that they at least believed that such a practice had proved inadvisable and 
detrimental to the case.
198
  
Earlier in the year informers had caused further problems for the government. In the 
case of the radical cotton-merchant Walker the informer Thomas Dunn was convicted of 
perjury and found to have been coerced by loyalist officials, while Walker was 
acquitted. In the “pop-gun plot”, the chief informer Thomas Upton was found to be a 
serial fabricator with a grudge against the accused, and despite long detentions and an 
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eventual trial for treason, no-one was ever convicted. The whole story was widely 
disbelieved, and the government’s continued pursuit of the matter did it little credit. 
Even the king had been sceptical, noting that while ‘any informer that comes voluntary 
forward is not to be entirely neglected, yet that he must be looked at with a jealous eye, 
he being most frequently actuated alone by the object of obtaining money’.199 Finally 
the Scottish plotter Robert Watt was identified in court as an ex-informer for Robert 
Dundas, and despite Dundas’ claims that Watt was no longer acting in that capacity but 
entirely on his own initiative, many radicals suspected him to be an agent provocateur. 
Nonetheless, Watt was convicted of treason and hanged. While the alarm caused by 
these affairs was useful in increasing public fears about radicalism, the government’s 
involvement with such sordid characters and events damaged its integrity and the 
credibility of its securitizing moves.
200
       
However despite these embarrassments and failures in court, the government’s actions 
and use of spies still dealt crippling blows to the radical movement. Evidence from 
informers, including the unidentified “JB”, was vital in securing the convictions of 
William Skirving, Maurice Margarot and Joseph Gerrald for sedition in Scotland. While 
no conspiracy was proved in court, the accumulated evidence allowed loyalists and MPs 
to affirm its existence and convince a majority of the public of the danger, justifying the 
arrest of leading radicals and suspension of habeas corpus. The arrests and trials caused 
significant financial, emotional and social hardship, depriving the societies of important 
leaders and creating fear and disorder amongst many members. The mere knowledge 
that spies were present also created arguments, accusations, distrust and hesitancy. 
During the internal LCS trial of Groves on the charge that he was a spy,  William 
Metcalfe reported that ‘The Committee was much exasperated much abusive language 
passed and he would have been excluded the Society at once’, had not calmer heads 
intervened.
201
 Groves had earlier argued that ‘If a Citizen made a Motion which seemed 
anyways spirited he was set down as a Spy’, yet in other instances ‘If a Citizen sat in a 
Corner & said Nothing he was watching their proceedings that he might the better report 
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it’. In these circumstances ‘Citizens hardly knew how to act’.202 Such scenes were 
obviously not conducive to furthering the society’s interests.  
The government’s use of spies and informers and its methods of surveillance and 
investigation in 1794 demonstrate both positive and negative aspects of security work 
and its connection with government policy. The government’s willingness to give 
credence to information from spies allowed it to harass and demonise the radicals, but 
its failure to conduct proper checks and willingness to persevere with persons of 
obviously dubious character exposed it to public ridicule and defeat in the courts. 
However voluntary informers could prove truly useful. Lynam’s information was 
generally sober and reliable (although he became flustered at Hardy’s trial) and the 
Home Office could rely on information like that provided by Robert Alderson in 
Norwich. Alderson informed the Office that  
Exaggerated communications are worse than no communications at all…I shall therefore not 
think it worthwhile to send you any but such as I can pledge myself for the liberal veracity of 
such as appear to me to be deserving of the notice of government.
203
 
Most informers were not so meticulous. Voluntary information arrived at the desks of 
Home Office officials and local magistrates in vast quantities, and was only followed up 
or investigated by government agents when thought to be reliable and/or of especial 
interest. In this manner the government attempted to maximise the productivity of its 
limited resources and keep abreast of as many relevant matters within the kingdom as 
possible, although at times it was still deceived by false or inaccurate reports. Attempts 
to coerce questionable characters like Dunn into giving information often proved 
disastrous. By contrast with these methods, the likes of Metcalfe, Groves and Gosling 
were agents specifically infiltrated into the LCS and the SCI in order to report their 
activities and potential sedition to the government. Metcalfe informed Portland that the 
Home Office undersecretary Nepean had 
requested that I would attend to the disaffected societies and endeavour to find out their 
intentions and designs, that Government being acquainted  therewith might have an 
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opportunity of frustrating any measures which they might have in agitation hostile to the 
Constitution…
204
 
While these agents provided highly useful information and a means of prosecuting and 
securitizing radical activities, their proclivity for becoming over-involved in the 
societies’ operations and eagerness to please their handlers, combined with further 
lapses in background checking, again exposed the government to accusations of 
provocation, deception and misunderstanding.  
Nonetheless the evidence suggests that, aside from irregular cases like those involving 
Upton, Dunn and Watt, the majority of the time the Home Office made a reasonable 
attempt to secure reliable accurate information and gain a realistic perspective of the 
state of the country. Conspiracy theories and securitization certainly influenced the 
manner in which the government employed its spies and other resources, but still did 
not yet precipitate a major change in structure. In the absence of a regular police force 
or a large bureaucracy the need to employ spies and agents to acquire and investigate 
information was unavoidable. Where possible multiple sources were utilised, allowing 
information to be cross-checked and tested for accuracy. Wickham once informed 
Castlereagh that some intelligence he had received was most probably accurate because 
it came from several different sources, with ‘all these informations mutually confirming 
each other, though derived from different channels, and from individuals wholly 
unconnected with, and unacquainted with, each other’.205 The Home Office retained a 
healthy scepticism and a realisation of the limitations of its sources. Portland once asked 
one magistrate ‘to contrive some means of ascertaining the correctness’ of the 
information he received from a particular informer, for the current picture of good order 
was ‘not lightly to be questioned upon the Reports of those who may suppose their 
importance to increase in proportion to the discoveries they may be supposed to make of 
Plots and combinations’.206 Requests and reports received from provincial magistrates 
were generally given as much consideration as time allowed. However against these 
factors one must consider the fractured and limited resources at the government’s 
disposal, the significant potential for misunderstanding and misinterpretation, the 
manner in which the government’s prejudices affected its activities, the influence of 
                                                         
204
 NA, HO 42/34, fols. 11-12, Metcalfe to Portland, 5 January 1795. 
205
 Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquess of 
Londonderry, Vol. 1, Wickham to Castlereagh, 8 June 1798, p. 217. 
206
 NA, HO 43/13, fols. 102-103, Portland to Ralph Fletcher, 14 July 1801. 
 Securing the Nation 63 
 
 
political factors, and the disputed extent and repercussions of the reliance placed on 
informers. These issues were hotly debated by contemporaries and will be analysed 
further in the following chapter. 
The backgrounds and standings of spies and informers covered the whole spectrum of 
society, from aristocrats to humble artisans. Motives were equally diverse. Some spies 
claimed to inform out of principle and as a service to king and country. Robert Holden 
informed the Home Office that  
You know my Zeal in the Cause, and my Readiness to support Government…I shall at all 
times be ready to inform Government of any Proceeding or Opinions of a dangerous 
Tendency, conceiving it my Duty as a Member of that State in which I enjoy Protection, to 
contribute to its Support…
207
 
Another informer claimed that he was ‘a friend to parliamentary Reform’, but fearing 
violence and unrest, he decided to turn informer, for ‘he by no means approved of such 
means being used to bring it about’.208 In Ireland some radicals like Leonard McNally 
who had grown disenchanted with the intentions of their colleagues sought to prevent 
further damage to the radical cause by advising the government on how to proceed, 
urging moderation, and assisting them to nip the extremists’ plans in the bud. McNally 
advised Dublin Castle that  
I write to you with the free and uninfluenced mind of a friend, who wishes to represent every 
thing that occurs to his observation with undisguised truth, considering that the only means by 
which you can, with justice and propriety guide your judgment.
209
 
Other informers acted in the hope of securing promotion or reward. Not a few were in 
debt and resorted to spying for financial gain. Agents like Metcalfe who perceived their 
activities almost as a fully-fledged profession may be contrasted with casual informers 
who often reported out of fear and misunderstanding. Some spies enjoyed the sense of 
adventure, danger, influence and notoriety that came with their activities, while others 
like McNally and George Orr were turned by the government in exchange for their 
freedom from imprisonment and prosecution. Finally some became informers due to a 
falling out with or perceived slight from a fellow radical or neighbour. James Powell 
                                                         
207
 NA, HO 42/31, Holden to F. F. Foljambe, 1 June 1794, quoted in Emsley, ‘The Home Office and its 
sources of information and investigation 1791-1801’, p. 541. 
208
 NA, HO 42/40, fols. 1-2, Duke of Richmond to Portland, 21 May 1797.  
209
 National Archives of Ireland (NAI), Dublin, Rebellion Papers 620/1/121/97, McNally to Edward 
Cooke, n.d. (1798). 
 Securing the Nation 64 
 
 
turned to spying after a radical colleague fled to the United States with his wife, while 
in April 1794 a Cambridgeshire farmer reported his landlord for seditious words after an 
argument over rent. 
The methods of information collection varied depending on the type of spy or informer. 
The terms appear to have been used fairly interchangeably during the 1790s, but in 
modern parlance Emsley notes that we may ‘classify as spies those paid agents who 
were recruited by the authorities to join popular societies and to report on their 
activities’, while ‘the informer, in contrast, volunteered his information’.210 Some 
informers simply reported talk and gossip overheard in a local tavern. Others 
specifically frequented the known haunts of radicals in the hope of obtaining 
information on their activities, while those who counted radicals amongst their friends 
and acquaintances could entertain them or seek out their company. In August 1797 the 
Irishman Thomas Boyle sought more money from Dublin Castle for the expenses 
incurred in cultivating the company of United Irishmen, advising that  
My keeping a Decent appearance…every day in the week increases much my outlaying as the 
people I associate with for Information, their company could not be got into if I did not do 
so…I never neglect sitting at all their meetings and paying my Expenses with spirit.
211
 
Agents sent on missions by the Home Office and local magistrates interviewed persons 
of interest, tracked suspects and attended radical meetings. Some committed loyalists 
like Reeves and John Gretton retained their own spies, whose information they duly 
passed on to the government. However there does not appear to have been anyone in 
England quite comparable with the notorious Irish newspaper editor Higgins, who ran 
his own personal network of spies and sent regular reports to the Castle on all manner of 
radical activities. Higgins boasted that  
From the numbers that I hold intercourse with and who frequently call, I receive intelligence 
of every transaction going forward in the city [Dublin], and of the meetings holding for the 
most wicked purposes.
212
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Informers like Thomas Collins and John Tunbridge who were already members of the 
societies could simply report what transpired at their meetings and discussions, while 
other sources, particularly those like Gosling and Frederick Nodder who joined a group 
specifically to spy on it, went further by actively seeking out information on specific 
topics or obtaining positions of greater access and influence. Some of these spies 
certainly strayed dangerously close to themselves provoking the sedition they reported. 
Powell appears to have covered his potentially suspicious zeal for radical action by 
posing as over-excitable and simple. Thelwall was aware of his unguarded divulgence 
of information to the Privy Council prior to the trials of 1794 but put it down solely to 
‘unguarded simplicity’, while Francis Place later wrote that ‘There was no absurdity no 
sort of proceeding among them [the LCS] that Powell did not eagerly go into nothing 
which any villainous spy could suggest that he would not adopt’. Nonetheless he 
concluded that his friend was ‘honest, but silly’.213 Finally we may mention the agents 
abroad like Samuel Turner, who insinuated their way into the confidence of resident and 
passing radicals and took advantage of their role in facilitating radical plans and 
communications by betraying them to the government.
214
 
Raising the Stakes  
As 1795 dawned the government’s gains from the preceding year were not immediately 
apparent. In parliament Pitt’s ministers became embroiled in a vigorous and spiteful 
debate about the outcome of the treason trials and the ongoing place of radicalism in 
society. Most of the government’s best spies had been exposed at the trials and it would 
take time for new ones to be found, while ministers remained undecided on how to 
proceed in their dealings with radicalism. In January the now former spy Metcalfe made 
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an unsuccessful attempt to hire the assistant secretary of the LCS Joseph Burks as an 
informer. Burks claimed that Metcalfe  
offered to introduce me to Mr. Ford, at the Duke of Portland’s Office, Whitehall;…that if I 
would accept the offer, I should have fifty guineas prompt payment, and one guinea regularly 
for each weekly report.
215
 
However it was not until July that the government found a truly valuable new source of 
information in the person of Powell, sometime acting president of the LCS and member 
of both the Executive and General Committees.  
While the government hesitated the radical societies managed to regroup and achieve a 
significant increase in membership, influence and activity, such that by the end of the 
year it was decided that the strength of the societies was becoming too great a concern 
to tolerate any longer unchallenged. The October attack on the king provided the 
government with a pretext for introducing the Two Acts. It was anticipated that the Acts 
would increase the power and prevalence of spies and informers, as the scope for 
reporting on treasonous and seditious practices had been considerably widened. 
However in practice the Two Acts were rarely used, and the fear alone of informers and 
serious punishment sufficed to quickly remove radicalism from the public sphere and 
dramatically reduce the size and importance of the societies. Spies dogged the efforts of 
the LCS to rekindle enthusiasm for the radical cause both in London and the counties 
and kept the government well-appraised of their activities. Thelwall finally abandoned 
his lectures after continued harassment, and the LCS members John Binns and John 
Gale Jones were arrested and tried for sedition while attempting to reanimate radicalism 
in Birmingham. Word of their impending mission was passed to the Home Office by 
Powell, and spies reported on their meetings in Birmingham prior to their arrest by local 
magistrates. However in court the evidence of the crown’s witnesses was disputed by 
those of the defence. Binns was acquitted and Jones, while convicted, was not 
sentenced.
216
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1796 and most of 1797 passed with the government embroiled in debates over the war, 
Irish affairs, subsistence and taxation, while radical leaders reconsidered their position. 
However as 1797 progressed it gradually witnessed a significant change of approach by 
both the government and the radicals. The radical cause fell into the hands of extremists, 
United Irishmen and republicans who supported a forceful overthrow of the 
government. As Thomis and Holt state, ‘Only when prosecutions and new legislation 
inhibited and intimidated the open reform agitation did a minority of diehard reformers 
go underground to plan the very revolts that the government had feared’.217 In response 
the Home Office reorganised its intelligence services to confront this new situation. The 
presence of clandestine societies with international links and insurrectionary intentions 
convinced the government of the need for change, and although the details of this 
restructuring were kept secret, ministers trusted that its noticeable effects upon society, 
in terms of increased surveillance, repression and central intervention in local affairs, 
would be accepted by a majority of the populace as being in the interests of national 
security.  
Historians such as Nelson, Emsley and Baxter and Donnelly have argued that there was 
no centralised state system of surveillance and investigation at any point in the 1790s, 
with Nelson arguing that ‘The great variation in the value of the reports of the spies 
reflects the absence of any concerted system’, while Baxter and Donnelly claimed that 
the Home Office ‘was quite deficient in the area of information retrieval. There was no 
cross-reference system and therefore the Home Office was often incapable of 
ascertaining the reliability of reports sent to it’.218 This view has been convincingly 
challenged by scholars such as Wells, Sparrow and Durey, who have demonstrated the 
existence and importance of the centralised secret service of the late 1790s. The hub of 
the overhauled service was the newly constituted Inner Office, placed under the 
leadership of the spymaster Wickham. This new body was a department of the Alien 
Office, chosen because, as Wickham stated, not only was it already experienced in 
matters of intelligence, investigation and surveillance, but it also had ‘the Chief and 
Singular merit…that from its very nature, no other Office could ever know any thing of 
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what was passing there, unless instructed from the Fountain Head’.219 It was therefore 
ideally suited to secret service activities.  
Under Wickham the Inner Office quietly became a genuine secret service headquarters, 
with centralised responsibility for all intelligence and domestic security matters. Durey 
argues that the available evidence demonstrates ‘Wickham’s awareness of the 
importance of the intelligence cycle’ and the need for careful and effective planning, 
collection, analysis and production.
220
 Under his leadership intelligence from many 
different domestic and foreign sources was sent to the Inner Office, where it was closely 
analysed by Wickham and his small team of specialists and integrated into the Office’s 
wider picture of the current security situation. Wickham described the new structure as a 
‘System of Preventitive Police’, conducive to a policy of pre-emptive strikes against 
threats and plots, and claimed that  
without bustle, noise or anything that can attract Public Attention, Government possess here 
the most powerful means of Observation and Information…that was ever placed in the hands 
of a Free Government…
221
 
Each member of the small staff was placed in charge of a different aspect of the Office’s 
work. Lullin recalled that Wickham quickly set about  
regularizing & apportioning the various branches of correspondence to different individuals 
according to their respective abilities & aptitude & no doubt the service derived considerable 
advantage from this arrangement…The organising this new establishment & setting to work 
its various & intricate branches, in addition to his usual daily & important occupations at the 
Home Office, called for Mr. Wickham’s indefatigable exertions.
222
 
 
In order to improve the collation and analysis of the vast quantities of information 
received at the Inner Office, Wickham created a comprehensive filing and record 
system, a part of which has survived in the Irish Rebellion Papers (see Figure 2.1).
223
 
This is a register entitled “Book of Informations”, sub-titled the “Book of Suspects”. As 
Durey describes it, the register 
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contains several hundred names of suspects, in rough alphabetical order, with dates, names or 
initials of informants, and relevant information. There are cross-linkages between individual 
names, based on a letter/number code.
224
 
The Irish Chancellor Lord Redesdale described the register as  
an alphabetical list of all the persons against whom informations have been made, the nature 
of the information, when given, and by whom, so that no character of that description may be 
unknown to Government.
225
 
These registers allowed the Office staff to quickly locate and place information on 
suspects in the official secret books. In order to be truly effective this system required 
comprehensive information-gathering capabilities. Nelson notes that ‘In ordinary times 
little correspondence passed between the Home Office and the officials in the counties 
and provincial cities’.226 However, with the flow of correspondence having already 
increased early in the decade, the Home Office now redoubled its requests to county 
magistrates to send all information of interest to London, and in turn instructed them on 
specific matters or where necessary sent a trusted agent or officer to provide assistance. 
Financial aid was given to those working in particularly troublesome areas. The 
instructing of magistrates was of course not a new practice,
227
 but it was now placed on 
a more systematic and regular footing. As Durey argues, this employment of the 
existing authorities within the Inner Office system was both an ‘efficient use of 
resources’ and a check on the ‘potential power of the security service’.228 
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Figure 2.1 – The ‘Book of Informations’ 
In the capital itself two of Wickham’s primary allies were Francis Freeling, resident-
surveyor of the Post Office responsible for the opening and inspection of mail, and 
Richard Ford, magistrate of the Bow Street Police Office. Freeling worked closely with 
Wickham on the regular Post Office tasks of opening suspect mail and compiling 
postmaster intelligence reports. The Inner, Post and Foreign Offices contained a number 
of experts in the arts of intelligence work, from cyphers and secret inks to the breaking 
of codes, as demonstrated in some examples below drawn from the papers of the spy 
James Talbot (see Figure 2.2).
229
 Ford took much of the responsibility for conducting 
investigations and examining suspects and also ran his own network of spies and 
runners. The police magistrate was both honest and scrupulous in his work. On one 
occasion in the Despard case he advised the informer John Moody that ‘I do not wish to 
be made acquainted with any thing…that may tend to prejudice the state prisoners on 
their approaching Trial, I do not think that would be fair’.230 Bow Street was a critical 
element of the security network, for as a 1798 Commons select committee reported, 
‘This is the Office with which the County Magistrates correspond, from which arises 
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much Business for the Magistrates, Clerks, and Officers.’231 The Inner Office also 
worked closely with the authorities in Dublin Castle, receiving all useful and relevant 
information and in turn advising the Castle on intelligence and matters pertaining to 
Irish affairs. At this time the undersecretary Edward Cooke also began to reorganise and 
improve Irish intelligence. Bartlett argues that ‘from mid-1797 on, there was a 
purposefulness about the Castle’s intelligence-gathering that is striking’.232 With notable 
success Cooke sought to promote a more systematic and productive analysis of 
intelligence, and his targeting of information on particular United Irish leaders and 
agents was critical to operations on both islands. 
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Figure 2.2 – Cyphers and Secret Inks 
In this manner Britain developed an effective secret service operating an international 
intelligence system aimed at ensuring domestic security and protecting British interests 
against threats planned and developed by participants acting in multiple countries. 
While domestic spies continued to ply their trade against radical groups in Britain and 
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United Irishmen across the sea, greater collaboration between English, Scottish, Irish, 
French and German intelligence officers meant that domestic information could now be 
used in conjunction with intelligence from foreign sources to track plans and 
connections between Irish, French and British radicals, carry out counter-intelligence 
operations, and trail suspected radical activists even as they travelled from country to 
country. Procedures to ensure the good character and utility of spies were improved, and 
a more careful analysis and cross-checking of information received allowed the Home 
Office to boost its ability to determine its veracity and context. Wickham insisted that 
all potential new spies were first given a trial period, and where possible sought a 
personal interview to establish their credentials, while Portland warned magistrates that 
although good informers were ‘very useful and necessary and very praiseworthy’, they 
were sometimes led astray even by ‘very good motives and by a very laudable zeal’, and 
must therefore be listened to with a caution to ‘which the occupation in which they 
employ themselves cannot improperly subject them’.233 Where possible informers 
recruited from within the radical societies were preferred over self-appointed spies and 
infiltration agents of the type used in 1794. In many cases informers were given 
standardised payments for regular trustworthy reports, avoiding many of the pitfalls 
arising from an over-eagerness to impress. For this reason in one instance Portland 
advised a local magistrate to recruit someone ‘who, by some or other of the means 
usually employed for such purposes, may be prevailed upon to disclose the purposes 
and proceedings of those who attend and take a leading part in this society’.234 By 
contrast ad hoc funding based on the importance of the information provided was 
generally avoided as it tended to encourage exaggeration and invention.
235
 
This overhaul of the secret service continued apace even as a plan conceived by the 
United societies in late 1797 required its urgent attention. The United Irishmen Coigly, 
O’Connor, John Allen and Arthur Leary along with Binns planned to go to Paris to 
apprise the Directory of the new United movement and push for a French invasion of 
Ireland and England in support of a combined radical uprising. The Inner Office was 
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well-informed on these activities. Powell and other spies kept the government informed 
of affairs in London, while in Manchester a member of the Manchester Corresponding 
Society named Robert Gray had turned informer and notified the proactive local 
magistrate Thomas Bayley of renewed radical Anglo-Irish efforts in Lancashire. Bayley 
reported this information to the Home Office, and conducted further investigations 
under the instruction of Portland and Wickham. Additionally, attempts to subvert the 
local militia were reported by Sergeant Joseph Tankard, who feigned interest in the 
plans of the United Englishmen to gain their confidence.  
In Hamburg, a hotbed of agent activity thanks to its position as a key port for travellers 
moving between France and the British Isles, the United Irish turncoat Turner provided 
the most important evidence of all. The Irish Lord Lieutenant Camden informed 
Portland that Turner ‘has it in his power to perform the most essential services at this 
moment to this country’, with the informer being able to supply detailed information on 
Coigly’s mission and other connections between France and the Isles.236 Further 
intelligence was also solicited from Ireland via Dublin Castle, where informers such as 
McNally and Nicholas Mageean kept the authorities abreast of plans for rebellion and 
the seeking of French assistance, while the informant Higgins sent out spies to search 
for Coigly upon his return to Ireland in January 1798. Wickham kept Cooke and 
Camden closely involved in proceedings, at one point advising the former that ‘in a 
transaction of this kind, the information collected in one Country tends naturally to 
throw great light on that which is procured in the other’.237 Coigly was tracked in his 
travels to Dublin, Manchester and London by Bow Street Runners, while other suspects 
were also monitored.  
Aware that Coigly and his associates were now heading for the south coast of England 
en route to France, Bow Street arrested them at Margate on 28 February 1798. Further 
arrests and charges followed in April in London and Manchester. In Ireland the 
leadership of the UI was likewise crushed as spies betrayed their identities, plans and 
whereabouts to the Castle. In Britain those arrested in Margate were the only ones 
brought to trial for high treason. Having seen the prejudicial effects of using spy 
evidence in court, the government this time chose to maintain the cover of its spies and 
rely exclusively on evidence obtained conventionally, despite protests from Dublin. 
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This proved to be a double-edged sword, for as Grenville noted the policy meant that ‘it 
may not be possible to bring such evidence of guilt as will suffice to convict them in the 
ordinary course of law’.238 And indeed while the Inner Office’s policy allowed it to 
retain its extremely important informers and removed a potential doubt from the minds 
of the jury, the remaining evidence sufficed to convict Coigly alone.  
This was another temporary public relations embarrassment for the government, 
although mitigated by Coigly’s conviction, but the long-term effects were far more 
beneficial to its interests. O’Connor and Binns were immediately re-arrested on fresh 
charges while many other radicals remained imprisoned without trial. The government 
resuspended habeas corpus in April. In its eyes this was justified by the wealth of 
intelligence in its possession proving the existence of the United conspiracy, and thirty-
seven leading radicals were detained until March 1801. Despite their inability to 
otherwise secure convictions, Wickham and Portland were convinced that retaining the 
cover of their sources was of primary importance. In June 1798, upon apprehending 
further suspects, Wickham informed Castlereagh that   
It is evident, under the present circumstances, and with the evidence of the nature of that of 
which Government here is at present in possession, strong and decisive as it is, that none of 
these persons can be brought to trial without exposing secrets of the last importance to the 
State, the revealing of which may implicate the safety of the two kingdoms.
239
 
Therefore it was determined that the best policy was one of preventative detention until 
such time as radical extremism and invasion were no longer deemed significant threats 
to British security. Trials were only sought when, in the words of the prosecutor Charles 
Abbot, they could satisfactorily be pursued ‘without disclosing those sources of useful 
intelligence, which will remain unsuspected and unimpaired, for the future security of 
the state’.240 This policy proved to be very successful. Intelligence from Home Office 
and Dublin Castle investigations confirmed the links between the United societies and 
the French Directory. This gave the government conclusive public proof of the multi-
national conspiracy against the state, prompting further repressive legislation. Irish 
connections and intelligence, facilitated by the revamped secret service, thus proved the 
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final downfall of the British radical societies. Bereft of the majority of its leaders, 
fearful of imprisonment and prosecution, hindered by repressive legislation and 
continually harassed by government agents and loyalists, the underground radical 
movement was checked and reduced to little more than a whimper.
241
 
Having struck hard in the first half of 1798, the Inner Office ran an organised and 
efficient secret service until the Peace of Amiens between Britain and Bonaparte’s 
France in March 1802. Ongoing intelligence from its widespread sources, including the 
reliable new London-based operatives Tunbridge, Moody and William Gent, recruited 
from within the radical societies, allowed it to maintain a vigilant surveillance of all 
radical and suspicious activities. Knowledge and accuracy were the watchwords of the 
Office. As Hone argues  
The surviving correspondence of the government with these regular informers…suggests that 
the government neither sought nor received “alarmist” information, but valued the collection 
and storage of “intelligence”, however humdrum.
242
 
With radicalism laid so low such measures were deemed sufficient, and investigations 
generally resulted in warnings and disruption rather than arrests. Only twice, in March-
April 1799 and November 1802, were a large number of arrests carried out, following a 
running surveillance of renewed Anglo-Irish plotting, including the Despard conspiracy 
of 1802. In the first case the government could not obtain sufficient concrete evidence 
to successfully prosecute those arrested, resorting instead to its policy of detainment 
without trial, but in the latter Colonel Despard and six fellow conspirators were 
convicted of treason and executed.
243
 The radical impetus was checked again, no further 
plots materialised on British soil and the secret service apparatus of 1798 gradually fell 
into complete disuse.
244
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Chapter Three – Defending the People 
‘The immediate object of government, is security. 
The means employed by government, is restriction, an abridgement of individual 
independence… 
Without independence men cannot become either wise, or useful, or happy. 
Consequently, the most desirable state of mankind, is that which maintains general 
security, with the smallest incroachment upon individual independence.’245 – William 
Godwin, 1793 
Radicals feared, resented and disagreed with the government’s deployment of its 
security and intelligence services to monitor British society and investigate and repress 
radical activities and sentiments. In particular they took aim at the use of spies and 
informers, as they presented an easily identifiable target historically despised by large 
sections of the population. Spies, informers and constables, as the principle agents of 
state surveillance, were a product both of the government’s securitizing move against 
radicalism and the efforts to eliminate the existential threat it was believed to pose. The 
radical response to their employment, proliferation and activities was a key component 
of the wider fight against government and loyalist securitization and repression, and as 
such provides us with an insightful and interesting case study of the manner in which a 
referent subject and their allies can attempt to counter a securitizing move and the 
means used to enforce it. What discourses, arguments and tactics did the radicals 
employ, and how were they used to discredit the government’s securitization? What 
were the motives, traditions, beliefs, literature, schools of thought and contemporary 
issues that animated, shaped and influenced radical arguments? 
As an issue relevant both to securitization and the push for reform, the radical
246
 attack 
on government surveillance and investigation was sustained and multi-faceted, 
approaching the subject from a range of angles and drawing on diverse sources of 
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evidence. The radical reaction to spies and informers took place not only in the public 
arena but also amongst themselves, as radical leaders discussed and advised the means 
necessary to successfully counteract government surveillance and repression. 
Radicalism endured as a force throughout the 1790s, but the arguments over this 
fiercely-contested topic reached their peak in 1794-95 – the years of the major treason 
trials and the final flourishing of public radicalism prior to the passing of the Two Acts 
in December 1795. The major subjects of discussion rose and fell in response to 
particular events and the fortunes of the radical cause, but some key themes remained 
consistent throughout. We shall address these issues individually, exploring the 
arguments concerning justice, liberty, law, good government, morality, space and 
traditions. 
Justice, Liberty and the Constitution 
The radical attack on the securitization of radicalism proceeded on two fronts. Firstly, it 
was argued that the government’s policy was reactionary, short-sighted, deceptive, 
repressive and unjust, driven by self-interest and a desire to maintain the position and 
privileges of the ruling elite. Secondly, it was posited that the methods employed by the 
government to maintain security were themselves likely to produce injustices, 
misconceptions and infringements on civil liberties. This is our primary focus here. The 
perceived use of spies and informers as the government’s principle means of obtaining 
information and evidence on radical and allegedly seditious activity was of grave 
concern. Spies were not regarded as reliable witnesses. Not only was their information 
likely to be inaccurate due to a lack of context and understanding or a poor memory, as 
was ably demonstrated by Erskine at Hardy’s trial, it was also widely believed that 
many informers would deliberately give false, prejudiced, exaggerated or misleading 
information, in the hope of gaining increased rewards and further employment. This 
would compromise the course of judicial proceedings, impinging the truth and 
increasing the possibility of the judge or jury arriving at an incorrect and unjust verdict.  
With the government believed to be deliberately targeting and securitizing radical 
activity, radicals argued that such policies were likely to lead informers into 
exaggerating and constructing speech and activities that could be construed as seditious, 
treasonous and threatening, and thus of increased interest and use to the government and 
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loyalist associations. At Hardy’s trial Erskine warned the jury about the potential 
hazards of evidence presented by spies, noting that a person who 
gives evidence against persons into whose confidence he has endeavoured to insinuate 
himself, is to be heard and attended to with very great caution and reserve; his value rises 
according to the importance of his testimony, he is a more or less valuable witness according 
as the acts which he communicates to his employers are more or less criminal; he is interested 
therefore to enhance them…
247 
As Cobb notes, for the informer ‘to be successful, he needs to prove that he has access 
to secrets that would otherwise be unknown to the authorities, and, in order to make 
money, he needs to provide a great deal of information’.248 This lends itself to a 
doctoring and selective interpreting of their information. Or as William Godwin put it, 
the spy  
undertakes to remember words, and he has an invincible bias upon his mind, inducing him to 
construe them in a particular way, and insensibly to change them for words more definite and 
injurious. His very income depends on the frequency of his tales, and he is paid in proportion 
as the tales that he brings, whether true or false, tend to the destruction of the persons to whom 
they relate.
249
 
At the trial of Coigly et al., the defence counsel Robert Dallas conceded that while spies 
may be of some use in providing general information to the government, ‘the LAW 
demands credible witnesses’.250 Yet the character of spies and the nature of the role 
precluded them from possessing such credibility, and they therefore should never be 
utilised in court. The questioning of spies in open court was believed to further 
compromise their already doubtful truthfulness and integrity. A letter published in the 
Morning Chronicle argued that   
I am of opinion that it should be a principle of jurisprudence, not to admit the evidence of a 
Spy…A known Spy is no Spy. It must therefore be apparent to a Jury, that he is swearing his 
last; that he can have no object but to secure the favour of his employers, and consequently 
that he will swear au plus fort.
251
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Lord Stanhope was dismayed by having seen ‘what I never hope any of us will see in an 
English court, a certain set of Spies and Informers…procured to confound the best, the 
most noble and respectable Juries’.252 
Even the harsh penalties for perjury were seen as little hindrance to the willingness of 
spies to lie from the witness box. Thomas Holcroft described the spy as a man ‘who 
must accuse, or must demonstrate that his office is useless’, a ‘trained and hired 
perjurer’, while Samuel Coleridge bewailed the existence of ‘hired spies’ and ‘hungry 
informers…who have graduated in guilt and passed through all degrees of serviceable 
iniquity from loss of memory to equivocation, and from equivocation to perjury’.253 
Worse still, it was argued that some spies acted as agents provocateurs, advocating 
and/or encouraging extreme or seditious policies in order to strengthen the 
government’s case against the radical societies; or enticing individual people towards 
seditious speech, enabling the informer to prosecute the entrapped speaker and collect 
the reward arising from a successful conviction. Godwin described the spy as a ‘man 
that insinuates himself into your confidence in order to betray you. He pretends to be 
uncommonly vehement and intemperate, that he may excite you to be the same’.254 
Richard Sheridan contended that by his very nature  
The spy, in order to avoid suspicion, is obliged to assume an appearance of zeal and activity: 
he is the first to disseminate the doctrines of sedition, or to countenance the designs of 
violence; he deludes the weak by the speciousness of his arguments, and inflames the turbulent 
by the fury of his zeal.
255
 
An extract from Charles Johnstone’s novel Chrysal, or the Adventures of a Guinea, 
published by the Morning Post, explained these methods to the public, opining that the 
informer insinuates 
himself into a Society for the gains of Treachery. When he enters he finds a community 
without criminality, he then leaves no methods unattempted, for the purpose of rendering that 
                                                         
252
 Morning Post (MP), 5 May 1795. 
253
 Thomas Holcroft, A Narrative of Facts, Relating to a Prosecution for High Treason; Including the 
Address to the Jury, Which the Court refused to hear: With Letters to the Attorney General, Lord Chief 
Justice Eyre, Mr. Serjeant Adair, the Honourable Thomas Erskine, and Vicary Gibbs, Esq. and the 
Defence The Author had prepared, if he had been brought to Trial, London, H. D. Symonds, 1795, p. 66; 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Plot Discovered; or An Address to the People, Against Ministerial 
Treason, Bristol, 1795, p. 12. 
254
 Godwin, Considerations on Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt’s Bills, Concerning Treasonable and 
Seditious Practices, and Unlawful Assemblies, p. 50. 
255
 PH 31, col. 1067. 
 Securing the Nation 81 
 
 
Society, in some of its weaker parts…tainted with his own poisonous guilt, and thus he attains 
his ends…
256
 
Thelwall also blasted the government’s ‘tools of venality and corruption’, exposing their 
‘covert arts and secret machinations’. He proclaimed to spies that 
Your’s is the palm of perjury: and how without this attribute should ye be fit tools for those 
who are destroying liberty, at the time that they pretend to reverence the Constitution? Your’s 
is the palm of fraud and base hypocrisy–pretended patriotism with you, as with your masters, 
is the engine with which you work out your own selfish and treacherous designs.
257
 
These claims formed an important part of the successful defences of Thelwall, Hardy 
and Horne Tooke in 1794. 
Radicals also believed that the employment and prevalence of spies was likely to result 
in an increase in investigations and prosecutions for alleged treason and sedition, 
initiated by the state, loyalist associations and private individuals, motivated more by 
the corrupting and unscrupulous pursuit of personal gain than any sense of justice or 
duty. The Morning Post argued that as a result of the increase in accusations and 
willingness to prosecute alleged offenders,   
every wretch in the Country, who has, either through Malice or Envy, a dislike to his 
Neighbour, will have now an opportunity of gratifying his malicious intentions…Those who 
have commenced Spies and Informers…will crowd the Prisons with Innocent people, as long 
as the Liberties of Englishmen are at the mercy of such debased and infamous Characters.
258
   
One radical work quoted Jonathan Swift, who had argued that ‘such ignominious 
wretches let their private passions into…their clandestine informations, and often wreak 
their particular spite or malice against the person whom they are set to watch’.259 Indeed 
informers were to be found willing to report even the most trivial of utterances. The 
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Morning Chronicle recounted that one man was reported and detained in a tavern for 
exclaiming that ‘Treason was only Reason, with a T at the beginning of it’.260 
Radicals argued that citizens could not be free to discuss their thoughts, opinions and 
grievances in a society pervaded by spies and informers, especially if these thoughts had 
a radical tendency. Abraham Jones described how  
Spies had been introduced, not only into frequented haunts, but into the recesses of society: 
conversation was proscribed, and opinion interdicted or dangerous, every Coffee-house had its 
Informer, every family apprehended a Traitor in its own bosom.
261
 
People therefore had to be ever-weary and cautious in their speech, bearing, associations 
and actions, or else live constantly under threat of being reported or prosecuted by an 
informer who chanced upon or invented words or conduct deemed offensive or 
dangerous and potentially open to prosecution. Erskine observed that ‘liberty of thought 
and speech is as necessary to preserve, as it was to form’ the British Constitution. Yet 
the power and prevalence of spies and informers eradicated these liberties. For  
While such a host of men…are combined to overwhelm the unhappy man who may venture to 
utter a sentiment which a weak or biased understanding may torture into a seditious meaning, 
liberty of thought, liberty of speech, liberty of publication, which may justly be called the 
palladium of British liberty, cannot exist.
262
 
In court Erskine was even able to quote Burke on this topic, for the fervent enemy of 
radicalism had once argued that under an administration that freely employed and 
rewarded informers  
the obnoxious people are slaves, not only to the government, but they live at the mercy of 
every individual; they are at once the slaves of the whole community, and of every part of it; 
and the worst and most unmerciful men are those on whom goodness must depend.
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The government claimed to be defending the constitution, when in fact its own actions 
were infringing upon and placing it at risk. Christopher Wyvill warned his fellow 
Yorkshiremen that they were witnessing the implementation of   
the system of a State Inquisition, begun by the employment of spies and informers, in every 
corner of the kingdom; you have witnessed the growth of that system, in its natural 
consequences, the most violent State prosecutions, and the most rigorous and unprecedented 
punishments…
264
 
Thelwall lamented that ‘the boasted freedom of Britons is no more, and every man of 
intellect and virtue lies at the mercy of the pimps and lacqueys of courtiers and court 
expectants’.265 The radical orator despaired at this calamity, for as Wagner notes, ‘The 
free exchange of ideas Thelwall envisaged became impossible in the environment of 
surveillance that settled over Britain in the mid-1790s.’266 
John Butler argued that spies and prohibitive legislation destroyed freedom of 
expression, for by their actions ‘the jaws of patriots are clinched-the pens of writers 
cramped-the press muzzled-the mind of man fettered-literary genius curtailed-and 
liberty scouted like a vagrant’.267 An anonymous cartoon from November 1795 entitled 
A lock’d jaw for John Bull (see Figure 3.1) depicted Butler’s summation of the state of 
affairs, with Pitt locking the jaw of the nation to prevent any further airing of grievances 
and political ideas in public.
268
 The Morning Post reported that ‘The Arts are almost put 
a stop to by the present system of Government prosecutions’, for few artists ‘will 
venture on an historical subject, lest it may be considered by some vile Spy as 
democratic’.269 The writing and publication of even vaguely political pieces became an 
extremely hazardous business, with informers being ever ready to report any potentially 
seditious content to the authorities. In a poem, Peter Pindar described the actions of 
informers thus: 
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Prerogative, ye Gods! will soon look fierce, 
Hunt with his hounds the shops for prints and verse 
And find the likenesses of men on high– 
Make of the booksellers and bards a hash– 
Smell rank rebellion in a star or dash, 
And bid the sneering culprit hang or fly.
270
 
 
Prosecutions often followed for those so reported to the authorities. 
 
Figure 3.1 – A lock’d jaw for John Bull 
The threat of spies and prosecution frightened most people out of any engagement with 
politics whatsoever. Securitization turned many political and social issues into black and 
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white matters of national security, with any dissent from loyalist opinion deemed 
seditious or detrimental to the interests of the state. Vicesimus Knox argued that as a 
result the people ‘are terrified into a tame and silent acquiescence. They learn to 
consider politics as a dangerous subject, not to be touched without hazard of liberty or 
life’.271 Joseph Towers lamented that it was now considered unsafe in ‘England, once 
considered as a free country, to speak of kings or ministers of state, or to converse on 
any political subjects’.272 Loyalist associations such as the Reeves Societies – the one 
seemingly legitimate outlet for political discussion and participation – were feared and 
castigated by radicals for their persecution and narrow-mindedness, described by Knox 
as a ‘most dangerous conspiracy of sycophants against a free constitution’, responsible 
for ‘undermining the fair fabric of liberty’ by their excessive encouragement of 
informers and efforts to suppress and prosecute all radical thought.
273
 Towers argued 
that they greatly contributed to the stifling of political debate, by attempting ‘to be 
judges of what was, and what was not, seditious conversation’ and by preventing 
‘freedom of speech from being enjoyed in inns, in taverns, in coffee-houses, in ale-
houses’.274 Informers and the associations that encouraged and rewarded them were 
therefore a blight on the free-born Englishman, incompatible with his ability to exercise 
his supposedly inalienable rights and liberties.  
Governance 
Radical opinion differed regarding the reasoning and process behind the government’s 
interpretation of the evidence garnered from its spies and informers. The Morning 
Chronicle was undecided, noting that two conclusions were possible:  
either that Ministers, having correct information, joined in the supposed conspiracy to mislead 
the Public; or that Ministers themselves were deceived, and that the employment of Spies is as 
little to be relied upon, as an engine of government, as their evidence ought to be in a Court of 
Justice.
275
 
The Morning Post believed the latter scenario, arguing that  
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If Government form their opinion of the People, as we apprehend they do, on the 
representation of Spies and Informers, it is no wonder that the character of the Nation is 
libelled; and that harsh measures are used by timid people, who dream of nothing but Sans 
Culottes and Hobgoblins.
276
 
Sheridan agreed, averring that a minister who relied on informers for information ‘must 
be eternally the dupe of those vile spies, whose interest it is to deceive him as well as to 
betray others’.277 
Charles Pigott, however, was more directly critical of the government, favouring the 
first scenario and arguing that the spy was a mere ‘underling of government, send to 
watch over the words and actions of innocent men’, in order to falsely implicate them in 
seditious crimes, so as ‘to satisfy the bloody vengeance of an infernal minister’.278 
Holcroft claimed that the reports of spies were construed in such a way as to ‘fit the 
treasonable model [their] employers had provided’, backed by Thelwall’s assertion that 
‘when Ministers want high Treason and can get no respectable evidence of its existence, 
they must hang up their men upon such testimony as they can procure’.279 One radical 
work quoted a passage from Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, in which Gulliver visited the 
kingdom of Tribnia, a land full of informers and accusers. It is noted that  
The plots of that kingdom are usually the workmanship of those persons who desire to raise 
their own characters of profound politicians; to restore new vigour to a crazy administration 
[and] to stifle or divert general discontents…It is first agreed, and settled among them, what 
suspected persons shall be accused of a plot; then effectual care is taken to secure all their 
letters and papers, and put the owners in chains.
280
 
The analogies with this particular interpretation of the government’s actions and the role 
played by its spies were obvious and striking.  
On a less conspiratorial level, Robinson believed that one must look to and critique the 
law enforcement system itself and its operators, rather than simply blaming those who 
sought to profit by it, asserting that the ‘law, or at least the administration of it, is bad, 
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which cannot be laudably and honourably enforced by voluntary, and even mercenary 
informations’.281 These radicals therefore believed that the government was wholly 
accountable for the actions of its spies, disparaged as the ‘bloodhounds of 
administration’.282 In sum, if the government was indeed misled, then securitization and 
repression were genuine responses based on a faulty understanding, still contemptible 
for their misguidedness and ignorance but more a result of fear and poor intelligence 
work than a deliberate attempt at unwarranted repression. However if the government 
was in fact working from a preconceived agendum and employing its spies accordingly, 
then its actions were a cynical and calculated ploy to obtain, create and twist the 
evidence necessary to justify a securitization already determined. 
All radicals could at least agree that the picture the government presented to the public 
concerning radicalism and the societies was false or inaccurate on many counts. As 
Thelwall argued, those who rely on spies for their information cannot possibly have a 
correct understanding, as it is in the spy’s ‘interest to deceive, because their salaries 
depend upon keeping their employers in good humour’.283 Cobb argues that  
an informer will often construct an elaborate “plot” where there is an open and probably 
harmless association, that he will make machiavellian conspirators of simple and angry men, 
and that he will scent daggers – or pretend to scent daggers – where there are kitchen knives 
and spoons. For the informer, nothing can be quite what it seems…
284
 
Such conspiracy paranoia certainly rubbed off strongly on the government. Sheridan 
targeted Pitt directly, claiming that the minister ‘had no communication with the people 
of England except through the medium of spies and informers’; therefore ‘he is 
unacquainted with the mode in which their sentiments are expressed, and cannot make 
allowance for the language of toasts and resolutions adopted in an unguarded and 
convivial hour’.285 Or as Daniel Isaac Eaton’s Politics for the People more whimsically 
put it, ‘Signor Gulielmo Pittachio…will produce his justly celebrated CURIOUS SPY 
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GLASSES, which distort and misrepresent all objects that are looked at through 
them’.286 Pitt saw only what he wanted or was led to see. 
Whatever the exact truth of the government’s beliefs and actions, radicals were 
convinced that its use of such secretive and underhand methods betrayed its elitism, 
despotism, corruption, securitizing tendencies and lack of understanding of the real 
needs and grievances of the people. Politics for the People argued that ‘Spies are the 
principal agents of a government weak, restless, and mutinous’.287 The editor of the 
Irish spy Edward Newell’s memoirs left no doubt as to his thoughts on the topic:  
A government conducted and supported by the agency of those heedless and miserable 
wretches called spies and informers, is not only contemptible to foreign powers, and detestable 
to those over whom it would rule; but by its very nature it undermines the obligations of 
religion, and the restraints of conscience. It seeks only its own safety, whilst it disregards the 
means by which that safety is secured.
288
 
The Morning Chronicle quoted Baron Montesquieu’s statement that ‘the usual practice 
of good Princes’ is not to employ spies, and later opined that spies had ‘never been 
resorted to in former times as a State-engine but in the very worst of governments – that 
of the tyrant, the usurper, or the despot’.289 Knox expressed similar sentiments, claiming 
that ‘A ministry must be sadly corrupt…which can so far degrade itself as to require the 
assistance of the vilest of the human race’, for the use of spies ‘argues an endeavor to 
govern in a manner unauthorized by that constitution which the employers of spies and 
informers pretend to protect’.290 The notorious character of informers inevitably tainted 
their employers. In criticising the matter in which the crown proceeded in the 1794 
treason trials, young Thomas Amyot wrote that  
A more pitiful Set of Ragamuffins could not have been picked up in the Highways than that 
which government has brought forward as witnesses on these trials. To be sure a Spy is a 
Character despicable enough; no man of Conscience or Character would assume it.
291
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Any policies that relied on such tactics and lowlifes must surely be being pursued 
heedless of the true interests of the nation.  
Radicals also rejected the government’s arguments for the necessity of extraordinary 
measures such as increased surveillance and employment of spies in order to preserve 
peace and security. Knox argued that ‘There are excellent laws, and there are 
magistrates and officers dispersed all over the kingdom, who are bound to take 
cognizance of any illegal and injurious practices, and to prevent them by a timely 
interference.’ Anything further was not calculated to maintain security but was rather a 
sign of the government’s contempt for the entirety of the common people:  
The employment of spies and informers is a virtual declaration of hostilities against the 
people. It argues a want of confidence in them. It argues a fear and jealousy of them. It argues 
a desire to destroy them by ambuscade.
292
 
Charles Grey argued against policies that would turn respectable magistrates into 
informers. As a result ‘A system of espionage was to take place by order of the crown. 
It was as surprising as it was odious, that such a proclamation should issue from the 
sovereign of a free people.’293 The surgeon John Stuart Taylor suggested that history 
teaches that ‘those nations are the most deficient in civil liberty, where the system of 
espionage has been most prevalent’.294 A people living exposed to such surveillance and 
espionage can enjoy neither freedom nor security. 
The debate over spies also formed part of the wider radical movement to increase the 
transparency of the mechanisms of government and state administration. Evans states 
that the radicals ‘insisted that the exercise of power should be a transparent process, one 
that could be understood and monitored by citizens’, thereby improving its 
accountability and liberality.
295
  While private life was arguably to be respected, a 
man’s public and state conduct must be open to scrutiny; and government reasoning, 
decision-making and policy should be public knowledge wherever possible. The 
Morning Chronicle quoted Montesquieu’s observation that ‘A Prince ought to act 
towards his subjects with candour, frankness and confidence.’296 This was seen as being 
the honourable and benevolent way to govern a state. However the Pitt government’s 
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willingness to employ spies, surveillance and secret services flew square in the face of 
these calls for greater transparency, and left it open to accusations that its actions were 
despotic, alarmist and couched in hypocritical secrecy and obfuscation. In September 
1794 the Morning Chronicle argued that the government was acting as if the conviction 
of the former-informer Watt ‘amounts to complete proof of all the extravagant tales 
with which the timid and the credulous were alarmed’. The paper also claimed that 
Windham stated ‘some things are the more to be believed from the very circumstance 
that they cannot be proved’. It was thought that such convoluted nonsense stemmed 
from the paranoia within parliament and the executive that radicalism was inherently 
dangerous and conspiratorial. If this could not be proved then the radical societies 
simply must be hiding it, making it even more likely that they were actively plotting 
something. The Chronicle aptly called this ‘ministerial logic’.297 
Suspicion and alarm may serve where the law and evidence fails, and the perceived 
government policy to foster such commotion was attacked by radicals on the grounds 
that it was calculated to facilitate its unjust securitizing move, deceive the public and 
allow it to wage war against both internal and external targets on its own terms, 
violating the rights and liberties of the people and suppressing inconvenient truths with 
tales of conspiracies and dark tidings. Politics for the People alleged that the 
government had ‘excited a sudden, but temporary commotion through the kingdom’, 
caused ‘for the infamous and scandalous intention of raising alarms in men’s minds that 
the State was in imminent danger of being subverted’, during which ‘Ministers seized 
the opportunity as being favourable to their knavish and infernal plans’ and struck 
forcefully against radicalism and France while the people were in a ‘kind of stupor, 
which did not evaporate till it was too late’.298 The Morning Post concurred, arguing 
that the alarm raised by spies and government created an ‘apathy’ amongst many of the 
public towards ‘the most dangerous infractions on the Constitutional Rights of 
Britons’.299 The pop-gun plot and the trials of Watt and Walker were all perceived by 
radicals as instances of created or exaggerated treason and alarm, while Richard 
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Newton’s cartoon A Bugaboo!!! of June 1792 (see Figure 3.2) listed spies and informers 
amongst other tools used by Pitt to alarm the nation and increase national security.
300
  
  
Figure 3.2 – A Bugaboo!!! 
Such alarm could also be used to divide the public and turn it against those blamed for 
necessitating the alarm in the first place. Thelwall argued that  
the wretch…who hires perjured spies and tumultuous assassins to breed confusion…that he 
may charge that confusion upon those whom he has basely and insolently injured; such a man, 
by his detestable arts, and sneaking tricks, proves that he knows himself to be a juggler, and 
that his cause is as rotten as his heart is hollow.
301
 
John Gale Jones posited that ‘Ministers have been studiously endeavouring to disunite 
the people at home’, while in the Commons George Tierney argued that ‘I see that 
government are acting thus. Those whom they cannot prove to be guilty, they will 
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punish for their suspicion. To support this system, we must have a swarm of spies and 
informers.’302 Public opinion distorted in this manner was channelled into loyalist 
associations, church and king mobs, and of course spying and informing, for as Wagner 
states, 
a once docile or impartial public may be convinced to identify political threat where 
previously it had seen none. That same public may also be convinced that part of their civic 
duty was to eject that threat from their midst.
303
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, threat awareness was heightened throughout Britain, 
occasioning a dramatic rise in investigations, reports, prosecutions and persecutions of 
suspected radical activity.  
In radical eyes security services and spies therefore served as a means of repression and 
the advancement of an unjust and unmerited securitization; achieved by restricting 
freedom of speech, debate and opinion, creating alarm, and encouraging betrayal, 
suspicion, investigation and persecution of the affairs of others, and the giving of false 
testimony. These measures assisted the government in shaping public opinion, 
exaggerating threats to security, building successful prosecutions and justifying 
repressive actions and extraordinary measures against supposedly dangerous and 
criminally-minded radical societies and individuals. Securitization was not a legitimate 
response to a real threat but a means of cultivating public and parliamentary support for 
policies designed to maintain and benefit the current political and social order.   
Morals, Values and Community 
Morality, be it social, political or religious, never lay far from the consciousness of late 
eighteenth-century British society, even if it had not reached the all-encompassing 
importance of the era of Victorian values. Undoubtedly it formed an important part of 
the debate over surveillance and security. We have already seen how loyalists attempted 
to appropriate morality as a referent object threatened by radical activity. Yet just like 
the constitution, radicals countered that it was in fact the government’s own actions that 
threatened and corrupted the morals of society, particularly through the employment and 
encouragement given to spies and informers. The profession of informer was one of the 
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most despised if begrudgingly tolerated in Georgian England, regardless of their area of 
operations. Many radicals were convinced that the incentives given by the government 
to such characters debased and corrupted both the individuals and the communities in 
which they operated, and they were not slow to make their outrage known, or to use 
them as a means of attacking government policies. 
Informers were believed to be base and dishonest characters, devoid of integrity, 
betrayers of trust and confidence, pariahs of the community who put financial and 
personal gain before all notions of decency and fellow-feeling. Their rewards came only 
at the expense of others, often as a result of a willingness to lie about, deceive and 
betray their fellow citizens. A small sample of the numerous references to the poor 
character and morals of spies and informers will suffice to demonstrate the depth of the 
contempt in which they were held. In the radical press they were variously described as 
‘despicable characters…held in universal detestation’; an ‘infamous race’; ‘miscreants’; 
and ‘villains’.304 ‘In the courts the spy was described by Dallas as a man ‘fallen so low 
as to lose all scrupulous feeling’. Dallas noted that 
If it be in the pursuit of blood that he is employed, he will have so many vices to practise, that 
it is utterly incredible he should preserve the feeling to arrest him in any part of the career 
leading to murder, when that should become necessary to his views.
305
 
Erskine castigated Groves as a ‘dishonest man’ and a ‘miscreant’, and brought up 
discreditable instances from Gosling’s past.306 Other spies also served as easy targets on 
account of notable defects in their character and evidence. Upton was described in 
Politics for the People as an ‘incendiary, next a horse-stealer, then the contriver and 
bespeaker of an instrument for compassing the death of the King’, a plot described by 
Francis Plowden as a ‘malicious and artful fabrication’.307 Watt fared even worse, with 
the Morning Post opining that the ‘people looking on him as a Vile Spy of Government, 
did not issue as much as a sigh of Compassion at his Execution’.308 Spies were not 
spared in parliament either. Charles James Fox stated that ‘of such characters there were 
no words in the English language which could sufficiently mark his contempt and 
detestation’, while Joseph Jekyll lamented the existence of a ‘villainous horde of spies, 
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informers, and perjured witnesses’.309 Elsewhere, Coleridge called spies ‘perjured 
conspirators against the lives and liberties of the people’, matched by Daniel Stuart’s 
description of them as men who ‘have lost all sense of shame and honesty; who must 
have abandoned all hopes of ever being respectable in society’.310 
As noted above, radicals also attacked the encouragement and incentives given to 
informers by the government and loyalist associations, arguing that this would tempt 
people into acts of dishonesty, perjury, voyeurism, greed, covetousness and betrayal, 
and teach them that vice could be worthy of reward by the state. Ousby states that 
‘Loyalty to the profession of spying involved disloyalty in the actual social relationships 
which form the basis of society.’ There was an  
incompatibility between the spy’s loyalty to his employer and to the social group of which he 
is a sworn and trusted member. The defence of national security in this case apparently 
involved an assault upon social ethics.
311
 
At Hardy’s trial, Erskine railed against the manner in which Lynam and his fellow spies 
betrayed the trust and friendship of their fellow LCS members, exploiting and damaging 
the social bonds that unite fellow citizens. Erskine argued that Lynam took his notes 
bona fide as a delegate, and yet bona fide as an informer;–what a happy combination of 
fidelity! faithful to serve, and faithful to betray!–correct to record for the business of the 
society, and correct to dissolve and to punish it!
312
 
These arguments were picked up by other radicals. An anonymous letter published in 
the Morning Chronicle argued that spies and informers ‘corrupt the source of social 
intimacy and confidence, vitiate every noble and generous sentiment of the human 
heart, taint the purity of moral evidence, and promote the growth of perjury by royal 
bounties’313, while Holcroft noted that spies and informers are a ‘poison which 
envenoms the whole state of social existence, infuses itself to every heart, and there 
broods suspicion, hatred, perjury, and rancour only fit for fiends’.314 
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Knox argued that the government was failing its moral responsibility to the people, 
noting that when ministers 
patronize such miscreants as spies and informers, they certainly corrupt the public morals, by 
leading the people, over whom their examples must always have great influence, to believe, 
that treachery, perjury, and murder are crimes of a venial nature…They teach one of the most 
corrupting maxims; for they teach, “That when ends eagerly desired by knaves in power are to 
be accomplished, the means must be pursued, however base and dishonest.”
315
 
Thelwall was not about to let the government or Reeves Societies plead ignorance over 
the vices of their tools either, arguing that 
We must look to the consequences of measures…and it was their duty, as the grand movers of 
the infernal engine thus set to work…to consider, before the experiment was adopted, what 
were the mischiefs to the morals and happiness of society, which were likely to be effected by 
its operations? 
Thelwall posited that any reasoned man would have realised that such operations could 
only have resulted in an ‘anarchy of morals’, for ‘if the principles of morality are once 
overthrown, nothing like political security can possibly be expected in any state’.316 A 
few years later Robert Southey came to the same conclusion, arguing that ‘Government 
do not seem to be aware, that when they offer premiums for treachery, they are 
corrupting the morals of the people, and thereby weakening their own security.’317 The 
mechanisms that minister and loyalist used to securitize and repress radicalism would 
thus result in the very thing they were trying to avoid – a collapse in political and social 
security. 
Radicals argued that the government’s policies and measures were not only immoral but 
liable to tear at the very fabric that held communities and common decency together, 
sacrificing collective for national security. Communities grow and survive upon shared 
values, order, trust and support of one another, bound by ties of kin, friendship, loyalty 
and mutual understanding. The actions of informers are predominantly anathema to 
these fundamental aspects of community, setting an individual against their fellow 
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citizens, creating conflict, and threatening to sever and corrupt existing ties and 
values.
318
 For as Victor Navasky wrote many years later,  
the role of the informer [is] to pollute the public well, to poison social life in general, to 
destroy the very possibility of community; for the informer operates on the principle of 
betrayal and a community survives on the principle of trust.
319  
Yet in the 1790s the government appeared quite happy to utilise such potentially 
destructive measures in the fight against sedition and radicalism. This could have 
significant repercussions. Warner and Ivis argue that 
An intervention that rewards informers creates enormous stresses within the community that it 
targets, forcing each of its members to choose among three possible careers or alliances: 
solidarity with the larger community, collaboration with other informers, and membership in 
neither group…From one community three are created, and for the moment each is weaker 
than its parent.
320
 
The presence of informers obliges community members to react and choose sides, 
turning communities and even families into divisive battlegrounds. In the 1790s it was 
argued that the support afforded to spies by government and loyalist groups had tipped 
the balance in the spies’ favour. In the words of a letter-writer to the Morning 
Chronicle, the employment of government spies had ‘armed one portion of the 
community to beat down the other’.321 
Many radicals and careless individuals could certainly bear witness to the truth of this 
statement, despite warnings about the dangers inherent in the government’s policies. As 
early as 1792 Fox argued that the increasing focus on surveillance and informing would 
‘set father against father, brother against brother, and neighbour against neighbour’. He 
was astonished that ‘in this way you [the government] expect to maintain the peace and 
tranquillity of the country!’322 Godwin believed that the prevalence of spies and 
informers turned the whole nation into ‘two classes of hypocrites: hypocrites, who hold 
out a false appearance, the better to ensnare; and hypocrites, who hold out a false 
                                                         
318
 Jessica Warner and Frank Ivis, ‘Informers and Their Social Networks in Eighteenth-Century London: 
A Comparison of Two Communities’, Social Science History, vol. 25, no. 4 (2001), pp. 563-64 & 580-82.  
319
 Victor Navasky, Naming Names, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1991, p. 347. 
320
 Warner and Ivis, ‘Informers and Their Social Networks in Eighteenth-Century London’, p. 563. 
321
 MC, 9 January 1795. 
322
 PH 32, col. 21. 
 Securing the Nation 97 
 
 
appearance, that they may not be ensnared’.323 Finally Taylor concluded that ‘Well and 
truly has it been observed, that for society to exist in peace, they must have one 
common connexion of interest, one universal tie of happiness.’ Yet the informer is 
opposed to this interest, for they cannot contribute to ‘honour and prosperity; nor can 
this reptile claim kindred with any part of the community…the virtuous citizen will 
regard him with detestation, the vicious citizen with fear’.324 
Public and Private Spaces 
The increase in spies and informers and government agents was believed to presage 
unwanted and harmful changes to the existing concepts of public and private space, and 
the intrusion of national and local government forces into what had previously been 
considered private space, protected and free from outside interference. The spy debate 
formed part of wider discussions in eighteenth-century England regarding the definition 
and status of public and private spheres, battles for control and position in the public 
sphere, and concerns over the increasing invasion of the private sphere by state, politics 
and media. 
Government surveillance and intervention increasingly infringed upon and consumed 
the public sphere over the course of the 1790s. McCann argues that the Two Acts in 
particular ‘attempted to effectively dismantle the infrastructures of the public sphere – 
freedom of speech, of the press and of association’.325 Public spaces, from taverns to 
coffee-houses to market squares, became a primary target for informers. Radicals of all 
stripes voiced fears over the unwelcome intrusion of spies into these spaces, 
eavesdropping on and interfering in meetings, personal conversations, intimate 
moments shared with friends and relations and statements made in relaxed and convivial 
company. It was argued that frightened citizens would no longer dare to freely speak 
their minds for fear of being reported by informers, while the consumption of alcohol 
would pose another threat on account of its loosening of the tongue and faculties. Inns 
and coffee-houses would suffer from a constrained atmosphere and a possible loss of 
trade, while, as the lawyer Felix Vaughan observed, good citizens ‘ought to look 
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around’ and carefully monitor their speech even amongst friends or in their own home 
lest there be a ‘spy, or an informer…within hearing’.326 One radical pondered  
What liquor can flow to inspire hilarity, promote mental relaxation, expand the heart, and 
elevate the soul by friendly communications, in the presence of concealed spies, informers, 
and perjurers; every little society must disperse…and the publican be reduced to the dismal 
visitation of having no customers, but gentlemen billetted by the constable. 
For alas ‘Had not every advantage been taken of words spoken in a drunken frolic, by 
the testimony of hired spies and informers, and numbers prosecuted to infinite damage 
and ruin?’327 
Indeed radical opinions had increasingly been viewed by many of the public and state 
authorities as outrageous, unwelcome and potentially criminal; liable to find the speaker 
hauled before a local magistrate on an often flimsy and/or twisted charge of sedition. 
Holcroft perceptively summed up the lamentable state of affairs:  
Every county assize and quarter sessions condemned some poor ignorant enthusiast to 
imprisonment, for follies at which infancy and idiotism scarcely could have taken fright; and 
men of respectable characters and honest intentions, in the fury of their new-born zeal, thought 
it a heroical act of duty to watch the conduct of their very intimates, excite them to utter what 
have been opprobriously called seditious and treasonable words, and afterwards to turn 
informers against the intemperance they had provoked.
328
 
Knox complained that spies would pick up on some ‘incautious comment’ and ensure 
that it was ‘carried to the agent of despotism, who, like the tiger, thirsting for human 
blood, lies watching for his prey in the covert of obscurity’.329 Citizens were no longer 
deemed safe in public environments, and McCann concludes that for radicals 
the extent to which existing modes of pubic interaction and opinion formation were seen as 
complicit with popular violence, mass indoctrination and forms of government-sponsored 
repression encouraged a paranoid retreat from the public sphere and a corresponding 
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valorization of private space as the site of uncoerced communality and the ideal speech 
community.
330
 
However they were to find little more comfort in the private realm than they had 
experienced in the public.  
McCann notes that in the eighteenth century, ‘the private was transformed into a 
sentimentalized tableau that stabilized a specific mythology of rational, harmonious 
communal existence’.331 This understanding of a protected and wholesome private 
space where citizens could speak and mingle free from public intrusion shaped the 
radical understanding and critique of the state’s alleged infringement upon this 
sanctified realm. Radicals argued that private life would be compromised and infringed 
upon as a result of the new emphasis on surveillance, destroying the customs and 
conventions that traditionally protected a citizen’s private affairs from unsolicited 
observation, and instead encouraging and sanctioning the intrusion of outsiders and the 
betrayal of confidences. The threat posed directly by the potential presence of spies and 
informers was not the only cause of concern. The perceived rise of a culture and 
atmosphere geared towards watchfulness, suspicion and spying, demonstrated by the 
wealth of stories and articles abounding from the period regarding spy scares, 
suspicious behaviour and the activities of informers, was also criticised as being an 
inevitable and undesirable result of the government’s policies.332 While Thelwall 
believed that ‘The police is organized into a complete system Espionage, and spies and 
informers are marshalled and stationed in every district’, government and loyalist agents 
were not the only threat. It was now also the case that ‘in every class and situation of 
society are to be found daring banditti who act…upon the maxim promulgated from the 
treasury bench’, eager to pry into the private affairs of fellow citizens.333  
Burke, again quoted by Erskine, had argued that in such conditions  
The seeds of destruction are sown in civil intercourse and in social habitudes. The blood of 
wholesome kindred is infected. The tables and beds are surrounded with snares. All the means 
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given by Providence to make life safe and comfortable, are perverted into instruments of terror 
and torment.
334
 
Erskine himself spoke of ‘the misery and disgrace of society’ when it existed ‘under the 
lash of informers, running before the law, and hunting men through the privacies of 
domestic life’.335 Thelwall argued that it was the role of the authorities to maintain the 
tranquillity and security of private life, for ‘the magistrate should protect every man in 
the enjoyment of his lawful privileges’. Yet instead the state now chose to order, permit 
and reward violations and intrusions upon the private, so that ‘our persons have no 
security’.336 The orator lamented that ‘even our own houses and our own tables furnish 
no longer a sanctuary and an altar where it is safe to offer the free incense of friendly 
conversation…In short, every key hole is an informer’.337 As Barrell explains, the 
loyalist associations were believed to be the chief instruments of these breaches of 
domestic quiet, for ‘they constituted a usurpation of the powers of government, 
undertaken with the government’s full consent, even connivance’.338 Pigott bewailed 
that 
there now exists an association…formed for the express purpose of encouraging and 
rewarding these miscreants [informers],…who annoy us in every quarter, who usurp a 
controul over our very amusements and conversations, however innocent or rational they may 
be, who debauch the fidelity of our servants, and prying into the inmost secrets and actions of 
families and of individuals, striking at every thing most dear in society, at the expense of 
honesty, good faith, hospitality, and domestic quiet, are only anxious…to display their venal 
and malignant zeal…
339
 
As Pigott noted, servants were now likewise perceived as the potential tools of state 
surveillance and repression, with Fox fearing that ‘The servant who stood behind his 
chair, if wicked enough, might betray him, and, seduced by those in power, might give 
information which would endanger both his liberty and his life.’340   
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In their invasion of privacy, a particularly important issue was the perceived threat spies 
posed to mutual trust and expectations of confidentiality and intimacy between friends, 
family and colleagues. Regarding our period, Habermas has argued that  
In the intimate sphere of the conjugal family privatized individuals viewed themselves as 
independent even from the private sphere of their economic activity – as persons capable of 
entering into “purely human” relations with one another.
341
 
The apparent infringement of this convention was raised repeatedly by radical orators 
and writers, for the ability to trust and talk candidly with their fellows was paramount to 
their plans to achieve political reform. Richard Lee asked:  
shall Englishmen, grown jealous of each other, dread to express their sense of wrongs, even to 
their closest intimates, from an apprehension that…their friend they may find a spy, set to 
watch over them for the worst of purposes?  
Such a society was worse than ‘savage nature’, a scene of ‘prostituted humanity’.342 
John Cartwright also queried ‘must Englishmen now, instead of the blessing of social 
and manly intercourse, have the curse of spies and betrayers, and false accusers?’343 
One radical writer argued that due to the increase in anonymous accusations and reports, 
‘the pleasing confidence of friendship and the domestic enjoyments of life, were 
poisoned by the introduction of a general system of suspicion and distrust’.344 Such 
confidence was vital to the continuance of frank and intellectual discussion and the 
preservation of trust and security in relationships, yet it appeared that the government 
and its loyalist allies cared little about such issues and their culpability in perpetuating 
them.   
One notable bone of contention regarding space was the coffee-house. These were 
believed to be places where people of all ranks could discuss a wide variety of issues, 
including politics, for it was assumed that, as Barrell notes, ‘the participants in coffee-
house conversation agreed that the space of conversation was a private space’.345 
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Therefore, even though the house was open to all and thus a public space, the 
conversations held within were, as Habermas states, ‘Included in the private realm’, for 
‘it was a public sphere constituted by private people’.346 Yet, as Barrell argues, the 
alarm about sedition in the early 1790s meant that now for many ‘the duty to divulge 
what was spoken in coffee houses must have seemed greater than the duty to respect the 
private terms of conversation’.347 At John Frost’s 1793 trial for speaking seditious 
words in a coffee-house, Erskine argued that coffee-house conversation remained a 
private space, and therefore the words spoken as mere opinions or thoughts must not be 
reported as ‘the objects of criminal justice, because the happiness and security of social 
life, which are the very end and object of all law and justice, forbid the communication 
of them’. Informers had no right to eavesdrop on, intervene in and report such 
conversations, as this constituted a breach of manners, decency and convention. Only 
‘criminal intention’, and not ‘indecent levities’ or even ‘grave opinions unconnected 
with conduct, are to be exposed to the magistrate’; only then does ‘the public duty call 
for the violation of the private’.348 Scott, acting for the crown, vehemently disagreed. 
While he concurred with Erskine that private confidences should be respected, he 
argued that a coffee-house is definitively a public space in its entirety, and therefore 
Frost was ‘not entitled to the protection that belongs to the confidences of private 
life’.349 Under this interpretation, the informer was simply doing their duty in reporting 
a seditious and unlawful intention made manifest in a public space. Areas of privacy 
within a public space simply did not exist. The jury appears to have agreed with Scott, 
and coffee-houses and taverns remained the active hunting grounds of informers 
throughout the 1790s.
350
  
In the bigger picture what radicals were fighting against was a politicising and 
securitizing of areas previously held to be private and beyond the limits of state and 
public intrusion. As Barrell argues, the loyalist and government intrusion into the 
private affairs of radicals, ostensibly for reasons of security and order, combined with 
the inevitable radical response, moved the reform debate into ‘Activities and spaces 
which had previously been thought to be private, in the sense not just that they were 
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“outside” politics, but were, by general agreement, positively insulated from it’.351 
Radicals believed that the corruption inherent in the public sphere and eighteenth-
century politics must be prevented as much as possible from entering into and damaging 
private affairs. However the government’s actions in increasing surveillance and 
investigation did just the opposite, for, as Knox argued, they ‘teach men to carry the 
profligacy of public characters and conduct into the sequestered walks of private 
life…They destroy at once the confidential comforts and the most valuable virtues of 
private life’.352 Such actions replaced honesty with deception, trust with suspicion, and 
neighbourly concern with fretful surveillance.
353
 
Traditions 
Part of the radical case against the government’s use of spies, informers and increased 
police forces was the quintessentially British argument that the encouragement and use 
of such personnel was foreign to the national character, and to traditional means of law 
enforcement, state intervention and the preservation of order. In the 1790s the creation 
of a large fully-professional police force was still over three decades away, and outside 
of London local magistrates could rely only on a few unpaid constables. Even the police 
forces in London as described in Chapter Two were small and thus limited in their 
ability to patrol such a large city. Nonetheless these forces and the increased use of 
constables in the provinces drew the ire of the radicals, who viewed their presence as an 
unwarranted and potentially corrupt intrusion on civil liberties.
354
 Thelwall argued that 
the police were a French appropriation, created ‘under pretence of keeping the peace, 
but in reality, I believe, for the express purpose of organizing the system of spies and 
informers’.355 
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The history of informers in England is more problematic. Their use as a means of law 
enforcement has been enshrined in statutes since at least the fourteenth century, and 
their existence in society and use in enforcing a wide range of laws have until recently 
been fluctuating but ever-present features of English life throughout the centuries. 
Informers have never been popular, and the occupation was widely viewed as being fit 
only for those devoid of integrity, status and good character. This was particularly true 
when informers targeted laws or regulations that found little favour with the people, 
such as the notorious Gin Acts of the 1730s. Communities, industries and criminal 
networks frequently closed ranks against informers, defying all attempts to penetrate 
them and ostracising, assaulting or even murdering those who dared to try. Warner and 
Ivis describe instances in 1730s London in which ‘informers were dragged along the 
streets or were forced to march in a procession’, and one in which an informer was ‘set 
upon an Ass…whilst others beat and pelted him, leading him up and down Bond-
street’.356 In 1771 the informer Daniel Clark was murdered by Spitalfields weavers. One 
of the offenders claimed that Clark had been ‘thirsting after their Blood not thro’ any 
motive of Justice but mearly for Reward’. The crime was thus justified and it was 
claimed that  
We are now satisfied having put an End to the existence of that Monster in human Shape, the 
fear of whom kept several families in a starving Condition by keeping them from their 
principal Support thro the Apprehension of being Informed against.
357
 
       
Despite these failings, generally even amongst radicals it was believed that informers 
were sometimes necessary to enforce the law, especially when directed against violent 
criminals. Colquhoun, despite his admission that ‘many dissolute characters have taken 
up this trade, seldom with a view to benefit the public’, nonetheless maintained that 
common informers were ‘indispensably necessary to the execution of the laws’.358 
While often unpopular, the role of “thief-taker” was carried out successfully in a semi-
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professional capacity by some enterprising individuals, and common informers 
remained an ongoing feature of English society.
359
 It was the political informer and the 
politicising of informers that were the main targets of radical wrath. The distinction 
between government or loyalist spies and common informers allowed the radicals to 
describe the former as distinctly “un-English”, despite their prevalence during previous 
episodes of unrest such as the Jacobite rebellions.
360
 The political informer was viewed 
as an even more unwelcome and illiberal innovation than their common colleague, a 
product of securitization prone to bias, unscrupulous behaviour, increased intrusiveness 
and a penchant for swearing whatever magistrates or ministers wanted them to. For as 
Fox noted such spies were often ‘blind dupes of the folly, or unconscious instruments of 
the wicked policy of ministers’.361 Fox was willing to concede that there were some 
‘useful and meritorious spies’, while one letter-writer proposed that they could be 
employed in a manner that fostered ‘an interest in the truth and exactness of the 
information they give’.362 Robinson speculated that in a country  
where law is the actual manifestation of the general will, and where the executive power is but 
the instrument to fulfil and to accomplish it;- there the profession of a public informer would 
be honourable and useful… 
Yet he recoiled with ‘utmost abhorrence’ from ‘the man who gains a vile subsistence by 
catching at the indiscreet but zealous and well-meant effusions of a reforming fellow-
citizen; by torturing every hasty expression into sedition or treason’.363 Informers had 
no business reporting and censoring the opinions and political activities of others. For 
liberals like Fox and Robinson, the issue lay not with the basic role of the informer, but 
rather the manner in which they were used and encouraged by the current government, 
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increasing their threat to liberty, security and justice. They therefore believed that a 
change in the latter would improve the respectability and utility of the former, removing 
the informer from the political and securitized realms, reducing the incentive to 
exaggerate and deceive, and making the task more attractive to a better class of 
citizens.
364
  
In radical minds the correct role of state surveillance and law enforcement was to 
protect society from legitimate criminal threats to life, security and property, operating 
primarily in a reactive rather than proactive capacity. While some central state 
involvement was conceded as necessary, radicals believed that competent local 
magistrates, assisted by a minimal number of agents and constables, should retain their 
long-standing role as the primary means of enforcing law and order. Centralised nation-
wide surveillance and law enforcement institutions were rejected, as were any increase 
in or reshaping of the use of spies and informers, and had radicals been aware of the 
secret service system of the late 1790s they would almost certainly have condemned it 
as a draconian, unnecessary and un-British affront to rights, liberty and privacy, 
incompatible with the limited liberal state they championed. It was not that national 
security was unimportant, but rather that the securitization of radicalism was regarded 
as a false or phony pretext for an unfounded and self-aggrandising  increase in the size, 
structures and scope of the security forces at the state’s disposal.    
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Chapter Four - Conclusions 
‘(T)his society have beheld with rising indignation, proportioned to the enormity of the 
evil, the late rapid advances of despotism in Britain; the invasion of public security; the 
contempt of popular opinion; and the violation of all those provisions of the constitution 
intended to protect the people against the encroachments of power and prerogative.’365 
– The London Corresponding Society, 11 April 1794 
Radical attempts to counteract their securitization and repression at the hands of 
government and loyalist forces were ultimately unsuccessful, both in the individual 
battlegrounds such as the security services explored above, and in the overall struggle to 
maintain radicalism as an active political agent and achieve long-desired political, social 
and economic reform. In our concluding chapter, I will attempt to answer four 
questions: Why did the Pitt government’s securitizing move against radicalism succeed? 
How effective is the securitization framework as a means of analysing historical 
domestic security issues? What was the impact of the government’s security measures 
upon British society and the security services? What lessons can be learnt from the 
radical response to their securitization? In addressing these questions, it is hoped that we 
may increase our understanding of the factors that effect and facilitate securitization, 
and the impact that a resultant engagement and reconfiguration of the state’s security 
apparatus can have upon the target existential threat and the society in which the 
security threat/response dynamic is carried out. We will also consider the effectiveness 
and limitations of the government’s developing security services, and finally ponder 
some final thoughts on the nature and study of security and its place in the history of the 
1790s. 
Threat Identification 
What conditions, factors, knowledge and actions are necessary or favourable in 
allowing an actor (generally the government) to make a successful securitizing move 
against a domestic political threat? Firstly, the actor must be able to construct a 
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plausible narrative identifying, describing and interpreting the threat and the actions, 
beliefs, intentions and resources of the referent subject in a manner that affirms the 
existential nature of the threat and the need for emergency measures to counter it. As 
seen in our case, conspiracy theory, as a powerful and persuasive denouncing, 
(de)legitimising and explaining agent, is one highly useful way of achieving this, as is a 
systematic attack on the ideology and principles of the target so as to identify its very 
existence as inherently and/or deliberately calculated to threaten the referent object. 
There are other means that may be equally serviceable in constructing a narrative, such 
as an alleged intention to initiate civil war or collude with foreign enemies, but the 
methods utilised by Pitt’s government were particularly well-suited to the terrain, 
context and nature of the radical threat. As discussed in Chapter One, the radical 
conspiracy theory served a number of purposes and facilitated a range of tactics aimed 
at turning radicalism into an insidious existential threat in the public mind. Like the 
government’s alarmism about invasion, disorder and French subversion, the propagation 
of a conspiracy theory effectively tapped into a popular mindset, in this case one highly 
receptive to notions of secrecy, guiding forces, hidden agendas and definitive 
expositions.  
However while conspiracy theories and fears of hidden forces are powerful securitizing 
agents in their own right, they have a far greater impact on the audience if they are 
attached to particular persons. This is the second point – that a threat should ideally be 
attributable to particular persons or at least a particular group or organisation. While the 
identified persons may not be considered as the ultimate leaders of a plot or conspiracy, 
they nonetheless serve as a useful reference point and object of denigration for the 
relevant audience. They also demonstrate the actor’s ability to counter the threat, while 
if necessary allowing a simultaneous belief in continuing conspiratorial powers behind 
the scenes. As Cubitt argues, 
Conspiracist discourse…oscillates between a preoccupation with exposure of individual 
guilt…and the interpretive mapping of sinister patterns in history and current affairs, in which 
emphasis is placed on the deceptiveness of surface appearances and the binary character of a 
reality shaped by the confrontations of good and evil…
366
 
Identifying and combating the “face” of a threat allows an actor to pose as a proactive 
champion against the forces of evil and destruction. It therefore follows that those so 
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identified are generally chosen on the basis of their accessibility, tangibility, status, poor 
reputation and character, and the ability of the securitising actor to prove, remove and 
punish their involvement in threatening activity. In the early 1790s the London-based 
LCS and SCI were singled-out by the government as the leaders of the treasonous 
radical conspiracy, supported by a myriad of societies in other areas, while later in the 
decade the various United groups were identified as responsible for a clandestine plot. 
In the case of the former, their size, organisation, notoriety, status, guiding principles, 
composition and novelty made them ideal targets as an identifiable front for the radical 
threat, while the latter were presented as the domestic arm of an international 
conspiracy, and a vindication of earlier warnings. Individual leaders were also effective 
as representatives of the threat, especially well-known figures like Thomas Paine, Horne 
Tooke, Thelwall and O’Connor, although more obscure individuals like Hardy and 
Coigly were also serviceable if solid evidence of their guilt could be brought against 
them.  
Thirdly, it is extremely useful if the target threat can be linked to support for and/or 
from a disliked or hostile foreign actor. Alleged connections with a major power such as 
the Soviet Union or an international terrorist organisation have ably filled this role in 
recent times. In our case, government and loyalist attempts to allege radical collusion 
with French republicans bore much fruit in convincing the public of the subversive and 
destructive nature of radicalism. The descent of the French Revolution into terror, 
violence and chaos, coupled with the declaration of war between Britain and France in 
February 1793, were significant blows to the radical cause, and key components of the 
government’s securitizing strategy against it. Without these events, it is unlikely that the 
government could have succeeded in presenting radicalism as an existential threat 
requiring an emergency response, nor in maintaining the securitization and repression of 
radicalism for so many years.  Public and parliamentary resistance to increased 
executive power and intrusiveness would presumably have been stronger in the absence 
of paranoia about invasion and subversion and patriotism inflamed by traditional 
Francophobia and desire to defeat the enemy. Instead, many liberals and radicals were 
trapped between their belief in reform and the need for national defence. The reformer 
Benjamin Flower summed this up in May 1798 when he wrote that ‘It is very difficult 
to say how an honest man, who wishes well to his Country, and who abhors despotism 
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in all its forms, ought to act.’367 Later links with Ireland were also highly effective in 
this regard. The government gained considerable and conclusive mileage in securitizing 
radicalism through the United debacle and the retrospective historicising it facilitated. 
Fifth-column paranoia has been a common feature of many securitizing moves against 
domestic threats, often successful because it magnifies the subject’s potential resources 
and scope for action and plays on popular prejudices, divisions and fears, particularly 
when used in conjunction with conspiracy theories. Indeed such concerns and 
insecurities are vital components of an environment conducive to successful 
securitization. As we have observed, the Pitt government cleverly utilised anti-French, 
anti-Irish and loyalist sentiment, widespread conservatism, divisions of class and 
ideology and fears concerning war, disorder and revolutionary upheaval to isolate 
radicalism and create alarm and prejudice against its actions, principles and ongoing 
existence.  
An actor also needs to be able to identify a suitable referent object. Unless it has 
recourse to excessive force or can claim an overwhelming right to rule, a government 
that is unable to sufficiently disassociate its own interests from those of a suitable 
independent object is unlikely to achieve its desired securitization, for it will almost 
inevitably be conceived as a political, factional or party act rather than one in the 
national interest. The chosen object must be deemed worthy of special protection, which 
in a domestic context generally implies an ideal or institution perceived as necessary for 
the ongoing survival of the state. Buzan notes that in any strong state, its  
ideas and institutions are inseparably intertwined. The idea of democracy or communism is 
useless without the institutions to put it into operation, just as the institutions would be 
pointless, and maybe even impossible, without the idea to give them definition and purpose. 
This interdependence means that institutions and organizing ideologies tend to stand or fall 
together in the context of any particular state…
368
 
In our study, the government wisely used the ideas embodied in the constitution – 
parliamentary sovereignty, limited monarchy and liberalism – and intertwined them 
with the physical institutions of king, parliament and the magistracy as referent objects 
threatened by radicalism. The liberal constitutional idea of the state was welded to 
specific institutions, such that the one could not survive without the other. An attack on 
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either represented an attack on the whole, and therefore posed a threat to the very 
foundations of the state. This was crucial in taking the radical threat beyond the realm of 
the merely political and turning it into a matter of national security, interpreting it as an 
attack not on the interests of the ruling elite but rather on those of the British nation-
state and its people.  
Fifthly, the availability of independent civil support will greatly assist a government 
actor. Such support, be it loyalist, patriotic, nationalist, ideological or self-interested, 
allows the actor to claim substantial backing for their cause, and provides a means of 
presenting additional arguments in its favour and placing pressure on people believed to 
be associated with or supportive of the threatening party. Without it, the actor must 
almost single-handedly convince the whole of its audience from scratch, a decidedly 
more difficult task that also probably robs it of the chance to play on societal divisions 
and tensions. In 1790s Britain, loyalist and government-paid writers, papers and 
associations played a vital and active role in supporting, reinforcing and at times leading 
the securitization and repression of radicalism. Loyalism was not merely an instrument 
of the government, for as Mori states it ‘was an empowering movement that gave its 
followers a public presence and political voice with which to criticize the polity they 
sought to defend’.369 Nonetheless, in matters of security loyalists were powerful if 
occasionally troublesome allies who allowed the government to claim widespread 
public support for its policies and provided it with what Rea has described as ‘a popular 
organisation which could pursue the aims of the Ministry without bearing the burden of 
responsibility which was constitutionally attached to formal organs of 
administration’.370 As early as 1792 Pitt argued that the foundation of the loyalist 
associations would create ‘the Impression and Effect of Numbers on our side’, while 
Loughborough stated that they were ‘highly meritorious, as tending to strengthen the 
hands of Government, and by keeping men upon their guard to prevent the insidious 
designs of their enemies’.371 While the securitization of radicalism was predominantly a 
top-down affair, without the loyalist groundswell of active civil support it is unlikely 
that the government’s moves would have been successful.  
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This brings us to the next point – communication and technologies of imagination. An 
obviously vital component of any securitizing move is the ability to communicate with 
and persuade the relevant audience – in the domestic context generally politicians, 
officials and the common people, and occasionally particular business, class and group 
interests – of the existence of an existential threat. After all, as Buzan et al. point out, 
‘Successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the 
security speech act: Does the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a 
shared value?’372 Even in the modern era of mass communication and media this is not a 
simple task, as the actor must engage with the audience in a manner both engaging and 
persuasive. In our case, the government appealed primarily to parliament and the 
bourgeois public sphere as defined by Habermas – that ‘sphere of private people come 
together as a public’ for the purposes of ‘ration-critical public debate’ and the forming 
of public opinion – but also made efforts to persuade the lower classes by means of 
cheap pamphlets, newspapers and sermons.
373
 It cultivated the public and parliamentary 
imagination both in the mediums and methods it used to communicate its arguments, 
emphasising the scale, novelty, subversiveness, foreignness and immediacy of the 
radical threat. Graham argues that ‘in the counter-offensive launched by the government 
in the winter of 1792-93, the role of propaganda was a crucial factor in rallying loyalist 
opinion’ and ‘establishing their influence’.374 Mori likewise states that ‘Unofficial 
routes through which public compliance with official initiatives could be sought were of 
great use to the governors of a decentralized state’, and indeed the government’s own 
efforts were strongly backed by subsidised and loyalist initiatives.
375
 Together they 
ensured that the securitizing message was clearly articulated and widely disseminated.  
Finally the securitizing actor must claim and demonstrate an ability to combat and 
defeat the existential threat. Failure to do so will result in a loss of confidence in the 
actor and their arguments, and a rise in fear, tension and alarm potentially leading to 
violence, disorder, economic slump and a lack of respect for authority. On the other 
hand, success will contribute to approval of the securitizing move and recognition of the 
need to support the actor in its struggle to overcome the threat. As Evans states, Pitt’s 
government argued that ‘The defence of good order required that conspiracy be 
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unmasked’ and claimed that if granted the necessary extraordinary powers and support, 
it could indeed do so and stem the tide of radical plots and principles.
376
 It then backed 
up this claim with a succession of actions demonstrating its commitment and ability to 
fight the radical menace with the forces placed at its disposal. This willingness to act 
reinforced the government’s proactivity, the gravity of the threat, and the feeling of 
involvement experienced by politicians and public alike. 
In conclusion the government’s securitizing move against radicalism, “upgrading” it 
from a political movement to an existential threat to national security, succeeded 
because it constructed a plausible threat narrative that successfully played on popular 
fears, concerns, beliefs and prejudices; its effort was sustained, multi-faceted and ably 
supported by loyalist works, papers and associations; it identified suitable referent 
objects deemed worthy of protection and preservation; it was carried out in conditions 
conducive to fear, alarm and insecurity; and because, despite a frequent lack of solid 
evidence, the government was able to gather sufficient information, make accusations 
and interpret statements, intentions and events in such a way as to at least cast 
significant doubts, suspicion and unease in the public mind over the potential threat 
posed by radicalism. Despite occasional setbacks and mistakes, the securitization and 
elimination of radicalism was carried out with the requisite force, intelligence, 
conviction and restraint to make it consistently and conclusively acceptable and 
successful. 
Securitization was initially constructed primarily as a model for the study of security in 
international relations. However as I hope this and other emerging studies have 
demonstrated, it also provides the tools and flexibility necessary to undertake an 
insightful and systematic analysis of domestic securitization events. Complications in 
applying the model are more likely to arise from utilising it in too rigid a fashion, rather 
than any inherent flaws in the model itself. However if a significant flaw does exist, at 
least in a domestic context, it may be the model’s insistence that a securitizing move is 
only being made when the actor is attempting to identify a threat as being instantly 
existential. The reality is often not so clear cut, and the fact that a state actor is 
grappling with a perceived threat to security and using it to justify particular measures 
and policies should still warrant classification and examination as a securitization event, 
even if the threat is either not yet identified as existential or the state not yet committed 
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to completely eliminating it by any means necessary. A securitization event can be a 
single effort, such as the identification of another country as an existential threat in 
anticipation of a war, but more often it is a process that develops over time and only 
gradually comes to the point of portraying a referent subject as an existential threat that 
must be eliminated, as is the case in our study. This flaw does not invalidate the entire 
model, nor need it detract from its effectiveness as a model of analysis in domestic 
contexts.  
It is here that the security dispositive, as described by de Graaf and Zwierlein, becomes 
particularly useful. Rather than an attempt to chart a concrete and instrumentalist chain 
of moves and developments culminating in a complete securitization event, in the 
context of a dispositive the securitization model becomes a ‘conceptual tool kit’ in 
which ‘the development and change of…security dispositives can be analysed over 
time’.377 The concepts of actor, object, subject, speech-act, securitizing move and the 
placing of an issue on an elevated and distinct plane are all relevant and useful in 
studying and understanding government security policy and actions, even if they do not 
occur in a linear and systematic fashion or result in a zero-sum outcome. A narrative of 
events or of a particular discourse may still be discerned and described, but it may and 
need not be continuous or cohesive, as was the case with the treasonous conspiracy 
theory. The identification and attempted elimination of an existential threat therefore 
becomes just one possible but still important component of a government’s efforts to 
maintain national security and defend whatever it deems worthy of protection. In our 
case, the government was in fact consistently seeking for a way to eliminate or at least 
marginalise radicalism as an active political force from 1794-99. However as discussed 
in Chapter One the manner in which it attempted to justify its actions and combat the 
threat changed over time in response to circumstances, the shifting nature of the threat 
and the presence of other relevant factors such as the course of the war with France. 
Nonetheless, an analysis of the dispositive surrounding these actions, carefully utilising 
the tools provided by the securitization framework, still allows us to meaningfully 
examine and interpret them not as preordained or isolated steps but as parts of an 
ongoing and uncertain struggle to understand and confront a potential security threat 
increasingly viewed as existential. I therefore believe that the securitization framework 
and security dispositive have a useful place and analytical role not only in security 
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studies, but also in a wide range of other fields, be they political, social, cultural, 
economic or military.          
Threat Response 
The securitization of radicalism justified an increase in security measures and 
surveillance, allowing the government to ramp up its operations without incurring 
significant public or political hostility. While it did not directly facilitate the 
centralisation and systematisation of the late 1790s, alongside the war with France it 
provided the conditions, inspiration and tools necessary for their implementation in 
secret. This expansion and reorganisation of the state’s security services was an 
important landmark in the history of British security and intelligence and a vital 
component of the surveillance, repression and elimination of the radical movement. At 
the start of the decade, the ad hoc, scattered and divided approach to intelligence and 
security was surprisingly effective, given the circumstances. In the absence of a large 
bureaucracy, a strong central government or a specialised intelligence department, the 
methods available to and adopted by the Home Office, London police and county 
magistrates were limited but not without their merits. They demonstrate the value of 
proactive local officials in touch with the affairs and concerns of their people, the 
usefulness of accurate informers paid regularly, the benefits accruing from even a small 
police force if handled well, the profuseness of the post as a source of information, and 
the ability of only a handful of dedicated bureaucrats to make some sense out of a vast 
mass of information. However, the lack of co-ordination and coercive power meant that 
the government was over-reliant on individual magistrates and officials, beset by what 
Hone describes as a ‘tangle of problems’ arising from ‘the strong traditions of local 
autonomy and weak central administration’.378 With no centralised intelligence analysis 
and an excessive dependence on often unreliable spies and informers, the government 
was often unable to determine fact from fiction, or to build an impartial and active 
assessment of the state of the country and the status of potential threats to security. 
Instead, the picture of radicalism the government constructed, while correct in many of 
the details, was tainted by inaccurate information, fear, prejudice, guesswork and lack of 
understanding, resulting in a composition that was flawed, biased and made to fit a 
particular narrative rather than being allowed to speak for itself. This suited the 
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government’s securitizing move as regards the accusations and evidence against 
radicalism, but limited its ability to actually counter the radical threat, undertake 
successful prosecutions and maintain national security.  
By contrast the creation of the Inner Office system demonstrates the significant 
advantages accruing from even a limited centralisation of intelligence and security 
services; improving the quality of incoming information, facilitating the development of 
a relatively specialised, impartial and ongoing intelligence analysis, and forging an 
ability to create strategic assessments, monitor suspects and respond to threats 
manifesting across multiple regions and borders. It also reduced the divide between 
foreign and domestic intelligence, allowing a more accurate and integrated assessment 
of any links between internal and external agents. By the latter part of the 1790s, the 
security services under Wickham, Ford, Portland and their colleagues were operating 
with an unprecedented degree of organisation, centralisation, efficiency and 
professionalism. Sparrow has described it as an ‘expanding foreign and home secret 
service’, creating ‘a complete system of surveillance for suspects, whether British or 
foreign’, while Wells has opined that ‘the regularity and the efficiency of the secret 
service are striking’.379 The intelligence and security weapons at the government’s 
disposal at the start of the decade were far from negligible, but their overhaul 
recognised and responded to the need to confront a new type of threat, one that was 
international in scope and driven by predominantly middle and working class societies 
bound by a shared ideology.  
Despite being weighed down by the baggage of prejudice, county independence, sparse 
resources a minimal police force, the revolutionised intelligence and security apparatus 
highlights the difference between ad hoc unco-ordinated information collection as 
necessitated by circumstances, and an ongoing security service operating a concerted 
policy of surveillance, analysis and threat response. Durey argues that this period 
witnessed ‘the emergence of a functioning intelligence nerve centre within the Alien 
Office that was increasingly proactive rather than reactive’, with the revamped service 
combining a general level of surveillance with a specific targeting of particular threats 
and hotspots in order to achieve their timely elimination and public disparagement.
380
 
The government was now able to gather intelligence that was of equal utility both in 
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securitizing and combating radicalism. The British arm of the United threat was 
carefully monitored, investigated and broken up with a minimum of fuss under the 
direction of a small group of semi-professional officials. The government over-reached 
in putting O’Connor and Binns on trial in 1798, and was shameless in its twisted use of 
intelligence for the purposes of securitization, vindication and propaganda, but 
otherwise it allowed the Inner Office to get on with its job, enabling it to avoid 
unnecessary scandal and the pitfalls of recent years. It maintained a useful network of 
trustworthy agents and informers and a competent grip on security matters and radical 
threats until its disbandment in 1802-03. The identification of radicalism as an 
existential threat had made these innovations, unthinkable at the start of the decade, 
both necessary and acceptable.            
However with the (albeit brief) coming of peace in 1802, the Addington government 
saw no further need for such a centralised system, despite Wickham’s pleas that it could 
adapt itself ‘at once to a State of Peace…and to all opinions and prejudices which a Free 
People jealous of its Liberties may be supposed fairly and rightly to entertain’.381 
Nelson notes that ‘Eighteenth-century statesmen envisioned the central government as 
interfering in local affairs in the natural order of things only when emergencies so 
demanded’, and in 1802-03, with the radical emergency seemingly dispelled, the system 
it spawned was scaled back and central interference in local affairs minimalised.
382
 The 
small London police were retained, but it was another half-century before policing 
became a country-wide affair, and there was no place for an ongoing semi-independent 
domestic secret service. In this case, securitization did not result in a permanent change 
to either the structure or mentality of security governance, but rather facilitated 
predominantly temporary measures to address a particular threat. As in other aspects of 
the repression of radicalism, there were limitations on how far the government was 
prepared to go, both publicly and in secret, in restructuring its security and 
administrative systems. It was willing to increase and diversify its traditional sources of 
investigation and law enforcement – spies, police, agents and militia – in order to 
monitor, investigate and harass a particular group of the population, and to implement a 
proactive central secret service headquarters with improved means of collection, 
analysis and direction, but the actual administrative apparatus of magistrates and 
officials remained unchanged. The Pitt government evidently felt it either unnecessary, 
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unwise or impossible (due to public opinion or available resources) to do anything 
further, and the majority of the primary innovations were scrapped by Addington’s 
ministry. However the disbandment of the key components of the centralised service 
and failure to document their structure and methods meant that much of the specialist 
knowledge and experience acquired during its brief existence was lost and forgotten. 
While some institutional memory and knowledge was most likely retained at least for a 
time, on the whole the Alien Office system proved a short-term experiment whose 
major innovations were not implemented again for over a century. Nonetheless it 
deserves a distinguished place in the history of British intelligence and security, for as 
Sparrow states it was ‘the first comprehensive British secret service in the modern 
sense’, paving the way for later nineteenth and twentieth-century intelligence 
operations.
383
   
The real societal impact of the government’s securitization of radicalism and 
employment of its security services is difficult to judge. Radical rhetoric about 
invasions of privacy, the degradation of morality, family and social breakdown and 
corrupted justice was passionate and in most cases spoken out of a genuine belief that 
surveillance, spies and informers posed a grave threat to such cherished and important 
institutions, but this does not necessarily mean that the reality matched the words.  
Further research would be required to determine whether the government’s actions and 
the prevalence of spies really did result in significant changes to moral values, family 
harmony, respect for privacy, social behaviour and expectations of trust and 
confidence.
384
 However some comments at least can be made on one important area – 
the unprecedented state penetration of and interaction with society and its impact on 
notions of public and private space, law enforcement and security, described by James 
Thompson as ‘the real source of terror in the industrial age of discipline and 
surveillance’.385  
As discussed in Chapter Three, the increase in state surveillance and oppression, and the 
resultant impetuous given to state and self-appointed informers and agents to delve into 
and interfere with the public and private realms, were new and deeply disturbing 
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developments for many radicals and liberals. Radicals were initially optimistic that the 
widening public sphere and growing influence of public opinion would significantly 
benefit their cause. Habermas argues that by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the 
importance of public opinion had reached such heights that  
the public’s involvement in the critical debate of political issues had become organized to such 
an extent that in the role of a permanent critical commentator it had definitively broken the 
exclusiveness of Parliament and evolved into the officially designated discussion partner of 
the delegate.
386
 
However while this assessment may have been somewhat close to the truth at the 
beginning of the 1790s, in the short-term it was not to last or prove as permanent as 
Habermas claimed. Public opinion was certainly a powerful force in the early part of the 
decade, ignored by MPs at their peril. Yet although the bourgeois public sphere, 
inhabited by Foxite Whigs and gentlemen reformers, initially remained relatively open 
to public debate, within reason, the entry of the lower classes into the public realm and 
the construction of public opinion, creating what may be viewed as a “popular sphere”, 
was eventually deemed unacceptable by the government and its supporters. No sooner 
had the public sphere opened to radical and working class discourses and activities, in 
the form of printed works, public and association meetings, lectures and informal 
debates, than it rapidly began to contract again. As the decade progressed it swiftly 
became a dangerous space for the dissemination of radical opinions and arguments, 
inhabited by increasing numbers of spies and informers ever-ready to report, twist, 
exaggerate or fabricate information of interest to the authorities.  
Radicals learned that the public arena was not a place for the free dissemination and 
discussion of ideas, but rather one in which some ideas were more acceptable than 
others, and in which there loomed an ever-present threat of being harassed and 
persecuted by loyalist groups and state officials and reported, correctly or otherwise, for 
sedition, illegal association and other crimes. Even liberal debate was increasingly 
stifled and shut down by the threat of sedition laws, censorship, guilt by association 
with radicalism and the general atmosphere of repression and intransigence. Public 
opinion, both as a by-product of rational-critical debate and the general mood of the 
populace, remained a factor in late 1790s politics, and ministers continued to be wary of 
maintaining public support for their policies and actions. However it had lost much of 
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the dynamism and expressiveness it possessed at the beginning of the decade, and to the 
extent it did exist such opinion had become more a by-product of loyalist and 
government propaganda, alarmism and war rhetoric, described by McCann as ‘a form of 
administered consciousness’387, than any genuine manifestation of public concerns and 
open debate.
388
   
Worse still in radical eyes, privately-held opinions, whether given in conversations in 
public places or in the truly private setting of the home or closed meeting, were now fair 
game for informers to eavesdrop on and report to the authorities, who could choose to 
act if they felt such opinions to be seditious or otherwise illegal. This invasion of the 
private was not directly sanctioned or advocated by the government, but it was given 
tacit approval and encouragement by the government’s willingness to reward and act on 
relevant information however obtained, and by statements emphasising the need to hunt 
and persecute radicalism wherever it may be found. Barrell states that it was believed 
among radicals that ‘The fence which had once divided private from public space had 
been removed, and space traditionally regarded as private was redefined as public as 
soon as it was used for the discussion of public affairs.’389 While some examples do 
exist, such as those of Walker and Thomas Muir, the true prevalence of spies and 
surveillance in the private domain cannot be determined, although the radical fears were 
most probably disproportionate with the reality. Nonetheless these fears were genuine, 
and such fears were in themselves likely to be damaging to personal relations. They also 
accord with the broader politicisation of the private in the 1790s described by Barrell in 
The Spirit of Despotism, in which ‘almost any space or topic could become the subject 
of political conflict, even those that might seem too trivial, too quotidian, too far 
removed from politics to be susceptible to being politicized’.390 Securitization was 
simply an extra impetus for this opening of the private, for the tavern corner, work 
space, dinner table and even the cottage hearth were now considered the potential 
breeding grounds of sedition, conspiracy and other threats to national security, thus 
becoming legitimate and necessary places for surveillance and investigation.    
                                                         
387
 McCann, Cultural Politics in the 1790s, p. 61. 
388
 Ibid., pp. 59-144; Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, pp. 27-67. 
389
 Barrell, The Spirit of Despotism, p. 8. 
390
 Ibid., p. 15 & passim. See also James Thompson, ‘Surveillance in William Godwin’s Caleb Williams’, 
pp. 173-92. 
 Securing the Nation 121 
 
 
Centralised security and intelligence services also resulted in changes to state-society 
relations, for although it did not significantly alter the daily activities and 
responsibilities of local magistrates, the communication of greater quantities of 
information to a single office and instructions flowing in the opposite direction 
increased the state’s knowledge of the affairs of its citizens and its direct involvement in 
their lives, be it in the form of spies passing on information, informers denouncing 
seditious words and publications, or Bow Street Runners and state officials sent to 
conduct investigations and co-ordinate operations. Despite what Wells describes as a 
‘lack of constitutional clarity and legality surrounding the growth of the intelligence 
system’, increased surveillance, repressive legislation, prosecution, and the practice of 
pre-emptive and preventive security made it more likely that citizens, particularly if 
involved in political and/or public affairs, would come to the attention of agents of the 
state, particularly in the towns and cities.
391
 This was especially the case in London, 
where, as Nelson notes,  
The mounting fear of radicals, the control over the public offices in the metropolis, [and] the 
use of spying…had drawn the [Home Office] Secretary of State into a more direct part in the 
process of preserving order in London than had ever before been the case.
392
 
The increased interest in domestic surveillance extended to the king himself. In 1799 
Wickham expressed his ‘great surprize’ that he met with the king for ‘three quarters of 
an hour, and the greater part of the questions and observations turned upon the Home 
Office’.393 The security system of the 1790s represented a new if temporary layer of 
contact and interaction between state and citizen, one that presaged but didn’t directly 
lead to later developments in state security and information collection and demonstrated 
the advantages accruing to government from such innovations.
394
  
Threat Reply 
Radical writers and orators certainly gained notable mileage for their cause from their 
fierce attack on the government’s security services and use of spies. However the 
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radical arguments, either on these or other matters, ultimately failed to convince the 
public of the need to reject the government’s securitizing move and support the radical 
cause, or to dissuade the government from continuing its securitizing moves and 
measures. It is argued here that in order for a referent subject to successfully counter a 
securitizing move in a domestic context, they must be able to prove either that their 
cause is irresistible – that it should be permitted and/or implemented regardless of the 
risks involved – or that they do not pose a threat commensurate with that alleged by the 
securitizing actor, and as such the extraordinary and repressive actions proposed by the 
actor constitute a risk of damage to society, state, liberty and security unjustified by the 
hazards posed by the threat itself – in other words, that the ends do not justify the 
means. Radicalism failed both in selling the case for urgent reform and in countering the 
government’s claims that it posed an existential threat necessitating extraordinary 
measures to eliminate it. 
A couple of points may first be made on the deficiencies and misconceptions in the 
radical arguments against spies, informers and surveillance. While many radical 
arguments about the corruption of justice, extension of state power and degradation of 
communities by immoral spies and invasive magistrates contained much truth; on some 
issues it was clear to many that their arguments were exaggerated, inaccurate or 
disingenuous. Despite radical claims to the contrary, not all government sources were 
spies, nor was all evidence from spies and informers inaccurate or deceptive. The 
government was not as biased and incompetent in their collection and analysis of 
information and evidence as some radicals believed. As Thompson argues, ‘It was in the 
interests of magistrates to obtain accurate information. They disliked being sent on 
fool’s errands after non-existent depots of arms, or wasting their time in pursuit of 
tavern demagogues.’395 Senior ministers were indeed deeply suspicious of radicalism 
and increasingly of the opinion that it was best to eradicate it altogether as an active 
movement. However while this definitely coloured and prejudiced their approach to the 
surveillance, investigation and prosecution of the societies and later the clandestine 
United groups, it does not mean that they were deliberately intent on securing or 
manufacturing incriminating evidence by any means necessary, or that their perceptions 
of radicalism were entirely without foundation. Attempting to build a solid case for 
treason from the available evidence is not the same as constructing one prima facie. Nor 
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were they incompetent or callous in their methods of information collection and 
analysis. High-grade intelligence was vital in allowing the government to make correct 
decisions, and Durey states that the Inner Office in particular functioned as a repository 
and analytical centre for ‘strategic information, to assist in formulating policy and to 
help to answer major political questions’, such as ‘the prospects of rebellion in Ireland’, 
and the existence ‘of conspiratorial links between Ireland, Britain and France’.396 
The Home Office was aware of the need to treat the information it received with caution 
and an understanding of the context and nature of its sources. For the most part it sought 
out sources that were reliable and trustworthy, and as we have seen attempts were made 
throughout the decade to improve the collection and analysis of information. 
Nonetheless it is inevitable that the government’s extensive reliance on and projected 
expectations of spies and informers shaped its perceptions and beliefs on the nature of 
radicalism and the state of the country, and it is undoubtedly true that at times the 
government simply sought or interpreted information to suit its own paranoia, 
preconceptions and agenda, rather than allowing it to speak for itself. While the 
government did not deliberately employ perjurers, liars and agents provocateurs, on 
some occasions it failed to look closely at the actions of its spies, accepting and 
trumpeting their favourable evidence on almost face value and disregarding proper 
caution and analysis. It is also true that on occasion the government knowingly misled 
the public and parliament about radicalism, above and beyond its securitizing spin, 
perhaps most notably in the secret committee report of 1799. Ultimately though it 
appears that the government’s use of spies was primarily pragmatic – it was deemed 
necessary to monitor and investigate radical activity and the employment of spies and 
informers was seen as the best and principal means of achieving this, regardless of the 
drawbacks such methods entailed. Sedition and treason were soon suspected amongst 
the societies and evidence sought to confirm and prove this belief correct. Hone sums 
this up by stating that  
The government had certain assumptions and relied on its particular “channels of authentic 
information”. Results had been obtained by probing in certain directions, and these tended to 
determine future investigations.
397
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This interpretation tallies with some aspects of radical discourse on the government’s 
handling of spies and security, but clearly differs on others. 
Viewed as a whole, the radicals’ arguments against the state’s security services may 
perhaps be best understood as a form of counter-securitization, often employing the 
same language and techniques as their opponents to define the government’s institutions 
and actions as an inquisition against free thought and action posing grave and 
unwarranted threats to the referent objects of justice, privacy, liberty, community, 
morality, tradition, social relations and individual and collective security. However, as 
in other areas, the radicals lost the battle over security. Undoubtedly the government’s 
suspension and severe curtailment of a number of protections and liberties in the 
interests of national security did indeed constitute a loss of freedom and individual 
security. As Buzan notes,  
While the state provides some security to the individual, it can only do so by imposing 
threats…Although they are powerfully balanced by the domestic and external security which 
the state provides, these threats, and therefore the contradiction between individual and 
national security, are unavoidable.
398
 
In 1790s Britain individuals, particularly those of radical leanings, were exposed to a 
greater risk of arrest and indefinite imprisonment, personal and financial loss, threats to 
their health and well-being, increased surveillance and breaches of privacy. They had 
reduced recourse to assistance from the law, the authorities and supportive organisations 
should they find their security infringed upon, and the institutions of justice, community 
and morality were all to some degree compromised by the state’s actions. As Graham 
concludes, the government’s policies inaugurated ‘a period of persecution and 
manipulation of law at the local and national level which…had its closest precedent, as 
many contemporaries remarked, in the reign of the Stuarts’.399 
Yet the lack of open dissent in the late 1790s suggests that the majority of the British 
people tolerated these infringements and negative impacts, either because they accepted 
the government’s securitizing argument that national security was at grave risk from 
radicalism, and, thus being either apathetical or opposed to the radical cause, believed 
that the government’s measures were appropriate to the circumstances, being genuinely 
and for the most part accurately targeted only at those who threatened the interests and 
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security of the state; or because they felt themselves to be too cowered, powerless or 
insufficiently concerned to oppose the government’s actions. Supporters could argue 
that while the overhauled security services did expand the state’s ability to monitor and 
investigate all its citizens, it also increased the accuracy and reliability of its 
intelligence, making it more likely that the correct suspects were targeted and 
prosecuted successfully. Any collateral damage was therefore tolerable – a justified 
imposition on individual security to contain a specific threat and ensure collective 
survival and prosperity, rather than the radical depiction of a general assault on 
individual rights and liberties and an aggrandisement of state power under the phony 
pretext of national security. Furthermore, many people evidently either accepted the 
government’s argument that the eventual lapse of radicalism into dangerous 
revolutionary underground cells was a product of radical ambitions rather than state 
repression, or acknowledged the need to contain the new threat regardless of its 
provenance. Therefore throughout the 1790s the elite either supported the government 
or remained neutral in the face of war and security scares; while a majority of the 
middle classes were convinced that the security provided by the military and repressive 
efforts of the government to their current financial, material and political possessions 
outweighed any concurrent loss of personal security and liberty. Even the working 
classes were divided on the key issues, a fact bearing out the strength of the 
government’s position. 
In sum, a strongly-backed securitizing move against a grand existential threat to 
national security, requiring concerted action to defeat it, triumphed over a counter-
argument denying the existence of such a threat and condemning the impact and 
implications of the actor’s actions as unjustified and unacceptable. Given the 
government’s sound use and exploitation of the advantages identified earlier in this 
chapter, it is little wonder that despite occasional hiccups over failed trials and 
embarrassing revelations it was ultimately successful in its securitizing move against 
radicalism. In such adverse conditions, radicals lacked a sufficient platform to match the 
government’s reach and influence over their target audience – the British public and 
parliamentarians. This was especially true post-1795, for by that stage ongoing 
prosecutions, persecution and legislative reforms had crippled their ability to engage 
and persuade the public, and this surely contributed to the decline of radicalism and the 
increasing strength and success of the government’s move. In classifying radicalism as 
an existential threat securitization robbed it of a legitimate place in the national political 
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debate, ensuring that the radical arguments advancing their cause and combating the 
government’s actions were either disregarded or dismissed.  
National (In)Security 
Security – individual, collective and national – is an ever-present factor of state and 
society. As an inter-subjective entity, it is as potent in the realm of perception and 
imagination as it is in tangible reality, making it an ideal means of political justification. 
Securitization is an act of labelling, empowering and othering, designed to influence and 
define people’s beliefs, perceptions and collective consciousness, identify particular 
groups and ideologies as intolerable, increase state power and sanction acts of 
repression, violence, surveillance, restriction and ostracism. As such, it is both powerful 
and potentially dangerous, used as much to coerce and oppress as to protect. With such 
significant contemporary and future consequences, the study of security from both 
empirical and theoretical perspectives is a vital and important area of research and 
analysis. In contributing to this pool of knowledge and analysis, this study has sought to 
demonstrate that the securitization model and security dispositive are important and 
highly useful means of examining and understanding not only contemporary 
international security events and issues but also historical and domestic ones, enriching 
our understanding of the past and ability to analyse, interpret and critique the present.  
In the 1790s Pitt’s government was convinced that democratic reform was untimely. In 
the unsettled circumstances of the time it was not content to address radicalism as 
merely a political or ideological issue. Instead it portrayed radicalism as an existential 
threat to national security, unworthy of a place in active political and civil society. 
However the government, while far from democratic, was not authoritarian, and it 
existed in an age and society in which public opinion, particularly that of the upper and 
middle classes, was an important factor in permitting and shaping the implementation of 
government policies. Therefore, the securitization of radicalism and the resultant 
measures to repress it and reform the security services required securitizing moves to 
convince both public and parliament of their necessity and efficacy. Applying the 
securitization model to this dispositive has allowed us to unpack and analyse the various 
components of these moves, and to understand why the government successfully chose 
security as a key platform for ostracising and confronting radicalism, and why it utilised 
particular arguments and discourses in projecting its interpretation of the radical threat. 
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It also reveals the intimate links between this securitization and the reshaping of the 
state’s security services, explaining the significant but limited and ultimately temporary 
changes to their mentality, structure and methods, and the importance of these measures 
in identifying and defeating threats to security.  
Finally, the radical response to these measures opens a new window into radical 
ideology and discourse, particularly regarding the contested grounds of security and 
state-citizen relations. For radicals, state measures to protect and enforce national 
security gravely weakened individual and collective security, and contesting these 
measures required efforts to convince the public that the realities of these infringements 
on security and liberty outweighed imagined threats to national security. However the 
government won both this argument and the struggle for political supremacy, and it is 
perhaps fitting to close with the observation that this was a victory achieved as much by 
word as by deed. As radicals learned to their cost, spoken security is the foundation for 
action, and it is in the discourses of security dispositives that notions of threat, safety, 
reverence and response are created, argued, disseminated and initiated. In this regard, no 
less than their political legacy, the story of the 1790s radicals and their government and 
loyalist opponents continues to hold valuable lessons for us today.    
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